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This dissertation considers some features of language in
relation to Piaget's account of class inclusion, the 'decisive test'
of a fundamental ability in any theory of cognitive development: the
child's ability to classify.
Noticing a general disparity between the results of Piaget's
studies of class inclusion: which suggest that the child cannot
function on a complex cognitive level until about age 8 years when
the solution of such inclusion problems is customarily observed, and
recent studies of language acquisition: which suggest that the child
can function on a complex linguistic level from about age 4- years,
it is suggested that such phenomena in one and the same individual
appear conceptually discomfiting.
It is then noted that although Piaget discounts any fundamental
relationship between the child's linguistic and cognitive abilities
in relation to the problem of inclusion, his studies have neverthe¬
less employed language as a vehicle for inquiry. While this implies
examination of the role of language by varying appropriate
linguistic aspects of class inclusion tasks, there appears no way of
deciding, a priori, which linguistic aspects might be appropriately
varied.
Due to the lack of an established literature on this question,
the problem is approached indirectly by turning to studies in the
psychology of language where considerable attention has recently
(ii)
been drawn to the importance of language structure (syntax). However
the results of four experiments suggest the relatively greater
importance ofsemantic aspects of language which reflect features of
language use in discourse.
When attention i3 drawn to semantic aspects of class inclusion,
four anomalies in Piaget's account of inclusion can be noticed. In
an attempt to reduce these anomalies, the results of twelve
experiments on class inclusion are presented. These experiments
suggest that the child's difficulties with inclusion problems do not
arise through cognitive inability to compare class and subclass (as
is suggested in Piaget'3 account), but rather through difficulties
with the language associated with class inclusion problems. The
child appears to use the language in a way different from the adult,
and the way in which the child uses the language can be seen to be a
function of context, type of utterance, and, especially, clarity of
reference of terms employed in utterances.
Besides specific implications for the problem of class inclusion
itself, the studies reported in this dissertation would seem to have
some wider implication for studies which employ language as a vehicle
for inquiry into cognitive abilities, and for studies of semantic
development.
In sum, the dissertation concludes that an understanding of
any relationships between linguistic and cognitive abilities in the
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Language and cognition have long been sources of fascination,
and the present century has witnessed their study both within and
between apparently separate disciplines such as philosophy,
psychology and linguistics. For example, it has been proposed
that consideration of the nature of language alleviates
philosophical perplexity (Wittgenstein, 1953); that consideration
of language provides insight into the working of the human mind
(Chomsky, 1958); that the particular language we possess determines
the way in which we think (Whorf, 1956); that in ontogeny, language
functions as a cognitively ego-centric instrument which becomes
progressively socialized (Piaget, 1926); or as a social instrument
which becomes progressively individualised (Vygotsky, 1962); that
in postulating linguistic grammars we ask whether such grammars
(1)
(2)
could ever be acquired by natural language users (Chomsky, 1957,
1960, 1965); and that before attempting to extend learning theories
fashioned in studies of non-human species to human language
acquisition (as in Skinner, 1957), we explore both the possibility
that human language is unique (species specific) by virtue of the
typical novelty of its utterances (Chomsky, 1959; Lenneberg, 1967),
and that postulation of operant conditioning procedures apparently
excludes language acquisition in young children (Bruner, Goodnow &
Austin, 1956; Galanter, 1966; McNeil, 1966, 1968; Miller 8 Chomsky,
1963; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960).
A varied sample of proposals such as this serves to illustrate
the increasing realization that studies of language and cognition
are closely related, that consideration of the one is often
illuminated by, if not contingent upon, consideration of the other,
regardless of whether our primary interests lie in philosophical,
psychological or linguistic inquiry.
The present dissertation intends to reflect this sort of inter¬
disciplinary concern: while recent studies of linguistic
development suggest that the individual can, from an early age, deal
with the complexity of language, Piagetian studies of cognitive
development suggest that the self-same individual is unable to
handle apparently non-complex cognitive problems until considerably
later in ontogenesis. More specifically, while studies of
language acquisition suggest that the child can handle, with a fair
measure of success, the complexities of morphology and syntax by
age four years (e.g. Berko, 1958; Bellugi S Brown, 1964; Brown, 1965;
(3)
Smith & Miller, 1966), studies of cognitive development concerning
the fundamental ability of classification suggest that the child is
unable to handle the apparently simple problem of class inclusion
before age eight years (Piaget, 1952, 1953; Inhelder & Piaget, 1964)
Such cognitive and linguistic phenomena in one and the same individual
appear conceptually discomfiting, and this dissertation attempts to
explore the possibility that in underestimating the role of language,
studies of cognition may underestimate the individual's cognitive
abilities.
That this may be so is suggested by the observation that Piaget's
investigations of class inclusion have invariably employed language
as a vehicle for study. As previous experiments have established,
language can exert considerable influence on cognitive processes:
the studies, for example, of Luria (1959) on the Pavlovian second
signalling system, or Brovm 8 Lenneberg (1954) on the Whorfian
hypothesis, point to the influence which general features of the
language code may have on cognitive processing, while the studies,
for example, of Carmichael, Hogan & Walter (1932) on the effect of
word-labelling on perceptual recall, or Judson, Cofer & Gelfand (1956)
on the effect of paired-associate learning on problem-sgiving,
indicate the possibility of influence on a more specific level. In
addition, non-verbal studies of reasoning in children tend to confirm
the view that in studies of cognition, the effects of language may
be considerable (e.g. Braine, 1959, 1962)2.
Yet despite this knowledge, little attempt has been made to
consider the effect of linguistic variables associated with Piaget's
(4)
investigations of class inclusion. No doubt this is largely due
to Piaget's disclaimer, detailed in the following chapter, of the
relevance of linguistic abilities to the solution of this
"cognitive" problem. Nevertheless, available evidence on the
relations between language and cognition would appear to render
suspect any inquiry into a cognitive problem via language, which
fails to examine the possible influence of linguistic variables.
It is this which motivates our inquiry, reported in the next three
chapters, into the role of language in the problem of class
inclusion.
Chapter 2
Class inclusion and language
Piaget*s investigations of classification and class inclusion
are reported at length in Piaget (1952), and in Inhelder S Piaget
(1964); useful summaries appear in Beth & Piaget (1966), Donaldson
(1960), Flavell (1963), Hunt (1961) and Piaget (1953); and a brief
outline statement, which serves as a convenient starting point, is
found in Piaget & Inhelder (1969)3:
When children from three to twelve are given a set of
objects and instructed to "put things that are alike
together," their sortings can be divided into three
basic stages. The youngest subjects begin with
"figural collections"; that is, they arrange the
objects not only according to their individual
similarities and differences, but also juxtapose
(6)
them spatially in rows, squares, circles, etc., so that
the collection itself forms a figure in space. This
figure serves as a perceptual or imagined expression of
the "extension" of the class. The second stage is the
stage of non-figural collections; the set is divided
into small groups of elements each without any
particular spatial form and these groups themselves can
even be differentiated into subgroups. The classification
now seems rational (after five and a half or six), but
upon analysis it still betrays lacunae in "extension".
If, for example, in a group B of twelve flowers within
which there is a subgroup A of six primroses, you ask
the child to show first the flowers B and next the
primroses A, he responds correctly, because he can
designate the whole B and the part A. However, if you
ask him, "Are there more flowers or more primroses?" he
is unable to respond according to the inclusion A < B,
because if he thinks of the part A, the whole B ceases to
be conserved as a unit, and the part A is henceforth
comparable only to its complementary A'. He may reply,
therefore, "the same", or, if there are a clear majority
of primroses in the set, he may say that there are more
primroses. The understanding of the relative sizes of
an included class to the entire class is achieved at
about eight and marks the achievement of a genuine
operatory classification.
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 102-103)
(7)
Thus Piaget isolates three main stages in the development of
genuine classificatory behaviour, characterised by the arrangement
of figural collections, non-figural collections, and the formation
of genuine classes. As a genuine ability to classify is held to
rest on the child's ability to negotiate the pons asinorum of class
'i> "•"' 1 1 1 1
inclusion, attention is concentrated on this topic in what follows.
But first the three stages in Piaget's account of the development of
classification can be amplified.
Stage 1 r Figural collections
This stage appears at approximately ages two to five years.
When the stage-1 child is asked to classify a set of presented
objects (e.g. a set of variously coloured geometric shapes), sorting
proceeds << de proche en proche >> : that is, although there is
classificatory behaviour on the basis of similarity of attributes,
this is often unstable and the sorting criteria tend to change as
new objects are added to the collection, with the result that it
loses the characteristics of a class (where all members are
exhaustively classified under constant, common criteria), becoming
what Piaget terms "a figural collection". For example:
FRA (U;0)4 arranges four blue and green rectangles to
form a square enclosure, beneath which he makes a second
enclosure out of five variously coloured squares. (The
child) suddenly adds three circles underneath the
rectangles and squares .. and says, "It's the Eiffel
Tower".
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 29)
(8)
This illustrates one facet of the child's inability to compose
genuine classes: namely, the difficulty in distinguishing a logical
class from an infralogical whole (i.e. a figural collection).
A further, equally important difficulty lies in the child's
inability to co-ordinate class intension (the properties which permit
class membership) and class extension (all objects exhibiting those
properties). In genuine classification these must strictly corres¬
pond, but at this stage one observes lack of this necessary corres¬
pondence. In partitioning a set of square and non-square shapes
for example, the child may begin to classify the squares in one
pile, but either fail to include all squares, or else include non-
squares .
Therefore before the child begins to classify in a mature fashion,
it must distinguish logical from infralogical collections, and
appreciate the necessity for correspondence between class intension
and extension. Complete understanding of this intension-extension
relationship (reflected in the grasp of terms like "some" and "all":
see Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: Chapter 3) does not occur, according to
Piaget, until the third stage of development, even although during
the second stage it may appear from the child's behaviour (including
verbal behaviour) that genuine classification is taking place.
Stage 2 : Non-figural collections
During this second stage of development, occurring from
approximately five to seven years of age, non-figural collections
replace the infralogical wholes of stage-1.
(9)
Here apparently mature classification may be observed for the
child may now exhaustively classify objects on the basis of constant,
common criteria; nevertheless, Piaget insists that the child*s
sorting behaviour results not in the formation of genuine classes,
but rather in what are still, essentially, collections: thus
crediting the child with mature classificatory behaviour is
unwarranted, for it can be shown that the child still suffers from
"lacunae in extension" of the sort illustrated above (p.6). This
is what constitutes the problem of class inclusion, for it is the
understanding of inclusion relationships that "marks the achievement
of a genuine operatory classification" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 103).
Stage 3 : Genuine classes
In the third and final (main) stage of development, occurring
from approximately eight to eleven years of age, arrangement of
non-figural collections is replaced by formation of genuine classes.
In Piagetian terms, the child's thought has become "decentred",
for now the child can not only construct heirarchical classifications,
but in addition comprehend inclusion relations: it can now handle,
simultaneously, the relations between any whole class and its
constituent subclasses (provided, Piaget suggests, that the objects
in question are concretely present). Thus the child's ability to
classify concrete objects is now genuinely mature, and this ability
may be said to have assumed the characteristics of concrete
operational thought.
From this brief account, it can be seen that for Piaget, the
crucial ability for the child to master before producing genuine
(10)
classification is the inclusion relation which obtains between
class and subclass. As class inclusion clearly stands as
foundation to genuine classification's edifice, this topic is
now examined in some detail.
Class Inclusion
Following Piaget, any class of objects is symbolised with B;
a subclass of B with A; and the complementary subclass of A
with Consider for example a class of flowers (»B), composed




four tulips (A) two daffodils(Af)
Subclass complementary subclass major subclass minor subclass
In this example the subclasses are unequal, and A will generally be
used to denote the major subclass (the four tulips), and A' the
minor subclass (the two daffodils). When the subclasses are equal
(e.g. three tulips and three daffodils) this will be indicated.
(11)
As already noted, the stage-2 child is able to make the sort
of heirarchical classification exhibited in Figure lj indeed, it
can set up more complicated classification heirarchiesj when
presented with geometric shapes (squares, circles, rectangles) and
letters of the alphabet -
GIL (6;4) constructs three collections (see Figure 2):
(i) all the letters except for p and q, (ii) all the ps
and qs, (iii) geometric shapes. The last of these is
divided so as to form three stacks containing squares,
rectangles and circles respectively.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 196*+: 54)
Figure 2
Thus the child appears to recognise that a class is composed
of its subclasses, and may therefore be said to appreciate5 the
relation B = A+A*. This will be referred to as the composition
condition of classification9 corresponding to the operation
(12)
of composition in set theory whereby two sets are combined to form a
union of sets, this union being itself a set.
But what the stage-2 child cannot appreciate, according to
Piaget, is the inclusion relationship holding between a class and
its subclasses, which enables recognition that a subclass (A) is
included in a class (B) while failing to exhaust it (e.g. tulips are
flowers, but not all flowers are tulips). Thus the child may be
said to fail to appreciate the relation B-A* s A, which will be
referred to as the decomposition condition of classification,
corresponding to the operation of decomposition in set theory
whereby a set is partitioned to form constituent subsets:
In the case of true inclusion, B .. does not exist only
when its constituent parts, A + A', are actually united ..
It continues to encompass them and it conserves its
identity, even when these are dissociated. In other
words, the subject is able to reason in the form
A = B - A*. On the other hand, the essential
characteristic of a collection as distinct from a class
is that it exists by virtue of the union of its elements
in space, and ceases to exist when its sub-collections
are dissociated. It follows that, so long as the sub-
collections are united in the form A + A', the subject
does connect them with the whole, B(A + A' =B); but once
they are dissociated, be it in space or even in thought,
he no longer connects the sub-collections with the whole
collection: in other words, the operation A s B - A* is
(13)
beyond him. An operation being, by definition, reversible,
we conclude that, since there is no inverse operation,
A = B - A*, the union A + A* = B cannot be a direct
operation at stage-2, however much it may resemble one.
It is in fact no more than an intuitive union because
it is contingent upon a temporary differentiation of the
collection B into the sub-collections A and A*.
Obviously it cannot always be easy to decide whether or
not there is inclusion in this sense, simply by looking at
the way in which a subject structures a varied set of
objects into collections and sub-collections. It is
quite possible to find one who constructs a fairly subtle
hierarchy and is still unable to reason in the inverse
direction, A = B - A* ...
Present the child with a collection of items B, made up of
two sub-collections, A and A1, such that .. there are more
A than A1, and ask whether there are "more of A" or "more
of B". Where there is no class-inclusion, children
inevitably reply that there are more A than B, (i.e. the
part is greater than the whole). The fact that A and A*
are dissociated in imagination destroys the whole, B; and
B is then reduced to A*.
(Inhelder X Piaget, 1964: 49-50)
The use of symbolism in Piaget's account is informative, for it
a further condition of genuine classification: namely that
(14)
these rules of composition and decomposition must be applicable to
any domain of objects before the child can be credited with mature
classificatory behaviour. That is to say, the rules must be
"content-independent", their application not being restricted to
any specific content area. What this involves is that the child
must be able to apply these rules to the classification of animals
as well as flowers, as well as geometric shapes, as well as
coloured beads, as well as ...i.e. to any content area. Concern
with the content-independence condition has been reflected in
Piaget's research, where his experiments have involved various
materials.
The early work on class inclusion (hereafter CI) arose in
connection with studies of the child's conception of number
(Piaget, 1952), where experiments were conducted with classes of
flowers, beads, children, geometric shapes etc. Consider as an
example the well-known experiment with beads, where Piaget used a
box containing a set of twenty wooden beads, mostly coloured brown
but with a few coloured white. This constituted:
B - the class of wooden beads
A - the majority subclass of brown beads
A* - the minority subclass of white beads.
When preoperational (e.g. Stage-2) subjects were presented
with the inclusion question: "Does the box contain more brown
beads or more wooden beads?" (A<B)6, the characteristic response
was "more brown beads" (A). A typical protocol (where the child's
responses are underlined) reads as follows:
(15)
STR0(6;0): Are there more wooden beads or more brown
beads in this box? - More brown ones. Why? - Because
there are only two wooden ones. But aren't the brown
ones made of wood? - Oh Yes? Well then, are there more
brown ones or more wooden ones? - More brown ones.
(Piaget, 1952: 164).
Piaget interprets this result as showing:
The child between 5 and 7 years is unable to construct
this inclusion A<B. His own interpretation of the facts
leads him to conclude (and once again this demonstrates
that the interpretation of perceptual data presupposes a
previous logical elaboration) that A>3 because A >A*. His
answer is: 'There are more brown beads (A) than wooden
beads (B) because there are only two or three white ones
(A*)'. What this answer really means is: either the
question deals with the whole class (B), and then all
the beads are wooden ones, or it deals with a part (A)j
but if the whole is split up into its constituent parts
we no longer have a whole. In this case it is reduced
to the other part (A*), hence A>3 because B = A*. In
other words, children find it difficult to reason about
the whole and the parts at the same time. If they
think of the whole, they forget the parts and vice versa.
In order to construct the inclusion A<B, which, on the
average, can be done between the ages of 7 and 8 years,
the child has not simply to carry out a verbal or
(16)
symbolic translation of the perceptual data, but an
operational composition or decomposition of its elements:
B s A+A1, hence A = B-A* and A* = B-A, hence A<B. The
logical relationship is, consequently, much more than a
linguistic expression which translates the empirical
properties of objects. It is the resultant of the
reversible actions of composition and decomposition,
which consist of actual operations of grouping or
regrouping carried out on objects,
(Piaget, 1953: 5-6)
According to Piaget, while the child at this stage can handle
the composition condition in an intuitive fashion (the brown beads
are made of wood and the white beads are made of wood, hence the
wooden beads comprise both the brown and white beads - i.e. B = A+A*),
he is apparently unable to handle decomposition relations (A = B-A*/
A' s B-A).
However perhaps this is not quite accurate, for when two empty
boxes were placed alongside the initial box, subjects were asked:
"If we take out the brown beads and put them here (first empty box),
will there be any beads left in this one (the full box)"; and, "If
we take out the wooden beads and put them here (second empty box),
will there be any left in this one (the full box)". Piaget reports
that stage-2 subjects find no difficultywith these questions, the
first being answered: "Yes, the white beads will be left", the
second being answered: "No, there will be no beads left". These
responses seem to suggest that the child can, to some extent, handle
(17)
the relations of composition and decomposition, for the former response
implies that the wooden beads (B) minus the brown beads (A) leaves
the white beads (A*) - i.e. B-A = A* (decomposition); and the latter
response implies that removal of the wooden beads (B) involves
removal of both the brown (A) and white (A1) beads, leaving none in
the box - i.e. -B = -(A+A*), or B = A+A* (composition).
These paradoxical results also appear in Piaget's later work
(Inhelder 8 Piaget, 1964: Chapter 4). Working with the classific¬
ation heirarchy set out in Figure 3 (note that the subclasses are
equal, thus A = A'), the following questions were presented:
Figure 3
B (16 flowers)
A (8 primulas) A' (8 flowers other than primulas)
Question
(1) Are there more primulas or flowers ( i.e. A B)
(2) If you take all the primulas, will there be any
flowebs left (i.e. B-A = A')
(3) If you take all the flowers, will there be any
primulas left (i.e. B = A+A')
Piaget reports (Inhelder & Piaget, 1264: 104) that the majority of
stage-2 subjects (between 50 and 90 percent) answer questions (2)
and (3) correctly, but fail with question (1), Illustrative
(18)
protocols quoted by Piaget are these:
THE (5;6) .. If you picked all the primulas in a field,
would there be any flowers left - Yes. Now supposing
you picked all the flowers would there be any primulas
left? - Yes .. no. Why? - Because you're taking all
the flowers.
AUB (6;9) (E takes two yellow primulas, one purple
primula, and two other flowers): Are there more primulas
or more flowers in this bunch? - More primulas, because
here there are two (other flowers) and here there are
three (primulas). And are there more yellow primulas
or more primulas? - More yellow primulas. There is only
one purple one.
DEM (6;6): Say you pick all the flowers in a field. Are
there any primulas left? - No, I*ve picked them all. And
if you take all the yellow primulas, will there be any
primulas left? - Yes. If you take all the primulas, will
there be any flowers left? - Yes, some daisies, a rose ...
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 104,105)
Piaget's account of these data runs as follows:
In effect, the two statements: 1. "If one takes away
all the primulas there will be no yellow primulas left",
and 2. "If one takes away the yellow primulas, the
purple ones will be left", should express the operations
A+A' = B and B-A = A' ... Is this true of the child? To
(19)
prove that it is, one would have to show that B is retained
in the child's mind, i.e. that the apparent logical
subtraction really is the inverse of the apparent
addition ... The only decisive test is to ask the subject
to compare the extension of B with that of A. If he
recognizes that there are more primulas (B) than yellow
primulas (A) in a bunch, he must be aware of B as the sum
of A+A* and he must simultaneously be aware of A as the
difference B-A'. Such simultaneous awareness, which is
characteristic of operational thinking, implies the
conservation of the whole B. It is not surprising that
a subject at stage-2 can be intuitively aware that the
whole is the union of its parts (statement 1), and that
one part is distinct from another, even though he cannot
compare the extensions of the part and the whole. For
this comparison is not implied by statements 1 and 2,
The fact that the subject only succeeds in comparing A
and A* (for B is momentarily non-existent) shows that
statement 2 does not express the logical subtraction of
classes, but only a simple intuitive separation of A and
A*.
When the problem of inclusion cannot be solved, the most
frequent error is to compare A and A', instead of A and
B, But it is not the only one possible. The reduction
of B to A' is not always automatic and unconscious; it
may be motivated by the fact that one cannot use the same
(20)
elements in two different ways. A child, for example,
may say: "If I make a bunch out of the primulas (A),
the bunch of flowers (B) will no longer contain any
primulas because these will be in the first bunch".
(B is then reduced to A* by the conscious subtraction of
A.) We might add that where there are more A's than As
the subject often appears to be giving the right answer,
although in fact when he tells us that there are more Bs
than As, what he means is that there are more A*s than
As and he is simply calling the A's Bs.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 106,107)
Thus here we have an account of Piaget*s criterion for
successful classification. While the stage-2 child may be able to
"intuitively" compose or "intuitively" separate B, A and A* as
appropriate, he cannot be credited with genuine classificatory
behaviour until he can be shown to treat such relations as operations
of logical addition and logical subtraction; and further, he must be
able to co-ordinate these operations simultaneously. This ability
to simultaneously co-ordinate the operations of logical addition
and subtraction is only uncovered with presentation of class
inclusion questions, which require the subject to undertake
simultaneous comparison of (the extensions of) the whole class with
one of its parts. Of course besides Piaget*s account of this
"decisive test" of presenting class inclusion questions, a
characterization of the processes which are held to underlie the
erroneous responses of subjects at stage-2 is also provided:
(21)
namely, the child is unable to undertake simultaneous comparison
(co-ordination) of part and whole; instead, it tends to compare the
sub-parts.
Before coming to criticism of Piaget's account of class
inclusion, it can first be remarked that there is independent
evidence for the stability of the data. Various studies have
observed that in children below about eight years of age, presentation
of the inclusion question "A<B" invites the response "A" (e.g. Dodwell,
1962; Hyde, 1959; Xnhelder, Bovet & Sinclair, 1967; Kofsky, 1966;
Kohnstamm, 1963; Lovell, Mitchell & Everett, 1962; Morf, 1959; Viohlwill,
1968), Further, attempts to facilitate correct responses by various
training procedures have proved generally unsuccessful (e.g. Morf, 1959),
although the teaching of an explicit justification rule appears to have
met with some, disputed, success (e.g. Kohnstamm, 1963, 1967; Pascuel-
Leone & Bovet, 1966). Thus for class inclusion questions, the data
themselves appear stable, the child's responses entrenched.
However it is interesting to find that these independent studies
have not attempted to examine other aspects of Piaget's data (e.g. are
the data on "subtraction questions" stable? - see questions (2) and (3),
p. 17 above). While confinement of attention to inclusion questions
may be understandable in one sense (for the "decisive test" of the
child's ability to classify is held to lie in the inclusion questioni
A(B), in another sense it is not. For perhaps the most striking
aspect of Piaget's data lies in the anomalous results obtained with
inclusion and subtraction questions. Consider the main results.
(22)
When presented with a class of material as depicted in Figure 1
above (six flowers: four tulips, two daffodils), and asked the
inclusion question: (1) "Are there more flowers or more tulips", the
child of below approximately eight years typically replies: "There
are more tulips (A)". Thus the child is apparently unable to
handle the problem of inclusion (A<B: i.e., A+A' a B/A a B-A'/A' =
B-A). However, when presented with subtraction question (2): "If
I take away all the tulips will there be any flowers left", and (3):
"If I take away all the flowers will there be any tulips left", the
child answers correctly; thus it does appear to appreciate the
relations of composition (B = A+A') and decomposition (A = B-A' / A'a
B-A) just mentioned. Therefore in one context of questions (inclusion)
the child appears unable to understand the relations between a class
and its parts, while in another context of questions (subtraction)
these relations seem correctly appreciated. Piaget's account of
these results (which he himself describes as "paradoxical" - Inhelder
$ Piaget, 196*+: lOH) has already been encountered: we must, he
suggests, distinguish between "intuitive" and "operational" composition
and decomposition, and further insist on evidence of the co-ordination
of these relations into an operational whole (pp.13, 19 above).
Nevertheless, the apparent disparity between the child's performance
in different contexts of questions constitutes a considerable anomoly
when viewed apart from Piaget's theoretical terminology.
Consideration of a further aspect of the data uncovers an
apparent inconsistency in Piaget's account. Here we refer to Piaget's
characterisation of the processes underlying erroneous responses to
class inclusion questions.
(23)
Two types of inclusion question can be distinguised; where
the question involves inclusion of the major subclass A, we will talk
of majority inclusion questions (A<B); and where the question involves
inclusion of the miner subclass A', we will talk of minority inclusion
questions (A'<B).
Again consider the material of Figure 1. When the child is
asked the majority inclusion question (A<B): "Are there more flowers
or more tulips", we obtain the response: "More tulips" (A). The
reason for this, Piaget argues, is that since the child is unable to
compare class B with subclass A, what in fact happens is that the
child compares the two subclasses (A and A'). However, when the
same child is presented with the minority inclusion question (A,<B):
"Are there more flowers or more daffodils", we obtain the response:
"More flowers" (B). Piaget suggests that this response is misleading,
for it does not indicate that the child is handling the problem of
inclusion correctly: rather, the child is still comparing subclasses
A and A1, but now he is "simply calling" the major subclass A by the
class name B. Recall what Piaget has to say on this topic:
Where there are more As than A's the subject often appears
to be giving the right answer, although in fact when he
tells us that there are more Bs and A's, what he means is
that there are more As than A's and he is simply calling
the As Bs.' '8
(Inhelder & Piaget, 196H: 106,107)
Thus the minority inclusion question invites the response: "More B",
(24)
not, according to Piaget, because of an ability to make a part-whole
comparison: the child still compares the subclasses, and finding the
major subclass the greater, he "simply' call^'this major subclass A
by the class name B.
Let this be tentatively accepted. The question now arises: why
is there an inconsistency between this process underlying minority
inclusion questions, and the process underlying majority inclusion
questions? For when the majority inclusion question (A<B): "Are
there more flowers or more tulips" is presented, we now obtain the
response: "More tulips" (A). As before, Piaget suggests that the
child compares the subclasses, finding the major subclass to be the
greater. But whereas with minority inclusion questions the child
"simply called" major subclass A by class name B, clearly this fails
to occur with majority inclusion questions.
Thus there appears to be an element of inconsistency in Piaget's
account of the two types of inclusion question: while the basic
process underlying both is held to be similar (reduction to subclass-
subclass comparison), a further process which is held to underlie one
type ("simply calling" A "B" in minority inclusion questions) is
clearly absent in the other type (absence of "simply calling" A "B"
in majority inclusion questions).
However apart from the anomaly between results obtained in
different contexts of question (inclusion and subtraction), and the
inconsistency in processes held to underlie different types of
inclusion question (minority and majority), there is a further,
perhaps more general feature of Piaget's position which is considerably
(25)
perplexing. Here we refer to Piaget's views on the relevance of
language to class inclusion.
Class inclusion and language
Piaget is quite explicit on this topic:
Both the syntax and the semantics of language involve
structures of classification and seriation. That this is
true of classification is immediately obvious. All nouns
and adjectives divide reality into classes. Insofar as
children use words with the same meaning as adults, these
may be directly transmitted to them when they learn to
talk. In any case, words inevitably force a beginning
of classification on the child.... One possible hypothesis
would be to attribute the formation of classification and
seriation exclusively to language. Alternatively, we
could give language no more than an auxiliary role (e.g.
that of an accelerator). We might even say that while
language is necessary for the completion of these structures,
it is insufficient for their formation. If this view
were found correct, their formation would have to be
explained by operational mechanisms which underlie
linguistic activity but are themselves independent of their
verbal expression.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 2)
(26)
From the beginning language favours a series of assimil¬
ations, and these imply a notion of similarity. (In the
same way, unsuccessful attempts at assimilation create a
notion of dissimilarity.) But for a long time these
relationships cannot be made concrete and precise. Little
children cannot arrange a set of objects in such a way as
to bring out the relation of inclusion, which is a part-
whole relation. Yet this relation is essential to an
understanding of classification in the strict sense. We
are bound to conclude that, although language is an
important factor in building logical structures, it is not
the essential factor.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 4)
Thus while recognising the general importance of language, in
relation to the specific topic of classification Piaget characterises
language as serving a subsidiary role: although language may serve
as an accelarator, little importance is attached to the possibility
of a radical, fundamental relation between the child's linguistic
and cognitive abilities in classification tasks.
Viewed simply as an a priori assertion, Piaget's position is
clearly unsatisfactory; however, he adduces evidence in support of
his position:
It is legitimate to conclude that the schema of class-
inclusion is a genuine logical operation and not a question
of mere verbal facility. A number of writers found that
children of 2-4 would tell them that a dog was an animal,
(27)
a lady was a person and a daisy was a flower. They
concluded that these children had reached the level of
hierarchical classification. To this we cannot agree.
What these facts indicate is that, given certain familiar
elements, these tiny children can reach beyond the level
of graphic collections, and the corresponding linguistic
schemata are structured into parts and wholes. But the
structure is not that of an operational classification. It
is that of a non-graphic collection, which is perfectly
consistent with the degree of differentiation shown. The
present results indicate that it is one thing to carry out
the union expressed by A+A' = B and quite another to
understand that it is logically equivalent to its inverse
A*= B-A', which means that the whole, B, retains its
identity and that the entire relation can be quantitatively
expressed in the form A(£. The conservation of the whole
and the quantitative comparison of whole and part are the
two essential characteristics of genuine class-inclusion
... Inclusion has not been acquired merely because the
child talks correctly and uses verbal concepts which
reflect the inclusions implicit in the language of adults.
(Inhelder a Piaget, 1964: 117)
It is not enough to study the way in which intension and
extension are as it were pre-figured for the child in the
system of verbal concepts which is incorporated in common
language. As a matter of fact, the results of our
(28)
investigations .. on the quantification of inclusion shov;
very clearly that children only reach a proper understanding
of the extension of verbal concepts .. in the measure that
they can themselves re-structure the content. In other
words, the starting-point for the understanding, even of
verbal concepts, is still the actions and operations of the
subject.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 283-284)
Thus despite knowledge of the lexical aspects of class inclusion
problems from about four years of age (e.g. that both men and women
are people), the child persists in making errors with inclusion
problems until about eight years of age (e.g. the child will say that
there are "more women than people" in a situation where there are five
women and three men, all of which, the child has already agreed, are
people).
There would therefore appear to be some grounds for denying a
radical relationship between linguistic and classificatory abilities,
for the child can apparently handle the lexical aspects of class
inclusion (- the "decisive test" of genuine classificatory behaviour)
long before it can handle the cognitive aspects of the problem.*
itowever Piaget seems open to criticism here, for while denying
the relevance of language to class inclusion, he has invariably
employed language as a vehicle for study. In the absence of variation
of appropriate linguistic parameters, Piaget's position on the non-
linguistic nature of the problem of class inclusion seems best viewed
(29)
as a hypothesis.
Of course this line of argument is by no means novel:
(In Piagetian studies) the problem of task-vocabulary is
at least partly a straightforward empirical problem: one
can vary the verbal aspects of the task and observe any
resultant variation in the child's response level. But
there is another verbalization-relevant problem not so
readily managed. The child not only responds to verbal¬
ization in Piaget's tests, he also responds with verbaliz¬
ations, and the problem lies in trying to decipher these
for their cognitive-developmental meanings and implications.
Piaget has not been unaware of this problem of translation
and has, in fact, discussed it in considerable detail (e.g.
Piaget, 1929). He has not, however, always followed his
own stated precautions regarding it, and has frequently
made cognitive inferences from verbal protocols as though
there were no translation problem at all.
We have argued that the child's linguistic comprehension and
usage is not independent of underlying intellectual structure
and orientation, but it would be absurd to suppose that the
one is always going to provide a faithful and accurate image
of the other. One must always look to the possibility,
particularly in studies like Piaget's, that what the child
says will lead you either to an overestimation or an under¬
estimation of his operant intellectual level ... The
translation problem has been and will long continue to be
(30)
one of the most troublesome for developmental studies
of the Piagetian type. Indeed, much of the criticism
of Piaget, especially the early Piaget, comes down to a
dissatisfaction with his language-thought translations.
(Flavell, 1963: 437)
Other writers have made the same point:
Piaget is inclined to see through words as though they
were not there and to imagine that he directly studies
the child's mind.
(Berko & Brown, 1960: 536)
However this sort of criticism provokes an immediate
difficulty: while there certainly appears to be sufficient
justification for examining the role of language in studies of
cognition, there seems no way of deciding, a priori, precisely
which linguistic parameters to vary. While we may agree with
Flavell's remark that: "One can vary the verbal aspects of the
task and observe any resultant variation in the child's response
level", we are nevertheless bound to ask: "How do we decide which
verbal aspects to examine?"
This problem does not appear to have received a great deal
of attention} in fact, the problem has often been circumvented by
undertaking "non-verbal" studies of cognition (e.g. Braine, 1959,
1962) where the conclusion: that language influences cognition,
however interesting and informative, nevertheless leaves the
problem intact; such a conclusion in no way illuminates which
(31)
aspects of language influence cognition, nor the nature of such
influence. Given the assumption that language does influence
cognition (an assumption for which, as suggested in Chapter 1 above,
there is considerable empirical support), it is of course to just
these topics that maximum interest attaches.
In the absence of an established literature on which aspects
of language might be appropriately manipulated in Piagetian studies
such as class inclusion, we approach this problem indirectly by
turning to consideration of studies in the psychology of language




It was suggested in Chapter 1 that during the present century,
the scope of study in language and cognition shows considerable
wdlL
variation, ranging from concernjbetween cognition and general features
of the language code (the work of Vygotsky, Luria, Whorf, etc.), to
more limited concern with relations between cognition and specific
aspects of language (the studies of Carmichael et al., Judson et al.
etc.). In recent years however, a great deal of attention has been
devoted in psychology to consideration of language itself, and
especially to consideration of language structure (syntax).
Initially, experiments in psycholinguistics seemed to hold great
(32)
(33)
promise. Working within a framework of generative transformational
grammar proposed by Chomsky (1957), natural language users (i.e.
experimental subjects) were observed to require more time to process
sentences that were complex in terms of linguistic structure, over
sentences that possessed a simpler structural form (e.g. Miller,
1962). The conception underlying these early studies was that
while sentences may vary in surface form they nevertheless derive
via application of various transformation rules to a common under¬
lying base. According to this conception, sentences (2) through
(7) are characterised as deriving from a common base, the differences
between their derived surface forms being accomodated by application
of passive (P), negative (N), interrogative (Q), passive negative
(PN), passive interrogative (PQ), and negative interrogative (NQ)
transformations respectively. (Let (1), a simple active
declarative sentence which has had no optional transformation
applied to the underlying string, be described as a kermal
sentence (K) - see Chomsky, 1957)j
(1) the boy hit the ball (K)
(2) the ball was hit by the boy (P)
(3) the boy didn't hit the ball (N)
(а) did the boy hit the ball? (Q)
(5) the ball wasn't hit by the boy (PN)
(б) was the ball hit by the boy? (PQ)
(7) didn't the boy hit the ball? (NQ)
So for example, it was found that in a sentence-matching task, the
(31)
greater the number of transformations applied to the underlying base,
the longer the processing latencies (Miller, 1962). Further
experiments appeared to confirm that transformed sentences were more
difficult to handle than kermis, lending support, both to the
notion that there was some "psychological reality" to transformational
grammar, and in turn, to further psychological studies of syntax (e.g.
Epstein, 1961, 1962; Gough, 1965; Marks & Miller, 1961; McMahon,
1963; Mehler, 1963; Miller 8 Isard, 1963; Miller & McKean, 1961;
Savin & Perchonock, 1965; Slobin, 1963).
However the data of these studies contained certain anomalies,
and it soon became apparent that no satisfactory explanation of
language processing was to be found solely in terms of linguistic
structure. For illustration, consider Mehlerfs early model for the
storage and recall of transformed sentences, which envisaged the
storing af kernel or base strings, plus "tags" indicating the nature
of the transformation(s) to be applied. On this view, (8) would be
stored as (9):
(8) the door is not open
(9) kernal (the door is open) + tag (negative
transformation)
Should there be impairment in subsequent recall, the more likely
element to be lost would be the tag rather than the kernal, leading
to the impaired recall of (9) as (10):
(10) the door is open
Clearly, (10) invloves a change in meaning from (8). But in a study
(35)
of memory for gist, Fillenhaum (1966) observed that such "meaning-
changing" errors were less likely to occur than "meaning-preserving"
errors: that is, if there was impairment in the recall of a
sentence like (8), impaired recall was more likely to be like (11)
which preserves the meaning of the original sentence:
(11) the door is closed
Therefore it can be appreciated that when we consider questions of
meaning, the early stucies on linguistic structure are by no means
free from criticism.
Of course to be fair, this was explicitly recognised in the early
studies themselves - whereas Millar (1962) had found that passive
sentences took longer to match than did negative sentences, McMahon
(1963) argued that Miller's task had involved no concern with meaning,
and when a different task was employed, the opposite result was
observed - negatives took longer to process than passives. Since,
transformationally, passives are more complex than negatives, and
since errors were observed to cluster on negatives rather than on
sentences that were grammatically more complex, McMahon was led to
suggest that negatives involved considerable semantic complexity.
Questions relating to semantics were also raised in connection
with passives. When it was suggested that actives and passives
with the same underlying phrase markers were mutually paraphrastic,
this was interpreted by some as a claim that actives and passives
were generally synonymous, the resultant confusion being attributed
to a failure to distinguish syntactic and semantic claims - e.g.:
Chomsky, 1965; Katz 1 Martin, 1967; Katz 8 Postal, 196H; Ziff, 1966.
(36)
However while considerable attention has been devoted towards
study of syntactic and semantic aspects of language, a more recent
trend has been towards study of the communicative function of
linguistic structures. Given the sort of conception engendered by
transformational grammar, this is perhaps understandable: consider
passive constructions. If such structures involve the application
of transformation rules to a base string which exhibits the under¬
lying logical relationships holding amongst the components of any
derived sentence, then we might ask why passive constructions ever
appear in the language at all, for they"seem at first glance to have
no purpose" (Wales 8 Marshall, 1966: 77). For compare (12) and
(13):
(12) John hit Mary
(13) Mary was hit by John
Both derive from an underlying base which exhibits the logical
relationships holding between John and Mary: namely, John is the
logical subject, Mary is the logical object, etc. Now if these
relationships can be expressed in active sentences like (12), why is
there a need in the language for the further complication of passive
constructions like (13)? This sort of consideration, in no way
alleviated by those early psychological studies which found that
(English) passives required more processing time than actives
(Miller, 1962; McMahon, 1963; Slobin, 1963 10 ), has turned
attention towards asking how structures such as the passive function
in language use.
(37)
Following Chomsky's misgivings that actives and passives
generally exhibit synonymy - e.g. compare (14) and (15) which .
Chomsky (1965) reports as apparently non-synonymous;
(14) Everyone in the room speaks at least
two languages
(15) At least two languages are spoken by
everyone in the room
- one proposal on the communicative function of the passive runs to
the effect that such constructions may serve a disambiguating
function in certain contexts of use. Thus in a situation where
John killed the father of Tom, we might prefer (17) to (16):
(16) John killed his father
(17) His father was killed by John
: for (16) may encourage interpretation of his as a pronominalization
for John, leading to the incorrect interpretation that John killed
his own father, rather than the father of some male other than John
(in this case: Tom) (Chomsky, 1965).
Psychological studies have attempted to clarify the communicative
function of the passive in more general terms. For example,
Johnson-Laird presents evidence from tests of speakers' comprehension
and production that:
The passive implies that the logical object is more
important than the logical subject whereas the active
implies that there is a minimal difference in the





(18) the man was killed by the woman
(19) the woman killed the man
(18) implies that it is the man (logical object) who is
important, whereas (19) implies that there is little
difference between the importance of the two or that the
woman (logical subject) is slightly more important.
(Johnson-Laird, 1968: 7)
Johnson-Laird is frank in noting that the notion of "importance"
is vague, and his study concentrates on "emphasis": "the passive
is more emphatic than the active", and "it is word order that
indicates to what the emphasis is being given" (Johnson-Laird,
1968: 13,14).
Data from other studies appear consistent with this account:
for example, when subjects are asked to complete active and passive
sentence-frames, they: "put what they want to talk about ... in the
beginning of the sentence" (Clark, 1965: 369)11 ; in studies with
children, the voice in which sentences are remembered is found to
be a function of differential focus of attention on the actor or
acted-upon element at times of sentence storage and, especially,
sentence retrieval (Turner & Rommetveit, 1968); and, subjects are
found to prefer the use of active sentences in the description of
situations where a "conceptual focus" is placed on the actor-subject,
(39)
but prefer passives when the focus is placed on the acted-upon-object,
"conceptual focus" being induced by use of a preamble (provision of a
context) that emphasizes either the subject or object (Tannenbaum &
Williams, 1968),.
Consideration of this account, against a situation where John
struck Mary, therefore provides the following notions: recall
sentences (12) and (13) above:
(12) John hit Mary
(13) Mary was hit by John
Were John the "important entity" in this situation, (12) might be
preferred to (13) as a description; however, were Mary the
"important entity", (13) might be preferred to (12), for use of
the passive indicates that "to what the emphasis is being given"
has switched from John, the logical subject, to Mary, the logical
object. Thus this account of passive constructions, in terms of
voice and word order, holds that use of the passive indicates that
"importance" attaches to that entity which occupies initial, rather
than subsequent, nominal position in the sentence, thereby serving a
useful communicative function.
Clearly, these notions hold considerable interest for the
purposes of this dissertation, for as already mentioned, a notable
verbal aspect of Piagetian tasks is concerned with interpretation of
adult utterances by the child and of child utterances by the adult
(i.e. experimenter) - in short, with communication in discourse
(see p.29 above). Now if certain communicative functions are
served by variation in the syntactic structure of utterances
(40)
employed in language use (discourse), this might suggest that we
manipulate syntactic variables in the "verbal aspects" of class
inclusion tasks in an attempt to uncover possible communicative
misunderstandings which might obtain between adult and child.
Thus we might manipulate specific syntactic variables such as
question form (e.g. "Are there more A or more B?" versus "Are there
more A than B?"), question term order (e.g. "Are there more A or more
B?" versus "Are there more B or more A?", etc.), or suprasegmental
features such as stress (e.g. "Are there more A or more B?" versus
"Are there more A or more B?" versus "are there more A or more B?",
etc. where primary stress is indicated as falling on underlined
terms), or intonation (e.g. "Are there more A or more B?" mapped on
to intonation patterns like:
(i) aN b\ (Are there more A (drop) or more B (drop))
(ii) kj B\ (Are there more A (rise) or more B (drop))
(iii) A b\ (Are there more A or more b (drop)), etc. 12
However before engaging in an examination of such specific
syntactic variables, we are first bound to query its general viability:
namely, is there sufficient support for the conclusion that communicative
functions are served by variation in the syntactic form of utterances
produced in discourse? In the experiments which now follow, this
general notion is examined in some detail with respect to utterances
of different syntactic form: namely, active and passive constructions.
First recall the essentials of the voice-:-ord order account (vwo)
(41)
of passive constructions indicated above. When the logical object
is "more important" than the logical subject, this is indicated by
employment of a passive structure which ensures that the logical
object occupies initial rather than subsequent nominal position in
the sentence. Thus use of the passive emphasizes that the logical
object is the important entity. Now consider some difficulties.
Firsts by denying recourse to the proper names of (12) and (13),
we immediately find ourselves involved with definiteness as in (20)
and (21):
(20) the boy hit the girl
(21) the girl was hit by the boy
The contention of VWO, that the important entity is indicated by
initial nominal position in passives, seems only now maintained by
adoption of an assumption of the irrelevance of definiteness. It
seems that all previous studies have made this assumption, all strings
used as experimental material having had both nominals definitely
marked. It will be suggested below that the validity of this
assumption is open to question.
Second: most previous psychological studies have used "full"
passives like (22) as compared with "short", "agentless", or
"impersonal" passives like (23):
(22) John was killed by Bill
(23) John was killed
: a factor which appears to create difficulties for VWO, for:
It is...a commonplace of traditional syntactic theory that
the principal function of the passive in all languages
(42)
(and in some languages its only function - e.g. Turkish)
is to make possible the construction of "agentless" or
"impersonal" sentences.
(Lyons, 1966s 130)
While Lyons notes that in English the agentive adjunct occurs quite
freely (which is unusual in comparison with other languages), it is
yet the case that short passives occur more frequently than full
passives (Lyons, 1968s 378; Jespersen, 1924$ Svartvik, 1966). But
if short passives are more common in English than full passives, to
what extent are generalisations about the function of passives marred
by exclusive use in experiments of relatively less frequent full
constructions? And perhaps more to the point, does an account that
holds the passive to emphasize the importance of the nominal that
occupies first rather than subsequent nominal-position in the
sentence not lose some of its appeal with the observation that the
most frequent type of passive occurring in the language fails to
specify any nominal other than the initial one?
The following two experiments attempt to test the force of these
difficulties. Specifically, employing active and full passive
constructions, the assumption that definiteness is irrelevant to
determination of "important" nominals is questioned in Experiment 1
by testing conflicting predictions that ariset (i) from VWO, and
(ii)s from an alternative account based on a topic-comment distinction
(see below). Finding the latter account the more satisfactory, its
tenability for both full and short passive constructions is then
examined in Experiment 2.
(43)
First consider a distinction between topic and comment13 .'
For speaker-hearer exchanges (discourse), topic may be defined as
the person, object or event about which something is said, and
comment as the information conveyed about this person, object or
event (cf: Lyons, 1968: 335). Thus the notion of topic parallels
"subject of discourse" (Sapir, 1921), "centre of interest"
(Jespersen, 1924), "what we want the hearer to attend to specially"
(Frege, 1879), "important entity" (Johnson-Laird, 1968), and
"conceptual focus" (Tannenbaum 8 Williams, 1968).. It may also be
supposed that in a speaker-hearer exchange, the speaker presupposes
that the hearer has knowledge as to topic and ignorance concerning
comment, for when these presuppositions are not met, communication
fails in the former case and is redundant in the latter. (We
a
return to this below).
It can further be assumed that in strings with two differentially
determined nominals (a N + V + the N; the N + V + a N) (where N =
noun and V = verb), topic is indicated by that nominal which is
definately marked - i.e. topic-indication is provided by definiteness.
For example, in (24) and (25) it is assumed that topic is "boy",
whereas in (26) and (27) topic is "girl":
(24) the boy hit a girl
(25) a girl was hit by the boy
(26) a boy hit the girl
(27) the girl was hit by a boy
This assumption arises since definitely marked nominals seem to
require presuppostion of previous knowledge: use of the "tacitly
(44)
insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance by referring the present
Perception to a like Perception already past" (Harris, 1751: 213;
cf: Sapir, 1921: 90). Of course this view of Harris is no more
than an intuition, but its validity can be established empirically -
see Experiments 3 and 4 below.
From this brief sketch of the topic-comment distinction, it is
clear that this topic-comment account (TC) conflicts with VWO.
First consider sentences where the nominals are differentially
determined (e.g. (24) through (27) above). WO makes firm predictions
for passive constructions (25) and (27) whereby the "important
entities" are the logical objects (- i.e. the nominals occupying
initial position in these passives), and weak predictions for active
constructions (24) and (26) whose important entities are identified
as the logical subjects (- again, the initial nominals). However
TC predicts that the important entities of these constructions are
those nominals which are definitely marked: as already mentioned,
"boy" in (24) and (25), "girl" in (26) and (27).
Now consider sentences where both nominals are definitely marked:
(28) the boy hit the girl
(29) the girl was hit by the boy
The important entities predicted by WO are again the initial
nominals, especially for passive construction (29). Since TC
suggests that the speaker of (28) and (29) has presupposed in his
listener previous knowledge of both (definitely marked) nominals,
TC can offer no predictions as to the important entities of such
sentences.
(45)
However with sentences where neither nominal is definitely
marked:
(30) a boy hit a girl
(31) a girl was hit by a boy
:while VWO will again predict the initial nominals, especially in
passive construction (31), TC suggests that the important entity
is the event, rather than the persons involved: namely, the action
of striking, for knowledge in the listener of neither nominal has
been presupposed (definitely marked) in their putative production.
Thus the VKO and TC acoounts of active and passive constructions
differ in a number of respects, and their conflicting predictions as
to the important entities of constructions like (24) through (31)
are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1/
(46)






1 the N1 + V(act) + the N2 the boy hit the girl (Nl) no prediction
2 the N1 + V(act) + a N2 the boy hit a girl (Nl) Nl
3 a N1 + V(act) + the N2 a boy hit the girl (Nl) N2
i+ a N1 + V(act) + a H2 a boy hit a girl (Nl) E
5 the Hi + V(pass) + the N2 the girl was hit by
the boy
Nl no prediction
6 the N1 + V(pass) + 4 N2 the girl was hit by
a boy
Nl Nl
7 a Nl + V(pass) + the N2 a girl was hit by
the boy
Nl N2
8 a N1 + V(pass) + £ N2 a girl wa3 hit by a
boy
Nl E
*N1 = nominal occupying initial sentential position
N2 = nominal occupying subsequent sentential position
(act) = active
(pass)s passive
**(N1) = weak prediction for N1
N1 * strong prediction for N1
Etc.
E a event
We tow turn to some data which attempt to distinguish these accounts.
(47)
Experiment 1
Subjects 40 naturally English speaking undergraduates of mean
age 21 years (range: 18-25)} approximately half were male.
Material Eight situations were described with active and
passive forms of description, each form containing two nominals. The
four possible combinations of determiners (the-the, the-a, a-the, a-a)
were then mapped on to the nominals of these descriptive forms. Four
of the eight situations were "reversible" (R) - e.g. boy hit girl,
and four were "non-reversible" (NR) - e.g. boy broke window; reversing
the nominals in the latter string yields ^window broke boy, whereas
reversal of nominals in the former type of string is acceptable (see
Mote 10). The eight situations described were these:
(R) taxi bumped lorry (NR) porter hailed taxi
car overtook bus artdealer bought fake
boy hit girl boy broke window
woman saw man woman smoked cigarette14
This procedure yielded 32R and 32NR sentences; these were
typed out on separate lists. For both lists, each successive block
of eight sentences included an example of each sentence-type (see
Table 1), order of presentation within each block being randomly
arranged. As completion of the first block of sentences simply exposes
subjects to all sentence-types, performance on these items will be
regarded as practice, and data from the remaining 24 items (8 sentence-
types x 3 examples of each type) reported below.
(18)
Procedure A considerable difficulty in this area lies in getting
subjects to respond without selling the pass in experimental
instructions: we wish subjects to indicate the important entity of
each sentence, and the problem lies in providing subjects with an
instruction which will both prevent individual variation in inter¬
pretation of instructions on the one hand, and discourage any
particular response bias on the other. Pilot testing underlined the
importance of this point, for it was found that mode of instruction
could exert considerable influence on mode of response. The most
satisfactory procedure to emerge consisted in instructing subjects
to regard each sentence as an answer to a question, and making it
their task to supply the question. Thus when given a sentence (e.g.
"Today is Tuesday") subjects had to regard this as an answer, and
construct a question for this answer (e.g. "What day is it?"). This
procedure enjoys a number of benefits, for,in constructing a question
for each sentence, the subject is obliged to indicate the important
entity1 s, and the method provides a precise instruction: to construct
a question, without creating any response bias: the characteristics
of the questions to be constructed by the subject are never alluded to.
As the pilot studies also indicated the possibility of interaction
effects when both R and NR sentences appeared in the same list, half
of the group of forty subjects was presented with R lists, and the other
half with NR lists.
Results Classification of responses is as follows: where one
nominal, or its pronominal, has been mentioned in the question-
(*9)
response, then the position of this nominal in the original sentence-
as-answer has been recorded (i.e. N1 or N2; see examples (a) and
(b) below)| where neither nominal (pronominal) has been mentioned
in the question-response, this has been recorded as "E" (= event;
see example (c))| and where both nominals (pronominals) have been
mentioned, this has been recorded as "0" (= unclassified; see
example (d)). Since this lattermost type of response effectively
repeats the stimulus sentence, minimally altered to interrogative
form, it cannot be assigned to the Nl, N2 or E category without
appeal to intuition, and here we prefer to leave such responses
"unclassified".
For example, for the presented sentence the boy hit the girl,
four typical responses (a) through (d) have been classified as
follows:
Sentence-as-answer Question response Classification
(a) What Aid the boy do? Nl
(b) What happened to the girl? N2
the boy hit the girl
(c) What happened? E
(d) Did the boy hit the girl? 0
Data appear in Table 2, where entries represent the number of
subjects who made consistent options for response categories Nl, E
or N2. "Consistent" is defined as choice of any response category
twice or thrice out of three choices (- each subject responds to
three examples of each sentence types see p. 47 above).
(50)





1 5 5 21 31
2 29 5 6 HO
3 1 3H 39
H 0 29 3 37
5 30 6 0 36
6 36 0 HO
7 8 5 25 38
8 5 32 1 38
For each sentence-type there is a possible maximum of %0
subjects who respond consistently for the three response categories;
departures from this maximum arise where subjects responded once in
each category for the same sentence-type (i.e. absence of consistency),
and/or where subjects consistently responded with "unclassified"
responses (i.e. category 0) which effectively repeat the stimulus
sentence, providing no indication of the important entity. Clearly,
both inconsistent and unclassified responses do not permit distinction
between VWO and TC; analysis is therefore concentrated on the
remaining data which do permit distinctions to be made.
Testing observed responses against chance distributions for
each sentence-type, we find where significant options have occurred
for one of the three response categories; these are presented in
(51)
Table 3 where the predictions of VWO and TC are summarized for
comparison with observed results.




Options predicted Options observed*
VWO TC
1 (Nl) no prediction N2 (x*: 11.02)
2 (Nl) Nl Nl (x* t 18.H2)
3 (Nl) N2 N2 (x»r 33.92)
4 (Nl) E E (J 22.54)
5 Nl no prediction Nl (xJ : 27.00)
6 Nl Nl Nl (xa J 38.55)
7 Nl N2 N2 (xa : 12.00)
8 Nl E E (xa l 29.49)
*A11 observed values of x1 are significant beyond the .001 level.
Clearly data provide a closer fit with the predictions of TC
than with the predictions of VWO. Thus indication of the "important
entity" of a sentence is not simply provided by voice and word-order,
for in full constructions containing two nominals, subjects indicate
as important - regardless of voice - that nominal which is definitely
marked when the nominals are differentially determined (i.e. Nl in
sentence-types 2 and 6; N2 in types 3 and 7), and the event when
neither nominal is definitely marked (i.e. E in types 4 and 8).
(52)
(Where both nominals are definitely marked in types 1 and 5, it
has been noted that VWO makes a weak prediction of N1 for type 1
(active) and a strong prediction of N1 for type 5 (passive); TC
offers no prediction for either type. In Table 3 it can be seen
that significant options have been observed: N1 for type 5 as VWO
predicts, but surprisingly perhaps, N2 for type 1. While the
former result on type 5 is taken into consideration below, the
somewhat surprising result on type 1 need not detain us since there
are such marked differences between the characteristics of the
response data for this particular sentence-type compared with data
characteristics of the other seven sentence-types.1*)
Discussion The results of Experiment 1 suggest the untenability
of VWO's Implicit assumption that definiteness is irrelevant to
consideration of full passive constructions containing two nominals,
and lend some support to an alternative (TC) account. However while
these results are of some interest, it has already been mentioned
that the adequacy of any account of the passive is not to be measured
in terms of its ability to accommodate full passive constructions, but
rather in terms of its ability to accommodate both full and short
passives, the latter sort of construction being the more typical of the
language. Therefore the next step is clearly to test the predictions
of TC with respect to both full and short passives.
(53)
Experiment 2
Subjects 112 naturally English speaking tinder-graduates
(approximately half were male) of mean age 22 years (range: 18-29)
were assigned at random to seven groups (n = 16) described below.
Material Since we wish to compare options for topic in short
and full passives containing definitely and nondefinitely marked
*
nominals occupying patient17 and, in full constructions, agent
position, six types of sentence were constructed from the template
shown in Table 4 where P s patient nominal, A = agent nominal,
0A a unspecified agent nominal, D = definitely marked nominal,
HD s nondefinitely marked nominal. The reversible and nonreversible
sentences employed are mapped out in full.
Table «*:/
(5»0




(a) NDP : 0A A man was killed
A toy was stolen
(b) DP : 0A The man ) was killed
John )
He )
The toy ) was stolen
It )
(c) NDP : NDA A man was killed by a woman
A toy was stolen by a boy
(d) DP : NBA The man ) was killed by a woman
John )
He )
The toy ) was stolen by a boy
It )
(e) NDP: DA A man was killed by (the woman
(Mary
(her
A toy was stolen by (the boy
(Tom
(him
(f) DP : DA The man ) was killed by (the woman
John ) (Mary
He ) (her
The toy ) was stolen by (the boy
It ) (Tom
(him
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that for full constructions,
sentence topic is related to definiteness regardless of voice and word-
order; predictions for the full passives of the present experiment are
therefore as before: the important entities of sentence-types (c),
(55)
(d)t and (e) are, respectively, predicted as E (the event, for neither
nominal is definitely marked), N1 (the definitely marked patient
nominal which appears with a nondefinitely marked agent), and N2
(the definitely marked agent nominal which appears with a nondefinttely
marked patient). TC again offers no predictions for the full passives
of sentence-type (f) where both nominals are definitely marked.
As regards the short, "agentless" constructions of sentence-
types (a) and (b), the options predicted by TC are the event E in
type (a) where the patient nominal is not marked for definiteness,
and N1 in type (b) where the patient nominal is definitely marked.
Procedure The sentences were typed out on separate pages which
were then stapled into booklets showing one sentence per page. For any
group, the short passives always appeared on the first booklet page
before any of the full constructions whose within-group orders of
presentation sampled the 24 possible orders (4|). Sentences
assigned to each group are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Sentences assigned to groups (Experiment 2)
Group Sentences
1 (NDP) A man was killed )by #A by a woman by the woman by Mary by her
)
2 (DP) The man was killed)(fllA) (NDA) (DA) (DA) (DA)
)
3 (DP) John was killed )
)
4 (DP) He was killed )
5 (HDP) A toy was stolen )by 0 by a boy by the boy by Tom by him
6 (DP) The toy was stolen)(0A) (NDA) (DA) (DA) (DA)
)
7 | (DP) It was stolen )
(56)
For any sentence, subjects were required to construct a question
to which the sentence could serve as answer (as in Experiment 1).
Subjects were further instructed not to read through their booklets
before beginning, nor, after beginning, to turn back to previous
pages already completed.
Results Classification of question-responses is as in Experiment
1 (p. 49 above). Results from R and NR sentences have been collapsed
as appropriate, as have results from the + nominal, pronominal and
proper name which are regarded here as equivalent in terms of
*
definiteness, by comparison with a + nominal1 *.
Data appear in Table 6s








(a) 1 31 0 32 32
(b) 67 13 0 80 80
(c) 3 24 H 31 32
(d) 63 3 I 67 80
(e) 2 3 24 29 32
(f) 50 2 4 56 80
For sentence-types (a) through (d), entries represent the number
of subjects who opt for one of the three response categories, and for
sentence-types (e) and (f), entries represent the number of subjects
(57)
who make consistent options for these categories, "consistent"
being defined as in Experiment 1.
The maximum number of subjects for sentence-types (a), (c) and
(e) is equal to 32 (Group 1 and Group 5); and equal to 80 for types
(b), (d), and (f) (Groups 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7) - cf: Tables 4 and 5.
Departures from these maxima again arise where subjects have produced
responses which are inconsistent and/or remain unclassified. Testing
observed results against chance distributions for each sentence-
type, we find where significant options have occurred: these are
presented in Table 7 where they can be compared with the predictions
of TC.




Options predicted (TC) Options observed*
(a) E E (x* : 38.74)
(h) Nl Nl(x*: 60.99)
(e) E E (x*: 18.09)
(d) Nl Nl(x*: 74.07)
(e) N2 N2(x*: 21.24)
(f) no prediction Nl(x*: 52.57)
*A11 observed values of X* are significant beyond the .001
level.
Discussion Results for both short and full passives clearly
confirm all predictions of TC. It is again noticeable that for
(58)
full constructions with both nominals definitely marked (sentence*
type (f)), subjects opt for Nl, as VWO would predict (see Experiment
1). Experiments 1 and 2 might therefore be interpreted as indicating,
not that VWO is wholly incorrect: for we do at times seem to depend
on word-order for indication of importance (as is the case with
languages other than English -e.g. Latin), but rather that it is
restricted to certain types of construction: namely, full passives
where both nominals are definitely marked. VWO therefore appears
incomplete, for it takes no account of definiteness and will only
account for full constructions which are either relatively
infrequent, even in English, or atypical of languages in general.
When both definiteness and the typical short form of passives are
considered VWO is found unable to accommodate data which can be
more readily accommodated under an alternative account which
utilizes a distinction between the topic and comment of an utterance.
While these studies indicate the relevance of definiteness to
determination of the "important entity" of both actives and short
and full passives, we must next inquire as to the viability of the
relation of definiteness to topicalization and presupposition
relations in discourse.
It has already been suggested that in discourse the speak®?
must presuppose that his hearer has knowledge as to topic, the
primary or important entity, and ignorance concerning comment: when
such presuppositions are not met, communication either fails or
becomes redundant. For example, suppose a speaker produces the
utterance: "The village has one hundred inhabitants". As a
prerequisite for successful communication, the speaker must presume
(59)
that his hearer knows which village is being referred to (- for
"village" as topic, presuppose knowledge on the part of the hearer),
otherwise commtaication fails. Further, the speaker must presume
that his hearer is ignorant as to the information contained in the
comment (• for "has one hundred inhabitants" as comment, presuppose
ignorance on the part of the hearer), otherwise communication is
redundant.
It was then suggested that indication of topic is provided by
definiteness, so that in sentences which have two differentially
determined nominals (a N + V + the N; the N + V + A N), topic is
indicated by the nominal which is definitely marked. The basis of
this assumption rested on an intuition reported by Harris (1751),
where he suggests that use by the speaker of definite determiner the
requires presupposition of knowledge in the listener: consider the
following passage from his work:
A certain Object occurs ... What is it? ... An Individual -
Of what kind? Known or unknown? Seen now for the first
time, or seen before and now remembered? » 'Tis here we
shall discover the use of the two Articles A and THE. A
respects our primary Perception, and denotes Individuals
as unknowns THE respects our secondary Perception, and
denotes Individuals as known. To explain by an example *
I see an object pass by, which I never saw till then.
What do I say? - There goes A Beggar with A long Beard.
The Man departs, and returns a while after. What do I
say then? ~ There goes THE beggar with THE long Beard.
The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.
(60)
Yet muck the force of this apparently minute Change. The
Individual, once vague, is now recognised as something
known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter
Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous
acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a
like Perception already past.
(Harris, 1351: 219 ff)
Now if Harris's intuition is correct: that use of the is tacitly
indicative of previous knowledge, which it has been suggested speckers- ■
must presuppose in their listeners for comnunlcation to succeed, then
there are good grounds for connecting topicaliaation with definiteness.




The specific hypotheses to be tested are detailed below after
description of the experimental material and procedure.
Material Two short movie sequences were prepared and recorded
on closed-circuit-TV video tapej each sequence showed a series of
events involving persons and objects. One sequence (Clip A)
involved a person who was known to experimental subjects, and the
other sequence (Clip B) involved an unknown person.1* In each clip,
these persons introduced objects that the experimental subjects had
not particularly encountered befores an envelope in Clip A and a
book in Clip B. After the envelope had been addressed in A, and
the book opened and briefly read in B, the persons departed from
camera view, returning a few seconds later to again work with their
respective objects - the envelope was blotted in A, and notes were
taken from the book in B.
Subjects 75 naturally English speaking undergraduates
(approximately one third were male) of mean age 21 years (range:
18-26).
Procedure A deception procedure was employed, subjects being
informed that they would be shown two film clips and then asked to
give testimony on the events they had witnessed, either immediately
after viewing or after a delay of up to one hour. Since the
experiment was ostensibly intended to test the hypothesis that
(62)
accuracy of testimony was subject to impairment as a function of
temporal delay between witnessing an event and reporting on it, subjects
were prevented from taking any notes while the clips were being shown,
but later provided with protocols on which to write out their testimony.
In reporting their testimony, each subject was allowed to use up
to, but notmore than eight sentences, each of which had to be
grammatical. The former instruction was given to prevent excessively
lengthy pieces of testimony, the latter to prevent use of cryptic notes
that omitted use of articles (e.g. "man sat down - wrote on envelope").
After protocols had been completed and handed in, subjects were issued
with a check-list which asked if the persons in Clips A and B were
familiar or unfamiliar. To allow counterbalancing in the order of
presentation of Clips A and B, subjects were run in four groups of
about twenty subjects per group.
Hypotheses In each piece of testimony we distinguish first and
second mention of persons and objects. Since each clip involved the
departure and return of the person raid-way through the clip, first
mention refers to initial mention of the person and object nominals in
the first half of a clip, and second mention refers to initial mention
of these nominals in the second half of a clip (i.e. after departure
and return of the persons). Before setting out the hypotheses in
detail, the characteristics of the material are first summarized:
Clip A: person known to subjects appears, introduces unknown
object (envelope) which is manipulated (envelope addressed);
known person departs and then returns, the person being still
known, to again manipulate the object which is now known (envelope
blotted).
(63)
Clip B: person unknown to subjects appears, introduces
unknown object (book) which is opened and consulted;
unknown person departs and then returns, the person now
being known, to take notes from the book which is likewise
now known.
We are testing the hypothesis that while persons or objects which are
known will be definitely marked, those which are unknown will not be
marked for definiteness. Specific hypotheses HI through H8 are set
out in Table 8, where DM = definitely marked (person or object)
nominals, and NDM = non-definitely marked nominals.
Table 8: Hypotheses in Experiment 3
Hypothesis Clip Nominal Prediction
HI ) ) First mention : NDM (unknown)
) A ) Object
H2 ) ) Second mention : DM (now known)
H3 ) ) First mention : NDM (unknown)
) B ) Object
H4 ) ) Second mention : DM (now known)
H5 ) ) First mention : DM (known)
) A ) Person
H6 ) ) Second mention : DM (still known)
H7 ) ) First mention : NDM (unknown)
) B ) Person
H8 ) ) Second mention s DM (now known)
Results Protocols of testimony were withdrawn where subjects
did not know the person in Clip A, did know the person in Clip B,
used cryptic notes, or failed to mention the persons or objects in
(64)
the second half of the clips. 75 protocols remained available for
analysis.
Classification of responses appears in Table 9:
Table 9i Classification of responses (Experiment 3)














Results are presented in Table 10 where entries represent the
number of subjects who definitely, or nondefinitely, mark the
person and object nominals in their first and second mentions.








DM NDM DM NDM
A Object 75 1 74 (HI) 75 75 0 (H2)
B Object 75 1 74 (H3) 75 75 0 (H4)
A Person 75 44 31 (H5) 75 75 0 (H6)
B Person 75 5 70 (H7) 75 75 0 (H8)
By inspection, all hypotheses are clearly confirmed except H5
where first mention of the person in Clip A was predicted as DM since
this person was known to subjects. While 59% of subjects do mark
(65)
this parson-nominal as DM, this result does not depart significantly
from chance. Since the rest of the data is quite clear-cut, it
seems likely that some variable is confounding this particular
result, and the confounding variables are perhaps just those under
examination - i.e. subjects who presumed that the reader of their
testimony would, like themselves, know the person in Clip A, have
marked the person-nominal definitely, while subjects who made no
such presupposition have marked the person-nominal non-definitely.
The considerable proportion of the latter type of response (41%)
may perhaps be indicative of an attempt at objectivity, given the
nature of the deception task: the provision of testimony. This
hypothesis was therefore examined in Experiment 4.
(66)
Experiment
Material As in Experiment 3.
Subjects 15 undergraduates, similar to those of Experiment 3.
Procedure Subjects were instructed as in Experiment 3 except
that they were further informed that the person who would read their
pieces of testimony would be familar neither with the film clips
themselves, nor with the persons, objects and events depicted.
Hypotheses Hypotheses are as in Experiment 3 with the
exception of H5. Since subjects have been instructed that they may
not presuppose that the reader of their testimony will know the
person in Clip A, H5 now changes from DM (known to subjects and the
reader of testimony) on first mention to NDM (known to subjects but
unknown to the reader).
Results Classification of responses is as before. Results
are presented in Table 11, entries again representing numbers of
subjects.






DM NDM DM NDM
A Object 15 0 15 15 15 0
B Object 15 2 13 15 15 0
A Person 15 «+ 11 (H5) 15 15 0
B Person 15 0 , 15 15 15 0
(67)
As before, all hypotheses are clearly confirmed except H5, where
comparison of the distribution of observed responses with a chance
distribution yields a value of xa (with Yates* correction) of 3.33
(df * 1, p<.10). However, whereas 59% of responses were as
predicted in Experiment 3, in the present experiment 73% of responses
are as predicted. While a replication of Experiment 4 could clear
up this point by increasing N to improve reliability of the data'0,
the results of Experiments 3 and 4 appear to provide sufficient
empirical validation of Harris*s intuition. Thus use of definite
determiner the does involve previous knowledge, and, what is perhaps
more interesting, Experiments 3 and 4 also suggest the relevance of
presuppositions about such previous knowledge on the part of
I
participants in discourse.'1^"
Discussion We can now better appreciate our reaction to
traditional criticisms of Piaget*s studies of cognition which employ
language as a vehicle for study. In response to the suggestion
(e.g. Flavell, 1963: *+37) that should one suspect that "language"
plays a significant role in Piaget's studies, one need only
manipulate the "verbal aspects" of the task, it was pointed out that
the essential difficulty of this position lay in deciding which
verbal aspects to examine. In the absence of an established
literature on this topic, we therefore considered an account of the
communicative function of linguistic structure, since a notable
aspect of Piaget*s tasks involves communication in discourse
exchanges between the adult experimenter and the child subject.
However, it appears that the account examined - VWO, which suggests
that variation in the syntactic aspects of utterances serves certain
(68)
communicative functions - is limited, for an alternative account
(TC, which distinguishes the topic and comment of an utterance) can
better accommodate data obtained in experiments which recognise the
relevance of semantic aspects of utterances (Experiments 1 and 2),
these semantic aspects; marking nominals for definiteness or non-
definiteness, being related both to previous knowledge of such
nominals (Experiment 3) and to presupposition relations holding
between participants in discourse (Experiment 4). These results
hold for both active and passive sentences - i.e. regardless of
variation in the syntactic form of utterances. Thus in considering
communication in discourse exchanges, semantic factors appear
especially relevant.
At this point, it might be argued that the notion that semantic
aspects of language use are primary to syntactic aspects runs counter
to a recently expressed view of Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) who,
in commenting on studies of Sinclair (1969), appear to read some
significance into syntactic aspects of the child*s utterances. In
these studies, tasks involving comparison were presented to children
who showed: (a) complete ability to conserve, (b) no ability to
conserve, subjects being presented with tests of both comprehension
and production (the former being tested by issuing the child with
instructions, the latter by asking the child to produce descriptive
utterances). For example:
We present the child with two dolls, to one of whom we
give 1 big marbles and to the other 2 small marbles, and
we ask: Is this fair? Are both dolls happy? Why not?
(69)
Or we ask him to tell us the difference between two pencils,
e.g. a short thick one and a long thin one. After this
exploration of the child1s use of certain expressions, we
studied his comprehension, by asking him to execute orders
couched in "adult" but simple terms (e.g. "give more
plasticine to the boy than to the girl"; "find a pencil
that is shorter but thicker than this one").
(Sinclair, 1969: 322)
While there was no difference between the groups as regards
comprehension, Sinclair reports "striking differences" between the
groups as regards production - i.e. their descriptions differed,
for whereas 70-100% of Group A (complete conservation) used
"comparatives" (e.g. <<Le garcon a plus que la fille)) - "The boy
3
has more than the girl") for the description of different quantities
of mass (plasticine) and count (marbles) noun objects respectively,
90% of Group B (no conservation) used "absolute terms" (e.g. <<Le
garcon a beaucoup, la fille a peu>> - "The boy has a lot, the girl
i
has a little" )a#V Sinclair also reports that while 100% of Group A
used different terms for different dimensions (e.g. < ( grand/gros;
petit/mince>> - "big/fat; little/thin"), 75% of Group B used one
word for two dimensions (e.g. <<gros>> for "long" and for "thick",
<< petit)> for "short" and for "thin). Further, 80% of Group A
co-ordinated the description of two dimensions (< < Ce crayon est
long mais mince, 1'autre est court mais gros>> - "This pencil is
long but thin, the other is short but thick"); but 90% of Group B
failed to co-ordinate in this way, instead dealing with one dimension
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at a time «<Ce crayon est long, 1'autre est courtj ce crayon est
mince, I'autre est gros>)).
From these studies, Sinclair concludes;
A distinction must be made between lexical acquisition
and the acquisition of syntactical structures, the latter
being more closely linked to operational level than the
former .. Operational structuring and linguistic
structuring .. thus parallel each other.
(Sinclair, 1969: 324,325)
In commenting on these studies, Piaget also notices the
"surprising degree of correlation between the language employed and
the mode of reasoning" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 90). But the
question that Piaget then raises concerns the interpretation of
these results:
How should this relationship be interpreted? A child at
the preoperatory level understands the expressions of the
higher level when they are integrated into orders or
assignments ("Give that man a longer pencil", etc.), but
he does not use them spontaneously. If you train him to
use these expressions, he learns them but with difficulty,
and the training seldom influences his notions of
conservation (it does in approximately one case in ten).
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 90)
(71)
The conclusion drawn by Piaget is that "these data .. indicate
that language does not constitute the source of logic, but is,; on
the contrary, structured by it" (Sinclair, 1969: 325, reaches
precisely the same conclusion). However while Piaget's conclusion
is clear: no fundamental importance can be attached to language in
the development of cognitive abilities, the grounds of this
conclusion seem rather obscure, for on looking closely at the
arguments above, a confusing admixture of views is revealed:
(i) The two groups of children differ in their cognitive
abilities (ability to conserve).
(ii) The two groups differ insofaras syntactic aspects
of their descriptive utterances (language production)
differ.
(iii) Thus there is a "surprising correlation" between the
structure of the language the children produce and
their cognitive abilities.
(iv) However there is no difference between the groups
as regards their ability to comprehend the language
involved in presented instructions.
It is not at all clear whether Piaget wishes to regard the
differences in the syntax of language production as significant.
Initially it appears that he does, but if this is so, there are
both formal and empirical grounds for complaint. For example, the
notion that utterances involving "comparatives" and utterances
3o .vet
involving "absolute terms"^differ jsuperficialUj.
has recently been suggested by Campbell S Wales (1969), who
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suggest that utterances containing absolutes must be linguistically
derived from comparatives. E.g. utterances containing absolute
terms like: John is tall, are characterised as implicit comparatives;
John is tall (er than 0), where 0 is some standard} otherwise we
could never have the perfectly acceptable utterance John ii tall,
where John is a child.94
However Piaget's position does not lend itself to criticism
on formal grounds alone - recent empirical studies have suggested
that Sinclair*s data do not enjoy stability, for the notion that
preconserversproduce absolutes rather than comparatives in language
production is not supported by the data of Campbell & Wales (1970:
251) who report observation of a variety of comparatives (so-called
absolutes, full comparatives, functional comparisons and superlatives)
in the spontaneous language production of 3-H year olds; and the
notion that utterances containing absolute terms function differently
from utterances containing comparatives is not supported by the
data of Wales (1970), who reports that children accord a comparative
interpretation to utterances involving absolute adjectives.
It is, however, perhaps superfluous to adduce arguments and
data which suggest that a distinction between "absolutes/scalars"
and "comparatives/vectors" is more apparent than real, for it is
not in any case clear whether Piaget wishes to regard this "distinction"
as significant. Although Piaget initially appears to argue that
there is "a striking correlation" between language structure and
mode of cognitive functioning84, he then points out that there is
no difference between the groups as regards their linguistic
»
comprehension.84 From this, he now appears to argue that if there
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are no significant differences between the groups as regards
language (comprehension) and yet if there are significant differences
between the groups as regards cognition (ability to conserve), then
this indicates that language and cognition are not fundamentally
related. However this does not follow, for Sinclair and Fiaget
did not undertake study of the linguistic aspects of conservation
tasks: "We explored the child*s verbal capacities .. by asking him
to describe simple situations which do not touch upon conservation
.(Sinclair, 1969: 322; emphasis introduced). Since the
eliciting contexts (tests of cognitive and linguistic abilities)
were kept separate, one cannot argue from the one to the other with
any degree of confidence. Precisely the same argument applies to
Sinclair*s attempt to induce conservation responses via "verbal
training" (cf: Sincalir, 1969: 322 ff) * the contexts were
completely distinct.
Although Piaget's position on the importance of syntax is
difficult to tinderstand, what does seem to emerge is that Piaget
himself is not prepared to pay too much attention to superficial
differences in the syntax produced in discourse between subject
and experimenter. This would suggest that the conclusion
obtained in the present chapter - that in considering communication
in discourse, semantic factors appear especially relevant - does
not necessarily run counter to the views of Piaget and Sinclair,
their initial attention to superficial syntactic variables not¬
withstanding. It is therefore to semantic aspects of class
inculsion that we now turn in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4
Studies of class inclusion
When one comes to consider semantic aspects of class inclusion,
a number of anomalies becomes apparent. First there is the anomaly
concerning what have been termed "equational sentences" (cf: Jakobson,
1960) and inclusion questions: the child is able to produce and
comprehend equational sentences likes "a dog is an animal", "a
primula is a flower", long before he can deal with inclusion questions;
"are there more dogs than animals", "are there more flowers or more
primulas". Success with the former type of utterance suggests that
the child can appropriately handle the semantics of such terms as dog,
cat, animal, etc. apparently appreciating that a member of a subclass
(e.g. a dog) is also a member of the class from which it is drawn
(i.e. the class of animals)} but the concurrent lack of success with
inclusion questions either suggests that the child is unable to deal
appropriately with the semantics of class and subclass terms which
class inclusion questions involve, or, as Piaget prefers to argue, that
the child's lack of success does not arise from an inability to handle
semantic aspects of the task, but rather from an inability to handle
(74)
OS)
the operations of inclusion in a logically co-ordinated fashion.
Second, there is the anomaly concerning just these operations,
for the child is apparently able to handle relations of composition
and decomposition in a context of what have been termed "subtraction
questions" (p.17above), but not in a context of inclusion questions.
Given a class composed of two types of flower, the child will answer
that one subclass remains on removal of the other (B-A » A' or
B-A* = A - decomposition), while removal of the class involves removal
of both subclasses (B = A+A* - composition): recall the protocol of
THE:
If you picked all the primulas in a field, would there by
any flowers left? - Yes. Now supposing you picked all the
flowers, would there be any primulas left? - Yes ... no.
Why? - Because you're taking all the flowers.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 104, 105)
Thus the child seems able to deal with the semantics of such terms as
primula, flower etc. in one context of questions (subtraction), but
not in another (inclusion).
Third, there is the inconsistency in Piaget's account of erroneous
responses to inclusion questions which might also be subsumed under a
general heading of "semantic aspects of class inclusion": when the
child is unable to compare a class with one of its parts (inclusion),
Piaget suggests that the child in fact compares the subclasses. But
whereas in minority inclusion questions (A'< B) the major subclass A
is "simply called" by the class term B, in majority inclusion questions
(76)
(A< B) no such process occurs (see p. 22 above). Hence a semantic
process: whereby a subclass is referred to by the class name, is
held to occur with one type of inclusion question (minority), but
not with another (majority).
However there appears to be yet a further anomaly concerning
the semantics of class inclusion. This arises from a report of
Piaget*s, that children who succeed with class inclusion questions
in some contexts of application (e.g. with classes of flowers, beads,
geometric shapes, etc.) may nevertheless exhibit lack of success in
other contexts (e.g. with classification of animals). In a study
with a sizeable group* of subjects (N = 117) aged 7-14 years,
Piaget reports that when inclusion questions were presented with
respect to pictures of animals rather than flowers, results with
animals "systematically lagged behind" results with flowers
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 110). Using material as depicted in
Figure 4, Piaget reports that not only can 7-13 year-old subjects
fail to handle class inclusion questions, but can even fail to
construct the appropriate heirarchical system:
We found that neither the heirarchical system (A<B<C) nor
the quantification of inclusion were properly understood...
Figure 4
animals (C)
other than birds (B')
(77)
A number of subjects were nearly at the stage of formal
operations (i.e. about 11-lHt years) by the time they
showed such understanding. Subjects who answered other
questions (i.e. with classes of flowers, beads, shapes etc.)
at the level of stage-3 often gave replies equivalent to
those of stage-1 when dealing with animals.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 196H: 112)
Piaget's explanation of these findings, which he admits to be
a posteriori, runs as follows:
That different results are obtained when animals are used
must be due to the fact that these classes are more remote
from everyday experience and therefore more abstract. It
is true that circles and squares, or primulas and flowers,
are designated by words which evoke verbal concepts of a
general kind and are therefore abstract. But children do
play about with circles and squares between the ages of 5
and 9; and unless they are city dwellers they often pick
flowers or just primulas either in their gardens or when
they go for a walk. Now using pictures of ducks and other
birds and animals should make precious little difference if
the questions are still confined to the actual pictures on
the table. Each one of these represents a perfectly
familiar object and there is no difficulty about naming
them. There is certainly no explicit reference to the
highly generalized conceptual structure which lies behind
this nomenclature. But in fact (this is our a posteriori
explanation ©f the results), a child cannot say that ducks
are birds and birds are animals by simply relying on
experience drawn from his own actions, as he can for squares
and circles which he has drawn and for flowers which he
has picked. He is compelled to rely far more on purely
linguistic concepts and he may need to structure and
develop these in the course of the actual experiment.
This explains the time lag.
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 110, 111)
Thus Piaget*s proposed explanation is that results with animals lag
behind those obtained with other classes of objects because classes
of animals "are more remote from everyday experience and therefore
more abstract".
However some further remarks of Piaget suggest an alternative:
Their difficulty in comparing the part with the whole in
this domain must be due to the fact that zoological classes
are not very clearly defined for them. lacks, for Pie,
are not birds; for Esc, ducks do not have wings and sea¬
gulls are not birds, etc. Spontaneous classifications
are frequently made in terms of more familiar properties
instead of the abstract verbal categories of birds and
animals. Stod, for instance, suggests classifying the
animals as wild and tame, or as large and small. Esc
can find no surer criterion than to examine the cards to
see whether the creatures are depicted with open wings
(giving a class which includes insects and sea-gulls), or
(79)
with closed wings. The moat frequent classification is
into animals that fly and animals that walk. But one
sometimes finds very strange mixtures| Stod, for instance,
begins with a class of insects, but goes on to put the
ducks with the mice ("fairly small animals"), and the birds
with the frogs.
(Inhelder 8 Piaget, 1964: 114)
Thus Piaget's subjects may fail to recognise that ducks are birds as
are sparrows, parrots etc. or that birds are animals as are mice,
horses, dogs, etc. (cf: Lovell, Mitchell 8 Everett, 1962). Thus
there appears to have been a lack of agreement between S and E as
regards the sonantic nature of the experimental material. This
alone might account for subjects' inability to construct the appropriate
heirarchy of classes, fer less answer inclusion questions. Piaget's
explanatory hypothesis therefore appears to require further examination.
A point to notice about Piaget's explanation is that the notion
that animals are more remote from subjects' everyday experience than
are flowers is no more than an assumption. For example, one might
argue that urban children living in town centres are just as likely
to have come into contact with animals as with flowers, for while
many urban households have no garden, they often possess domestic
pets. However this sort of variable can be effectively controlled
by use of artificial material, labelled with nonsense syllables,
which the child could not possibly have encountered before the
experiment.
In the following experiment subjects' performance on material
which Piaget holds to be within the child's everyday experience
(80)
(e.g. flower's) la therefore compared with performance on specially
constructed nonsense-material, genuinely "remote" from the




Subjects 2k naturally English speaking schoolchildren,
assigned to two equal groups on the basis of age:
Group 1 (n » 12, 6 male) of mean age 6;10 years (range: 5;6-8;7)
Group 2 (n s 12, 7 male) of mean age 10;2 years (range: 9;10-12;0)
Material Outline drawings on white cards (6 x 4"), representing










On Card (ii) wugs were similar to the duck-like nonsense
figures employed by Berko in her studies of morphology (Berko, 1958),
(82)
and laps were fat caterpillar-like nonsense figures.
Procedure Subjects were tested individually by the same
experimenter, Ss were informed that E had some pictures which they
were going to look at, and that E would ask some questions about
them. (This same preamble was used in all subsequent experiments).
Card (i) was introduced, S informed that this was a picture of
flowers, and the referents of the subclasses (daffodils and daisies)
indicated. Details were then checked:
Let's go over it again. This is a picture of ..? Yes,
flowers. These (pointing) are .. ? Yes, daffodils.
These (pointing) are ..? Yes,daisies.
The same procedure was employed with Card (ii). After introduction
of each card, three comparison questions were presented; these
involved:
(a) comparison of subclasses A and A' (A:A' - subclass comparison)
(b) comparison of subclass A* and class B (A<B - minority inclusion
question)
(c) comparison of subclass A and class B ( A<B - majority inclusion
question)
The form of the question was always: "Are there more or more
the questions being presented first in one order of presentation
(A':A, A'<B, A(B), then in reverse order (A:A', B<A', B<A)*7. This
provides two responses per type of comparison, and checks the consistency
of the child's response - unless the child answers correctly on both
orders of presentation, he is not credited with a correct response.
(83)
Results Data appear in Table 12 where entries represent the
number of subjects per group (maximum: 12) who produce consistently
correct responses on the three types of comparison question* Results
for the familiar material of Card (i) are compared with those for the
unfamiliar material of Card (ii).
Table 12: Correct responses (Experiment 5)
Group Material Comparison
AsA* A'< B A<B
1
familiar 11 7 5
unfamiliar 5 2 0
familiar 12 11 8
2
unfamiliar 10 10 8
With the younger subjects (Group 1) there are significant
differences between familiar and unfamiliar material for all three
types of comparison (AjA'j-s ■ 2.12, p(.05{ A'KBj-s a 2.21,
p<.05; A<B:-z a 2.21, p<.05). With the older subjects of Group 2,
there is no significant difference between familiar and unfamiliar
material on any type of comparison.
Discussion With reference to the inclusion question presented
by Piaget (A<B), although we observe a difference in performance on
familiar and unfamiliar material that Piaget's views might lead us
to expect, this is clearly restricted to the younger subjects, for
the older subjects of Group 2 exhibit no such difference. Further,
although the younger subjects have found A<B inclusion questions
(84)
significantly more difficult with unfamiliar material, they have
also found A:A* subclass comparisons, and A'<B inclusion comparisons,
significantly more difficult. This suggests that significant
decreases in performance are not simply due to differences in the
familiarity of the material, but rather due to difficulties with
naming. With unfamiliar material, the significant decrease in
performance on comparison of subclasses (AsA1) in the younger
group suggests that they have experienced difficulty in keeping
track of the appropriate subclass names, leading to consequent
difficulty with inclusion question. The older subjects however
show no decrease in performance on comparison of subclasses, nor
on inclusion questions.
These results therefore fail to confirm the hypothesis that
performance deteriorates with material which is unfamiliar, simply
because it is unfamiliar per sc." Thus Experiment 5 suggests
that the differences in performance which Piaget observed with
flowers and animals as material are not to be accommodated in the
manner which he proposes.
However, despite failing to confirm Piaget's proposed
explanation of differences in performance being due to unfamiliarity
or remoteness, the results of Experiment 5 are not wholly negative,
for they indicate an alternative hypothesis for investigation:
namely, decrease in performance seems linked with difficulty in
appropriately naming the constituents of the experimental material.
The possibility of such a link is reinforced by arguments of
Brown (1958), to the effect that children learn to name objects
which compose such classes as animals and flowers in a different
(85)
manner - whereas the names learned for the former objects are
invariably subclass names (e.g. dog, cat), the name learned for the
latter objects is invariably the class name (i.e. flower). Brown
argues that the child learns more specific (subclass) names for
objects which the adult expects him to distinguish, but (class)
names of wider generality for objects which he is not expected to
distinguish. Thus the specificity or generality of object-names
acquired by the child is interpreted as a function of the
discriminatory abilities expected of the child by adults.
If Brown is correct in suggesting that there are differences
in the child's learning of names of objects which compose different
classes like animals and flowers, and if there is a link between the
abilities to name and compare classes and subclasses (as the data
of Experiment 5 suggest), than this line of inquiry seems worth
pursuing. These notions are therefore explored further in Experiment
6 where we present different classes of objects and observe: (i) any
differences in the naming of their constituents; (ii) any differences
in ability to make class/subclass comparisons.
(86)
Experiment 6
Subjects 36 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (21
male) of mean age 6;0 years ( range: 5jO - 6;10).
Material Outline drawings on white cards (6 x 1") representing
the classes of Figure 6:
Figure 6
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1 tulips 2 daffodils 1 horses 2 cows 1 boys 2 girls
Major subclass:
Minor subclass: A*
Procedure (See the preamble on p.82 above). Cards (i) - (iii)
were presented in random order. On presentation of each card, S was
asked what the "pictures" showed. If the child initially named the
objects with the class name, he was then asked to name the subclasses;
alternatively, if he initially produced subclass names, he was then
asked to name the class. As we will come to see, there were consistent
differences in subjects* naming behaviour between cards: for Card (i),
the initial response was invariably to give the class name and then
(87)
fail to give the subclass names; for Cards (ii) and (iii), subjects
first gave the subclass names and then met with some success in
giving the class names. This can be illustrated with a typical
protocol for each card:
Card (1) What is this a picture of? - Flowers. Yes, this is
a picture of flowers. What are these (pointing to
one of the subclasses)? - Don't know. These are
tulips; what are they? - Tulips. Show me the
tulips - (child points to tulips). Good. What are
these (pointing to the other subclass)? » Don't
know. These are daffodils; what are they? -
Daffodils. Show me the daffodils • (child points
to daffodils). Good. So this is a picture of? ...
Daffodils. And ...? - Tulips. Good. And what are
daffodils and tulips? - Flowers.
Card (il) What is this a picture of? - Horses. Yes, show me
the horses - (child points to horses). Good; what
are these (pointing to cows)? - Cows. Yes show me
the cows - (child points to cows). Good; what are
horses and cows, what do we call them? - Don't kngg
(24 out of 36 subjects). Horses and cows are
animals; what are they? - Animals. Yes, so this is
a picture of ....etc.
Card (iii) What is this a picture of? - Boys ... and girls.
Yes, show me the boys (child points to boys), and now
the girls, (child points to girls). Good; what are
(88)
boys and girls, what do we call them? - Don't know
(20 subjects out of 36). Boys and girls are children;
what are they? - Children. Yes, so this is a picture
of etc.
When this naming procedure had been completed, the cards were shown
again and comparison questions presented, the form of the questions
being held constant: "Are there more ore more ?". The questions
involved the three types of comparisons studied in Experiment 5:
(a) comparison of subclasses (A:A* - e.g. "Are there more boys or
more girls")
(b) comparison of minor subclass with class (A'<B - e.g. "Are there
more girls or more children")
(c) comparison of major subclass with class (A<B - e.g. "Are there
more boys or more children").
Each subject answered all types of comparison question, but always with
a different material content (e.g. A:A' against flowers, A'<B against
animals, A<B against children). For each subject, the cards and
associated comparison questions were presented three times. Order of
presentation of questions, order of terms within questions, and
associated material content, were counterbalanced across subjects.
Results Data on the spontaneous naming of the experimental
material appear in Table 13 where entries represent the number of
subjects who can provide class and/or subclass names for the objects
depicted on Cards (i) - (iii) without the help of the experimenters
Table 13s /













flowers 29 tulips 10 daffodils 3 42
animals 12 horses 35 cows 22 69
children 16 boys 36 girls 36 88
As already mentioned, there are clear differences in the way in
which the material is spontaneously named. Whereas most subjects
(29 out of 36) give the class name for flowers, few can name the
subclasses. And while practically all subjects name the subclasses of
animals and children, less than half (12-16 out of 36) can give the
class names. Thus while subjects distinguish by name between
different types of animal and (male and female) child, they do not
distinguish by name between different types of flower. «
Thus for naming responses, out of a possible maximum 108
responses per class (36 subjects x 3 constituent names per class),
42 correct responses were observed for the class of flowers, 69 for
animals and 88 for children.
With regard to correct responses to comparison questions (a),
(b) and (c), out of a possible maximum 108 responses per elass (86 x
3 presentations per comparison), 34 correct responses were observed
for the class of flowers, 56 for animals and 75 for children.
The mean correct responses for these classes of material on
naming, and subsequent comparison, appear in Table 14:
(90)





flowers animal a children
Naming 1.17 1.92 2.44
Comparison 0.94 1.56 2.08
Differences between these means are statistically reliable:
comparing the classes of flowers and animals, z = 4.386 for naming
responses, z = 2.791 for comparison responses; comparing the classes
of animals and children, z s 2.998 for naming responses, z = 2.356
for comparison responses; all these values of z are significant at
least beyond the .05 level. Thus the ability to make correct
comparisons increases with the ability to spontaneously name the
objects referred to in the comparison questions.
Discussion The results of Experiment 6 apparently lend
support to the notion of a link, suggested by Experiment 5, between
the child's ability to name and compare.
However while Experiments 5 and 6 suggest the existence of a
relationship between such abilities, they provide little information
as to the nature or characteristics of this relationship, for the
experimental data so far presented fail to inform us as to the
processes which might be held to underlie the child's responses.
Since such information is essential if a resolution of the apparent
(91)
anomalies in Piaget's account of class inclusion is to be attempted,
we therefore attempt to obtain such information in Experiment 7,




Subjects 12 naturally English speaking pre-school children
(8 male) of mean age f;8 years (range: H;2 - 5;1).
Material Cards (1) - (ill) of Experiment 6 were employed,
showing flowers (4 tulips and 2 daffodils), animals (4 horses and
2 cows) and children (4 boys and 2 girls) respectively. A minor
change in this material involved colouring the flowers: instead
of requiring subjects to discriminate the different types of flower
solely on the basis of petal-shape, an additional cue was provided
for these younger subjects by colouring the tulips red and the
daffodils yellow.
A further three cards ((iv) - (vi)) were prepared by simply
reversing the subclass ratios of Cards (i) - (iii): thus whereas
Card (i) showed 4 red tulips and 2 yellow daffodils, Card (iv) showed
2 red tulips and 4 yellow daffodils; and so for Cards (v): 2 horses
and cows, and (vi): 2 boys and H girls.1*
Procedure (Preamble, p.82 above) Cards (i) - (iii) were
presented in random order, and S asked to name the constitutent
objects as in Experiment 6. When details of the child's ability to
spontaneously name the constituent material had been obtained,
Cards (i) - (vi) were presented with comparison questions in a
manner similar to Experiment 6. As before, the questions were of
(93)
three types, involving comparisons between subclasses (A:A*)» class
and minor subclass (A*<B), and class and major subclass (A<B). Each
S answered all three types of question against each type of material,
the general question form being held constant as: "Are there more
or more ?", Order of presentation of cards and of types of
comparison question were counterbalanced across subjects.
Results Data on the spontaneous naming of the experimental
material appear in Table 15 where entries represent the number of
subjects (maximum: 12) who respond correctly.








flowers 6 tulips 1 daffodils 2 9
animals 0 horses 11 cows 5 16
children 1 boys 10 girls 11 22
While there are differences in these results compared with the
older group of subjects in the previous experiment, a similar pattern
emerges nevertheless: while most subjects name the subclasses of
animals and children, but fail to name the classes, the opposite is
true of flowers, where subjects name the class rather than the
subclasses.
Results with the comparison questions appear in Table 16 where
both correct and incorrect responses are recorded for each class
of material and type of comparison; there is a total of 21 responses
(94)
in each instance, since each subject is presented with two cards
(ratios reversed) per class:







children 24 1 21 2 4%
M B animals 24 3 19 2 12%
flowers 24 16 7 1 67%
children 24 15 6 3 63%
A»*B animals 24 14 4 6 58%
flowers 24 6 0 18 25%
children 24 0 19 5 79%
A:A' animals 24 0 18 6 75%
flowers 24 0 8 16 33%
It is difficult to Imagine a more intriguing aet of results,
whose two most striking features are these: first, data obtained
with animals and children conform in detail to the pattern
customarily reported in the literature: namely, subjects succeed in
comparing subclasses (A:A* comparisons are 77% correct), apparently
succeed in comparing class and minor subclass (A*<B comparisons are
approximately 61% correct), but fail to compare class and major
subclass (A(B comparisons are 8% correct). Second, data obtained
with flowers apparently bear no relation to these results, for
subjects generally fail to compare subclasses (A:A* - 33% correct),
fail to compare class and minor subclass (A'<B - 25% correct), yet
(95)
apparently succeed in comparing class and major subclass (A< B - 57%
correct).
Further analysis of responses confirms this impression. Table
17 shows appropriate values of z for comparisons between the three
classes of material:








A<B 1.57 4.81** 4.13**
A'<B 0.30 2.31* 2.05*
AsA1 0.35 2.91** 2.61**
* p(.05
** p<.01
Thus there are no significant differences in results between
children and animals on any type of comparison question, while
results obtained with flowers are significantly different from both
these classes on all three types of comparison.
Before undertaking discussion of these data, some estimates of
their reliability is clearly required. Thus in the following




Subjects** 12 naturally English speaking pre-school children
(5 male) of mean age 4;9 years (range: 4j5 - 5(2).
Material As far Experiment 7.
Procedure As for Experiment 7.
Results*1 Subjects' ability to spontaneously name the
experimental material conformed to the by now familiar pattern: with
classes of animals and children* subclasses rather than classes were
named* whereas with the class of flowers* subjects named the class but
not the subclasses.
With the comparison questions* the pattern of data* as presented
in Table 18* is also similar to that of Experiment 7:







children 24 2 22 0 9%
A<B 24 6 18 0 25%
flowers 24 14 8 2 58%
children 24 18 3 3 75%
A'<B animals 24 16 7 1 67%
■ flowers 24 6 1 17 25%
children 24 0 19 5 79%
A:A* animal a 24 0 20 4 83%
*
flowers 24 0 8 16 33%
(97)
With the classes of animals and children, subjects succeed with
AsA* comparisons (81% correct), apparently succeed with A'<B comparisons
(71% correct), but fail with A<B comparisons (17% correct).
However, as in Experiment 7, results with the class of flowers
are strikingly different - A:A* comparisons: 33% correct; A*<B
comparisons: 25% correct; A<B comparisons: 58% correct.
Further analysis again confirms this impression • consider the
appropriate values of z in Table 19:








A<B 1.94 3.98** 2.63**
A*(B 0.17 3.18** 2.61**
A:A» 0.37 2.91** 3.22**
** p< .01
Again, there are no significant differences in results between
classes of children and animals on any type of comparison, while
results obtained with flowers are signifcantly different from both
these classes on all three types of comparison.
Thus the results of Experiment 8 suggest that the data of
Experiment 7 are stable, the patterns of response in each case
being virtually identical. For convenience in subsequent
discussion, the results of both experiments have been collapsed in
Table 20:
(98)







children 48 3 43 2 6% )
) 13%
A<B animals 48 9 37 2 19% )
flowers 48 30 15 3 63%
children 48 33 9 6 69% )
) 66%
A' <B animals 48 30 11 7 63% )
flowers 48 12 1 35 25%
children 48 0 38 10 79% )
) 79%
A:A' animals 48 0 38 10 79% )
flowers 48 0 16 32 33%
Discussion The results of these two experiments suggest that
when subjects are familiar with the subclass-names of objects (e.g.
boy, girl, horse, cow) their responses to comparison questions
conform to the pattern previously reported in the literature: namely,
they succeed with A:A* questions, apparently succeed with A*< B questions,
but fail with A<B questions. However When the subclass-names are
unfamiliar (e.g. tulip, daffodil), responses depart from this pattern,
subjects now failing with A:A* and A*<B questions, but apparently
succeeding with A<B questions.
These results might be explained as follows: subjects, being
unfamiliar with the mmes of the subclasses of flowers, have simply
confused the subclass-names, the appropriate referents of each being
(99)
transposed - i.e. "daffodils" and "tulips" have been confused, the
former name being taken as applicable to the tulips and the latter
name as applicable to the daffodils. This is suggested by the
lack of success with A:A* comparisons, where of ^8 responses, we
observe 16 correct responses of "more A" and 32 incorrect responses
of "more A1" (Table 20; recall that A>A* - see p.10 above).
With this assumption, the rest of the data fall into place.
For the class of flowers, the assumption that A and A* have been
confused requires amendment of the inclusion questions: we must
now regard A*< B questions as being, in effect for the child, A<B
questions; likewise A(B questions must now be regarded as, in
effect, A*<B questions. When we now consider the appropriate data
in the light of these revisions, we find:
(i) A(B comparisons (63% correct, Table 20) be regarded as
in effect A'< B comparisons, with a success rate of 63%;
(ii) A'<B comparisons (25% correct, Table 20) be regarded as
in effect A<B comparisons, with a success rate of 25%.
These data compare with the results for classes of animals and
children, where A*< B comparisons are 66% correct, and A< E comparisons
are 13% correct (Table 20).
Thus the results on inclusion questions presented against the
class of flowers show an inverse relation with those presented
against classes of children and animals; but this inverse relation
is corrected with the assumption that the subclass-naraes (A and A')
of the class of flowers have been confused. This assumption is
checked in Experiment 9.
(100)
Experiment 9
It has been suggested that the inverted pattern of results
previously obtained with the class of flowers arose as a result of
confusing the referents of the subclass-names, tulips being associated
with the name "daffodils", and daffodils associated with the name
"tulips". It is a consequence of this view that had the referents of
these subclass-names not been confused, the response pattern would
not have been inverted. This can be tested simply by clarifying
the referents of the subclasses of flowers, referring to them not
as "tulips" and "daffodils", but as "red flowers" and "yellow
flowers" respectively. If our interpretation is correct, we now
expect that the response pattern with the class of flowers will
re-invert, and conform to the response pattern previously observed
with the classes of animals and children.
Subjects The subjects of Experiments 7 and 8, tested up to
two weeks later."
Material Card (i){ H red tulips and 2 yellow daffodils, and
Card (iv): 2 red tulips and 4 yellow daffodils, of Experiments 7 and
8.
(101)
Procedure Since subjects were familiar with the general
procedure, they were now simply shown a card and presented with the
questions "Are there more flowers or more red flowers?" (care was
taken to ensure that subjects could distinguish red from yellow).
Presentation of the question in this form, compared with: "Are there
more flowers or more tulips", clarifies the referent of the subclass,
for the child no longer has to remember whether "tulips" refers to
the red or the yellow flowers - the question does this for him.
The inclusion question: "Are there more flowers or more red
flowers" functions as a A<B question for Card (i) (4 red tulips), and
as a A*<B question for Card (iv) (2 red tulips).
The cards were presented twice to each subject in random
order.
Results Responses (both correct and incorrect) appear in
Table 21:







A( B 48 2 42 4 4%*
A»(B 48 26 15 7 54%ftft
* 63% in Experiments 7 and 8 (Table 20)
25% in Experiments 7 and 8 (Table 20)
(102)
Subjects now fail with A(B comparisons (4% correct) and meet
with apparent success in A'<B questions (54% correct). Thus the
pattern of responses re-inverts as expected, and is now comparable
to that obtained in Experiments 7 and 8 with the classes of animals
and children.
Discussion The main findings of these experiments can now
be briefly summarized.
Starting from Piaget*s report of different results being
obtained when inclusion questions were posed of classes of flowers
and animals, it has been suggested that such differences are not to
be explained in terms of "remoteness from everyday experience", for
when A:A*, A*<B and A<B comparison questions are posed of familiar
material, and nonsense material which is genuinely remote from the
experience of experimental subjects, we find no decrement in the
performance of a group of 10-year-old children on any type of
comparison, while the performance of a younger group of 6-year-old
subjects shows a decrement on all three types of comparison question
(Experiment 5). This suggests that decrements in performance are
not due to the "remoteness" of the experimental material, but rather
that such decrements are a function of the difficulty subjects can
experience in co-ordinating the names and referents of the comparison
question constituents.
That there is a link between the child*s ability to name and
compare receives some credibility from Experiment 6 which suggests
that the child's ability to handle comparison questions is a function
of his ability to spontaneously name the constituents of the
(103)
experimental material. This latter ability provides an index of
the child's familiarity, not with the nature of the experimental
materiali for he knows that the objects are flowers, or boys and
girls, or horses and cows, but with the appropriate class and
subclass names of the material. I.e. spontaneous naming of the
material constituents either by class or by subclass implies
differential familiarity with class- and subclass-names. And it is
this differential familiarity with the names of constituent terms
in comparison questions which appears to (at least partially)
underlie the child's differential success in answering such comparison
questions.
In an attempt to uncover the processes which might underlie
the child's responses via more intensive study of a smaller group
of younger subjects, the data of Experiment 7 suggest tliat when the
child spontaneously names sets of objects (e.g. animals and children)
with the appropriate subclass-names, the child's pattern of responses
conforms to that previously reported in the literature: the child
meets with success in comparing subclasses (A:A'), apparent success
in comparing class and minor subclass (A'<B), but failure in
comparing class and major subclass (A<B). However with another set
of objects (flowers), where the child's spontaneous naming behaviour
indicates an inability to produce appropriate subclass-names, the
pattern of responses is inverted: failure with A:A', failure with
A*<B, but apparent success with A<B comparisons.
These patterns of response remain stable when replicated with
another group of subjects (Experiment 8).
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It appears that these results are explicable given the assumption
that the child's unfamiliarity with the subclass-names of the class
of flowers has led to confusion of their referents J A-objects have
been associated with A'-name, A'-objects with A-name. This will
account for the child's failure with AsA* comparisons, his failure
with A'<B comparisons (which, given the character of the confusion,
are, for the child, in effect A<B comparisons), and his apparent
success with A<B comparisons (in effect, A'(B comparisons).
The notion that this inverted pattern of results with the class
of flowers in Experiments 7 and 8 arose as a function of the confusion
of subclass-names and referents ia tested in Experiment 9, where on
presentation of A'<B and A<B inclusion questions, the referents of
the subclasses are made appropriately clear in the form of the
question presented to the child. The pattern of responses now
re-inverts, data now conforming to the pattern previously established
with classes of animals and children.
In summary then,these experiments suggest that semantic aspects
of the task play a considerably greater role in the problem of class
inclusion than has been previously recognised. However in addition
to this general conclusion, the results of Experiments 7, 8 and 9
provide us with hypotheses for further investigation, for they
indicate some interesting features of inclusion questions in the
event that the referents of the subclasses are unclear. This
suggests that we pursue inquiry into the problem of the clarity of
reference of terms in inclusion questions, and how this problem
might relate to the processes which Piaget postulates as underlying
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erroneous responses to such inclusion questions. Therefore let
us first briefly recall Piaget's account of processes underlying
A'<B and A(B comparisons, and then,in the light of our present
results, propose a number of amendments.
A'(Bt comparison of class and minor subclass
We have seen that for Piaget, the child's success with this type
of comparison is more apparent than real: the child in fact
compares the two subclasses (A and A*), finds A to be the greater,
and then "simply calls" A by the class term B, thus yielding an
apparently correct result.
A< B: comparison of class and major subclass
Again Piaget argues that the child compares A with A', finding A
to be the greater ("more A"). However the child now produces just
this response, for now A is not "simply called" by the class term B,
as in the previous comparison.
Clearly, both these processes rest on the assumption that the
child cannot compare a class with one of its partsj the child's
reduction of such inclusion questions to subclass-subclass comparisons
is therefore regarded as inevitable.
Now consider some alternative proposals. First, suppose that
the child does indeed compare subclasses on both types of Inclusion
question, but that this is not inevitable - i.e. this process of
reduction to comparison of subclasses does not arise from the child's
inability to compare a class with one of its parts, but rather from
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the child's interpretation of the inclusion questions. For
assume that the child interprets inclusion questions as follows.
Consider an array of H tulips and 2 daffodils, and the
inclusion questions:
(1) A'(B: Are there more daffodils (A') or more flowers (B)?
(2) A< B: Are there more tulips (A) or more flowers (B)?
For these questions, suppose that the child interprets the class
term B (flowers) as referring to that subclass which contrasts
with that specified in the inclusion question. Thus we suppose
that in question (1), where the subclass specified in the question
is daffodils (A*), the class term flowers (B - the remaining term
in the question) is interpreted by the child as referring to the
remaining subclass • i.e. to the tulips (A). And with question
(2), where the specified subclass is tulips (A), we suppose that
the child interprets the class term flowers (B - the remaining term
in the question) as referring to the remaining subclass - i.e. to
the daffodils (A').
For convenience, the following short-hand notation can be
h-
employed.- - When a term is spokec^ by E or S, this will be enclosed
with quotation marks - thus: "A" represents the utterance of the
term-A, "B" represents the utterance of the term-B, etc. By
comparison, when such terms are not enclosed in quotes, this will
indicate that the objects themselves are intended - thus: A represents
the A-objects, B the B-objects, etc. Thus the distinction between
the A-term and the A-objects will simply be represented by "A" and
A respectively, etc.
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Summarising our proposals then: the child interprets inclusion
questions as follows:
in question (1): "Are there more daffodils or more flowers"
("A'<B"), the child interprets "A"' ("daffodils") as referring
to A' (daffodils)# and the remaining term "B" ("flowers") as
referring to the remaining subclass A (tulips);
in question (2): "Are there more tulips or more flowers" ("A<B"),
the child interprets "A" as referring to A, and the remaining
terra "B" ("flowers") as referring to the remaining subclass A'
(daffodils).
Thus we suppose, with Piaget, that inclusion questions do
involve reduction to subclass-subclass comparisons# but not via an
inability to compare class and subclass, but rather through the
child*s interpretation of inclusion questions, where "B" is
restricted to A in minority inclusion questions (like (1)), but to
A* in majority inclusion questions (like (2)).
The former assumption - that the child can compare class and
subclass, is based on consideration of responses to "subtraction
questions" (p. 17 above) which suggest that the child does possess
this ability; and the latter assumption - that the child restricts
the reference of "B" in inclusion questions, is based (i) on
consideration of the response patterns in Experiments 7, 8 and 9
and (ii) on consideration of a recent study of semantic development.
Consider these latter points in turn.
(i) When we present "A'<B" inclusion questions, we customarily
obtain the response "B" (animals and children material, Experiments
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7 and 8; flower material, Experiment 9); however should the child
confuse "A"' with A, we do not obtain this response "B" (flower
material, Experiments 7 and 8). Likewise, when we present "A<B"
questions, we customarily fail to obtain response "B" (animals and
children. Experiments 7 and 8; flowers, Experiment 9), unless the
child has confused "A" with A' when we do obtain response "B"
(flowers, Experiments 7 and 8),
Now if the above assumptions are correct, this is precisely what
would be expected. For in "A'<B" questions, if "A,M is taken as
referring to A, the remaining term in the question "B" will be taken
as referring to the remaining subclass A*. Since subclass A is
greater, and since the child is referring to this subclass by "A1",
this is the response that is produced (Table 20), Similarly in
"A<B" questions, when "A" is interpreted as referring to A*, the
remaining term "B" will be taken as referring to the remaining
subclass A; and again, since A is the greater subclass, and since
the child is referring to it by "Bn, this is the response that is
produced (Table 20),
Thus these assumptions seem able to accommodate the patterns of
response observed in Experiments 7 through 9, Let us now turn to
discussion of their general features.
First, by envisaging an identical process - of differential
restriction of the reference of the term MBM - underlying both types
of inclusion question, our assumptions attempt to resolve the
inconsistency between such processes in Piaget's account.
Second, our assumptions envisage short-term switches in reference
of term "B": from A in minority questions to A1 in majority inclusion
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questions. It is conceit-able, by analogy, that in a different
context of question - e.g. subtraction questions, that we obtain yet
a farther switch in reference of "B", which is now apparently
interpreted as referring to both A and A1. If this should be so,
the anomaly in Piaget's account between results obtained in different
contexts of question will be reduced."
Therefore these assumptions are clearly of some interest, for
they counteract two features of Piaget's account which appear
unsatisfactory: the inconsistency in processes held to underlie
erroneous responses to different types of inclusion problem (majority
and minority inclusion questions)? and the anomaly between the child's
performance in different contexts of question (inclusion and subtraction
questions). If our assumptions can be justified, the similar process
they envisage underlying both types of inclusion question is not
subject to the criticism of inconsistencyJ and the short-term switches
in reference of the term "B" envisaged both between majority and
minority inclusion questions, and between these and subtraction
questions, do not lead to anomaly.
Clearly the central assumption concerns differential restriction
in the reference, or applicability, of the superordinate term "B", and
we must now ask if there is any evidence that this in fact occurs.
This brings us to a recent study of semantic development.
(ii) Study of the young child's acquisition of adjectives which
describe variations in size (e.g. big, tall, thick„ wide, etc.) leads
Campbell S Wales (1970) to the following suggestion:
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(Initially, bi£) is used with reference to almost all
differences of size. As the other more specialized
adjectives are learned, however, big may fall out of use
or may be restricted to cases of complex differences in
size (e.g. to cases where the objects being compared covary
along two Dr more dimensions).
(Campbell 8 Wales, 1970: 259)
Thus whereas all differences in size (tall, thick, fat, wide, etc.)
are initially described via use of big, as the child acquires the
more specialized adjectives, use of big decreases, being used only
in cases of complex size differences.
By analogy with this process six initial use of an all-encompassing
superordinate adjective being progressively restricted through
acquisition of more specialized hyponyms (Lyons, 1968: 453-455),
Campbell 8 Wales go on to suggest that a similar process may underlie
the child's response to Piaget's inclusion questions:
For instance, show the child three tulips and five roses
and then ask: "Are there more roses or more flowers?". At
lower age-levels children tend to reply that there are
more roses. If children typically organise their
vocabulary in the way we have suggested then this result
is hardly surprising.
(Campbell 8 Wales, 1970: 253)
Thus Campbell 8 Wales envisage that, initially, the child acquires
correct application of the all-encompassing superordinate term
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flowers. Use of this term (like big) is then progressively
restricted as the hyponyms (e.g. rose, tulip, daffodil etc.) are
acquired (like tall, fat, thick, wide, etc.). Thus the child's
response: "More roses", to the inclusion question: "Are there more
roses or more flowers" is interpreted as due to the fact that the
child has, for the roses, restricted application of the term flowers.
The "inclusion" question effectively asks the child to compare the
roses and the (remaining) flowers - i.e. the tulips.
Now of course there are similarities between the account of
inclusion questions which we have presented above, and that of
Campbell & Walesj however it is useful to stress the differences.
While Campbell & Wales envisage the process of restricting applicab¬
ility of the superordinate as hyponyms are acquired, it is clear that
this is seen as a long-term process. However in the account being
presented here, it is suggested that the process is essentially
short-term (i.e. dependent on immediate context). Consider the
inclusion question discussed by Campbell & Wales: whereas the
reference of "flowers" is interpreted as applying to tulips in the
"more roses or more flowers" question, we know that on presentation
of a "more tulips or more flowers" question, the child's interpretation
of the reference of "flowers" will immediately switch to roses. So
while Campbell & Wales appear correct insofar as the processing of
A< B questions is concerned: the child does indeed appear to restrict
use of "B" to the subclass of tulips (A'), their suggestion as to
the long-term nature of such restrictions appears less satisfactory:
there seems ample evidence in Experiments 7 through 9 to suggest
that such restrictions are essentially short-term.*4
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Since, as already suggested, restrictions in reference of
superordinate terms will accommodate both the inconsistency and
anomctLy apparent in Piaget*s account of inclusion, and since there
is some evidence that such a process of restriction does occur in
semantic development, the next step must be to obtain some evidence
which will reflect not only on the incidence of referential
restrictions of the superordinate class term in inclusion questions,
but also on their short-, or long-terra nature. We attempt to
obtain such evidence in the following experiment.
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Experiment 10
This experiment intends to test the incidence (if any) of
short-term switches in the reference of the class term "B" by
presenting A(B and A'<B inclusion questions in the standard manner,
and then asking the child to indicate the referents of the terms in
the question he has just answered.
Predictions are as follows (cf: p. 107 above):
(1): for A<B questions it is predicted that "B" will be
interpreted as applying to subclass A' (i.e. "B" = A').
(2): for A'(B questions it is predicted that the reference of
"B" will switch and now be interpreted as applying to subclass A
(i.e. "B" = A).
A third condition will also be observed, where the child is
presented with an instruction involving use of "B" without specific
mention of either major or minor subclass. For such instructions
we predict:
(3): a further referential switch in that the child will now
interpret "B" as applying to both subclasses (i.e. "B" = A+A').
Subjects 12 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (6 male)
of mean age 5;5 years (range: 5;4 - 5;6).
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Material Cards (i) - (ill) of Experiment 6, showing classes
of animals (4 horses + 2 cows), children (4 boys + 2 girls) and
flowers (4 red tulips + 2 yellow daffodils).
Each member of each of these classes, individually mounted on
cardboard squares (approximately 1 x lw).
Three cards (9 x 9"), one red, one black, one grey.
Three wooden boxes (8 x 7 x l£").
Procedure Subjects were tested individually by the same E.
Ss were informed that E had some games which they were going to
play. The classes of objects were introduced by showing Cards (i) -
(iii) and asking S to name the material as in previous experiments.
The subclasses of flowers were referred to as "red/yellow flowers"
rather them "tulips/daffodils".
The coloured (9 x 9") cards were then placed on the table
between S and E, the red card in the centre, the grey card to S's
left, and the black card to S's right.
A class of material (on separate lxl" squares) was then placed
on the table in front of S, who was asked to reidentify them: consider
the class of children as examplei
You have seen these before. What are these (pointing to A)? -
Boys. Yes, that's right. And what are these (pointing to A')? -
Girls. Yes, these are girls. And what do we call them, what are
boys and girls? - Children. Yes, that's right, boys and girls
are children.
Let's put them on the red card.
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When this had been done, S was then instructed!
You put the children ("B") on the black card ...,.(R1)
When S*s response had been noted, E returned the material which S
had moved to the centre red card.
Thereafter, one of the two standard inclusion questions was
presented: "Tell me, are there more children or more girls (A'<B)?"
When S had given a reply, he was then instructed:
Put the children ("B") on the black card, and the girls (A*)
on the grey card, •„,..(R2)
Alternatively: "Tell rae, are there more children or more boys
(A(B)?", After S had given a reply, he was instructed:
Put the children ("B") on the black card and the boys (A) on
the grey card. ......(R3)
The order of presentation of these two inclusion questions was
counterbalanced across the group, as were the order of terms in the
questions ("more A/A' or more B" versus "more B or more A/A*"), and
the order of terms in the subsequent instructions ("put the B on
the black card and the A/A* on the grey card" versus "pmt the A/A*
on the grey card and the B on the black card").
After S had replied to an inclusion question and made a response
to the appropriate subsequent instruction, E placed the material
which S had moved back to the centre red card, presented the other
inclusion question and instruction, and again returned the material
to the centre red card.
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E then placed a wooden box on the table, and instructed Ss
You put the children ("B") in this box. . (R"+)
E noted S's behaviour in placing material on the black card on
the occasions R1-R3, and into the box on
If the above predictions are upheld, for each class of objects
S should place material as follows:
(Rl) S should place all the material on the black card, indicating
his interpretation of MB" as referring to both A and A* ("B" a A+A' -
see prediction (3) above).
(R2) S should place the A material on the black card, indicating
a switch in reference where MBW is now interpreted as restricted to A
("B" = A in A'<B inclusion questions « see prediction (2) above).
(R3) S should place the A* material on the black card, indicating
a further switch in reference of MB", now restricted to A' (MBM = A' in
A?B inclusion questions - see prediction (1) above).
(R*0 S should place all the material in the box, indicating yet
another switch in reference of "B", now taken as referring to both
subclasses ("B" = A+A* • see prediction (3) above).
Results Data appear in Table 22, where entries represent the
number of subjects (maximum: 12) whose behaviour in placing material
on occasions Rl through R4 conforms to that predicted:
Table 22: /
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Table 22: Number of subjects who respond as predicted (Experiment 10)
Material Occasion
R1 R2 R3 m
children 10 12 12 9
animals 8 10 11 8
flowers 10 12 12 12
Totals 28 3h 35 29
Percentage totals 78% 9h% 97% 81%
The patterns of observed data clearly indicate that subjects*
interpretations of the referents of "BM switch at different points
in the experiment, in the manner predicted.
Discussion On the whole, the results of this experiment seem
reasonably clear, for subjects' interpretation of the reference of
"B" for instructions R1 through R4 seems dependent on whether or not
the instruction has been immediately preceded by specific mention of
a subclass. Thus for R2, immediately preceded by A'< B questions
which specify minor subclassA*, subjects clearly interpret "B" as
applicable to major subclass A (9h% of observations), while for R3,
immediately preceded by A(B questions specifying major subclass A,
subjects now interpret "B" as referring to minor subclass A* (97% of
observations) - see Table 22. Thus short-term switches in the
reference of "B" between these occasions are observed as predicted.
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However the results for R1 and R4 are perhaps not quite so clear,
although on the whole they do conform to the expectations that when
instructions involving mention of "B" are »ot immediately preceded
by mention of subclasses, there will be no restriction in the
reference of the B term: for Rl, 78% of observations conform to the
prediction that "B" will encompass both subclasses (A+A*), while the
analogous figure for R4 is 81% (Table 22).
However am interesting feature of these results lies in the
considerable proportion of observations which fail to conform to
expectation - 22% of observations in Rl, and 19% in R4, where
subjects appear to restrict the reference of "B" to one or other of
the subclasses in a "spontaneous" fashion. This process of
"spontaneous restriction" does not seem accommodated by the suggestion
that restrictions of "B" are induced by specification of contrastive
subclasses (p. 106 above). A more detailed breakdown of the
data for Rl and R4 appears in Table 23, which shows that in 12% of
observations, reference Of "B" appears spontaneously restricted to
major subclass A (11% for Rl, 14% for R4), and that in 8% of
observations, reference of "B" is spontaneously restricted to minor
subclass A' (11% for Rl, 5% for R4).
Table 23:/
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Table 23: Referents of "B** for instructions R1 and R4 (Experiment 10)




















Of course these results might be attributed to experimental
noise, except that the apparent lack of noise in the data for R2
and R3 makes this seem less plausible.
Further consideration of subjects' responses to R1 and R4 is
informative} most subjects, when presented with the instruction:
"You put the B on the black card/in the box" immediately moved the
A and A' subclasses on to the card/into the box. However some
subjects moved one of the subclasses and then appeared rather
hesitant before moving the other subclass. One subject expressed
his doubts quite explicitly for Rl, asking E: "Do you want me to
put all the B on the black card?".
As we can see from Table 23, uome subjects simply moved one of
the subclasses and left aside the other subclass (8/36 observations
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for Rl, 7/36 observations for R4). When this occurred, E asked
the following supplementary question - consider the class of animals
(horse3 said cows) with respect to Rl as examples
assume that on the instruction to put the animals on the black
card, S moved only the horses, leaving the cows on the centre red
card; E would then ask: "What about these (pointing to the cows) -
aren't these animals too?" (and so as appropriate to the class of
material and the child's behaviour). The responsesto this type
of question are interesting: in some cases children made no further
response, neither saying anything nor moving any material. In one
case, the child gave an explicit answer: "No, these (the cows) aren't
animals", whereupon E then asked: "Well if they're not animals, what are
they?", to receive the response: "They're cows". Now this would
look very much like the sort of long-term restriction discussed above
(p. Ill), except for the fact that the child has just previously agreed,
when the material was set out on the table, that both horses and cows
are animals.
An equally common response to E's supplementary question was .
where S replied: "Oh yes, they are animals too", and then moved the
subclass in question from the centre red card to join the subclass
which had already been moved to the black card. This sort of
response occured in 5 out of 3 cases for Rl, and in 2 out of 7 cases
for R4.
Thus it appears that with the B term, even without mention of
a contrastive subclass, some subjects spontaneously restrict
application of "B" to one or other of the subclasses, while the
spontaneous restrictions of other subjects seem little more than a
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result of uncertainty which is overcome on presentation of a
supplementary question sufficient to clarify the application of "B".
Since the notion that "B" terms may be restricted as a result
of uncertainty as to their application is of considerable interest,
it was decided to examine this further by presenting the same
subjects with "subtraction questions" (p. 17 above) in order to
observe whether this process of spontaneous restriction of "B"
occurs: (i) with a different context of questions; (ii) when such




Subjects The subjects of Experiment 10, tested up to 4 days
later.
Material The 9x9" red card, and the classes of material
individually mounted on 1 x 1" cardboard squares, of Experiment 10.
Procedure Subjects were introduced to the task with the
preamble of Experiment 10 (see p. 114 above), and the same
reidentification procedure was employed ("You have seen these before,
etc..... Let*s put them on this red card").
The following subtraction questions were then presented, order
of presentation being counterbalanced across subjects except for
question (4) which was always presented last!
(1) If I took the A away from this card, would there by
anything left?
(2) tThis time) If I took the A' away, would there be
anything left?
(3) (This time) If I took the B away, would there be
anything left?
(4) (This time) If I took all the B away, would there be
anything left?
Subjects responses were recorded.
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Results The results for questions (1) and (2) are clear -
subjects uniformly reply that the A* will be left in question (1),
and that the A will be left in question (2). (Occassional
misunderstanding did occur: for example - "If I take the boys away,
will there by anything left? - Yes, the girls. This time, if I
take the girls away, will there be anything left? - No. Why not? -
Because you've taken them all away. What have I taken away? -
These (pointing to the boys and girls). All right, suppose I
haven't taken anything away yet. Now this time, if I take the
girls away, will there be anything left? - Yes, the boys". Clearly
this sort of misunderstanding arose when the child did not appreciate
that the intended "starting point" for each subtraction was the
total class. When this was made clear, subjects invariably handled
questions (1) and (2) correctly.)
Results for questions (3) and (4) appear in Table 24, where
entries represent the number of subjects (maximum: 12) who say that
subclass A, subclass A', or nothing (0) will be left on subtraction
of "the B" ("-B": question (3)), and on subtraction of "all the B"
("-all B": question (4)):





















Note To obtain the appropriate restrictions, we simply
invert. E.g. consider responses to Question (3) in Table 24. If
7 subjects (Column 1) say that on subtraction of "B", A will remain,
then clearly these subjects are restricting "B" to A*. Analogously,
if 11 subjects (Column 2) say that on subtraction of "B", A* will
remain, then clearly these subjects are restricting "B" to A. Taking
a specific example: if there are tulips (A) and daffodils (A') on
the board, and if S says that the tulips (A) will be left on removal
of the flowers (-B), then the subject is restricting flowers ("B")
to the daffodils (A*)} but, if S says that the daffodils (A*) will
remain on removal of the flowers (-B), then S is restricting "B" to
the tulips (A).
Discussion These results indicate that in a different context
of question than that presented in Experiment 10, we can again observe
some spontaneous restriction of "B" to one or other subclass; although
on 50% of observations there is no such restriction, on 31% of
observations "B" is restricted to A and on 19% of observations "B"
is restricted to A* (Table 24; see the above Note on inversion).
However these results are quite clearly a function of uncertainty
i.
as to the application of "B" in question (3), for when the application
of "B" is clarified in question (4)i "If I take away all the B ...",
subjects uniformly reply that there will be nothing left. The
differences in response to these questions are significant (for the
class of children: z = 2.45, p<.05; animals: z = 2.65, p<.05; flowers:
z s 2.24, p<.05).
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Thus the process of restriction of the "B" term would appear
to be not only a function of specification of a contractive subclass,
for "B" also appears at times spontaneously restricted when its
application or reference is unclear; however when its reference is
clarified, such restriction disappears.
These results are of interest in that they have a direct
bearing on the anomaly in Piaget's account of inclusion: when
Piaget presents subtraction questions the child appears to appreciate
the relations holding between a class and its constituent parts: i.e.
that B a A+A* and that B-A* a A/B-A a A*. However the child appears
unable to handle these relations on presentation of inclusion
questions. As already mentioned (p. 19 above) Piaget attempts to
account for this anomaly by suggesting that in the latter context of
inclusion questions, the child is unable to co-ordinate the relations
of the former context of subtraction questions. We are now in a
position to offer an alternative hypothesis.
First consider Piaget's data (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 109,
Tables IV and V): while twenty subjects of 5-6 years produce a 46%
success rate with the inclusion question: "Are there more flowers or
more primulas" (Table IV), the success rate increases to 71% with
subtraction questions (Table V).
The present results with subtraction questions show 50% success
with question (3): subtraction of "the B", but 100% success with
question (4): subtraction of "all the B".
Now consider the form of Piaget's subtraction question: "If all
the flowers are picked, are any primulas left?". Thus Piaget's
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question, like question (4) above, includes the phrase "all the Bs",
which presumably clarifies the reference of the "B" term, leading
to a considerably higher rate of success than might be obtained with
an analogue to question (3) above: "If the flowers are picked, are
any primulas left?".
Thus the anomaly in Piaget's data may be due to the fact that
in one context of questions (subtraction) the reference of "B" is
clarified - yielding a large measure of success, but unclarified
in the other context of questions (inclusion) where considerable
lack of success is generally observed. On this assumption, should
the reference of "B" be as unclarified in the context of subtraction
questions as is the case with inclusion questions, a considerable
decrease in the success rate might be expected. And this is
exactly what is observed in the results of Experiment 11 (Table 24).
This yields an interesting hypothesis: namely, that the child's
lack of success with inclusion questions is not a function of an
inability to simultaneously co-ordinate comparison of a whole class
with one of its parts, as in Piaget's account, bat rather a function
of the language associated with the inclusion questions presented to
the child. For consider the argument to date: the reference of "B"
seems unclear in inclusion questions (A(B) which subjects generally
fail to answer correctly; when the reference of "B" is similarly
unclear in subtraction questions (-B), we obtain a similar failure
rate. However when the reference of the "B" term is clarified in
subtraction questions (-all B), the success rate increases
significantly (Piaget's own results; Experiment 11 above). The
next step is now clear: if inclusion questions are presented with
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the reference of "B" clarified (e.g. A<all B), will we obtain an
increase in success as is the case with subtraction questions?
If so, the anomaly in Piaget's account will dissolve. This notion
is tested in the following set of experiments.
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Experiment 12
At this point we encounter a methodological difficulty,
although our problem seems straightforward enough: we wish to present
what can be called "standard" class inclusion questions of the sort
used by Piaget (i.e. A<B), and compare performance with that
obtained on presentation of "amended" class inclusion questions
where the reference of the "B" term is clarified in some way (e.g.
A(all 3). But clearly, subjects must respond incorrectly to
standard CI questions before we can draw any conclusion from
differences in performance (if any obtain) with amended CI questions:
for our hypothesis is that incorrect answers to standard questions
are not so much a function of inability to simultaneously compare a
class and subclass, but rather a function of the language of the
standard questions. If a child answers standard questions correctly,
in Piagetian terms he is already functioning in an operational manner,
and is thereby unsuitable as a subject for the present experiment.
The most obvious means of ensuring that subjects are not
operational is to work with children considerably younger than 8
years (when subjects customarily pass from the preoperational stage).
Thus the following experiments observe children of 5-6 years, most
of whom can be expected to answer standard CI questions incorrectly.
(129)
However this does not meet the difficulty completely, for it is
a commonplace of developmental theories that one may not identify
age with stage; thus there is no guarantee that all 6 year-olds will
be preoperational and answer standard CI questions incorrectly.
Indeed, we have seen Piaget report that 46% of 5-6 year—olds answer
his (standard) questions correctly (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 109;
see p. 125 above).
Previous studies underline this difficulty - in a study by Morf
(1959), as reported by Kohnstamm (1963), 27% of subjects aged 4-7
years answered standard inclusion questions correctly in a spontaneous
fashion. However in Kohnstamm's own studies, only 3% of 5 year-olds
gave spontaneously correct answers.
These differences in the proportions of subjects who answer
standard CI questions in a spontaneously correct manner can presumably
be attributed to sampling and/or material. Nevertheless this does
suggest that in any group of 5-6 year-olds, there are likely to be
some children who will answer standard CI questions correctly from
the outset. Thus in the present experiment, and in those that
follow, we attempt to incorporate a check which will identify that
proportion of the group which answers standard questions in a
spontaneously correct manner, and base any conclusions on data from
the proportion of the group that remains. Thus any differences
that may obtain between performance on standard and amended CI
questions will be confined to subjects who answer the former questions
incorrectly.
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Subjects 24 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (14 male),
of mean age 5;8 years (range: 5;6 - 5;11),
Material As for Experiment 11 (p. 122 above).
Procedure A class of material, mounted on individual lxl"
squares, was placed on the red card on the table. The customary
naming procedure was effected.
E then presented a standard CI question (A< B) in the form: "I
wnat you to tell roe which there are more of: are there more of the A
or more of the B?". S's response was recorded, the material removed,
the next class of material presented, the naming procedure effected,
and a further standard inclusion question put to the child. This
continued until S had made a response to standard CI questions
presented against all three classes of material (children, animals,
flowers), order of presentation of classes being counterbalanced
across the group, as was order of terms within the questions: "more
of the A or more of the B" versus "more of the B or more of the A".
When a child had completed this part of the experiment, the
material was presented again, but now the child was asked amended
CI questions of the form: "Are there more of the A or more of all
the B?", or: "Are there more of the A or more of the B altogether?",
or: "Are there more of the A or more of all the B altogether?", these
forms of question being intended to clarify the reference of the "B"
term. Presentation of material and order of terms in the questions
were counterbalanced as before.
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Results For each subject we have three responses on a set of
standard CI questions, and three responses on a set of amended CI
questions, presented against the same material. Where a subject has
given two or three consistent responses in any set, that consistent
response has been recorded as his answer for that set. For
example, if a subject answered "more boys" (A), "more animals" (B),
and "more red flowers" (A), to a set of three questions, whether
standard or amended, then his overall consistent response has been
recorded as A. However had this subject answered "more children"
(B) to the first question, his consistent response (2 out of 3) would
have been recorded as B.
Of the 24 subjects tested, 8 answered B to at least two of
the standard CI questions; we therefore regarded these subjects as
having answered the standard questions in a spontaneously correct
manner, and did not test them further.
Of the remaining 16 subjects, who had answered A to at least
two standard questions, 5 then answered the amended CI questions
correctly while the other 11 subjects answered the amended questions
incorrectly. Thus of 16 subjects amenable to facilitation in
answering CI questions when the reference of the "B" term is
clarified, 5 are in fact facilitated, but 11 are not.
These results, summarised in Table 25 where entries represent
number of subjects, are somewhat unexpected:
Table 25i/
(132)
Table 25: Results (Experiment 12)
CI question form Responses
Total Correct Incorrect
Standard 24 8 16
Amended 16 5 11
However, while we might be tempted to reject our hypothesis
had none of our subjects shown facilitation, the fact that five
subjects do show facilitation suggests that the hypothesis be
regarded as "not proven" - i.e. there is not at present sufficient
evidence in its support.
The hypothesis is therefore tested further in the following
experiment where we attempt to ensure that all subjects are aware
of the reference of the term "all the B", Although it was assumed
in Experiment 12 that this would he so from the form of the amended
CI question, this assumption may not in fact have been met. Thus
subjects showing lack of facilitation on a question like: "Are
there more of the A or more of all the B" may still be restricting
the term "all the B" to the contrastive subclass A*, as in previous
experiments. In the experiment which follows we therefore interpose,
after presentation of standard CI questions, but before presentation
of amended CI questions, the set of subtraction questions utlilized
in Experiment 11 (p. 122 above), where the difference between question
(3): "-the B" and question (4): " -all the B" is intended to clarify




Subjects 24 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (12 male)
of mean age 6;5 years (range: 6;0 - 6;8).
Material As for Experiment 12.
Procedure The customary naming procedure was effected for a class
of material placed on the red card. A standard inclusion question
(A<B: "Are there more of the A or more of the B") was then presented.
When S had given a response, subtraction questions (1) - (4)
(p.122 above) of Experiment 11 were presented, in that order, in an
attempt to emphasize the reference of the phrase "all the B".
An amended question (A<all B: "Are there more of the A or more
of all the B") was then presented.
This procedure was repeated for the other two classes of material,
orders of presentation of classes and terms in the inclusion questions
being counterbalanced as before.
Results Data are treated as in Experiment 12 *» the subject's
consistent response to two or three out of three standard, or amended,
CI questions is recorded.
Of the 24 subjects tested, 6 gave spontaneously correct answers
to at least two of the initial set of standard CI questions and were
therefore not tasted further. The remaining 18 subjects may be
regarded as amenable to facilitation.
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With the subtraction questions, results are similar to those
obtained in Experiment 11 - while answers are generally correct to
questions (1) and (2) ("-A" and "-A*" respectively), there is a
considerable amount of restriction with question (3) ("~B"), which
again disappears with question (4) ("-all B"). Data for these last
two questions appear in Table 26, where the maximum number of
observations per entry equals 54 (18 subjects x 3 classes of material).
Observations concern what subjects say will be left (A, A' or nothing)
on subtraction of "the B" (question (3)), and on subtraction of
"all the B" (question (4)); as before, restriction may be guaged by
inversion (see Note p. 124 above).














totals 59% 6% 35% 0% 0% 100%
Direct comparison between Tables 24 and 26 is of course
misleading, since the former includes data contributed by subjects
who might well have given spontaneously correct responses to standard
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CI questions, while the latter does not. Nevertheless as before, we
notice that restriction of the term "B" to A or A* disappears when
the reference of "B" is clarified in question (4).
With the amended CI questions (A<all B), we find that of 18
subjects amenable to facilitation, 3 are facilitated and 15 are not.
These results are summarized in Table 27 whose entries represent
number of subjects:
Table 27: Results (Experiment 13)
CI question form Responses
Total Correct Incorrect
Standard 24 6 18
Amended 18 3 15
As with Experiment 12, results are somewhat unexpected:
attempted clarification of the "B" term in inclusion questions has
resulted in the facilitation of but a few subjects. This result
naturally leads to the question as to why so many subjects have
shown lack of facilitation, quite apart from the obvious factor
that but little training has been given.
It was suggested in Experiment 12 that with amended inclusion
questions, the term "all the B" may be restricted to the contrastive
subclass as was the term "B" in previous experiments. (Should this
process in fact underlie the majority of responses in Experiment 12,
this is clearly not overcome by attempted clarification of these
terms in the context of subtraction questions interposed in the
present experiment).
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Some plausibility that this in fact occurs comes from consideration
of transcribed tape-recordings of responses to a series of supplementary
questions presented to the last six subjects of the present experiment,
none of whom showed any facilitation, When the experiment proper
had been completed, in an attempt to uncover the processes underlying
lack of facilitation, E presented an unstandardized set of supplementary
questions with respect to that class of material which S had first
encountered in the experiment proper. Dialogue between S and B was
tape-recorded, and E made appropriate notes of S's pointing behaviour.
Protocols for these 6 Ss read as follows (because of the counter¬
balanced order of presentation of material, there are two protocols
for each class of material);
Protocols t Experiment 13
Array; 6 children, 4 boys and 2 girls
SI ; P.B. female, 6;7 years. "Are there more of all the children
or more of the boys? - More of the boys. Show me the boys (- points
to the four boys, one at a time; we indicate this with;) bbbb. How
many? - Four. Four of the boys. How many of the children? - Six.
How many of the boys? - Four. How many of the children? - Six.
Which are there more of; more of the boys or more of the children? -
More o* ..... the children. Show me the children - bbbbgg. Why
are there more of the children? - 'Cos they*re all together."
Notes: This subject appears to answer the inclusion question
adequately when the referents of the terms in the question are made
clear. However her attempted justification of her response is of the
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"inscrutable" variety, at least in Piagetian terms, since there is no
explicit recognition that the extension of the major subclass is less
than, but contributory to, that of the class.
S2: L.C. female, 6;8 years. "Show me the boys - bbbb. How many? -
Four. Shov? me the children - gg. Show me all the children -
bbbbgg. How many? - Six. Six of all the children and how many of
the boys? - Four. Are there more of all the children or more of the
boys? - Boys. Is six more than four: which is more? - Six. How
many of all the children? ~ Six. How many of the boys? - Four.
Which are there more of, more of all the children altogether or more
of the boys? - The boys. How many boys are there? - Four. How
many of all the children? - Six. Which are there more of? - (no
response). If there*s six of all the children and four of the boys,
which are there more of? - (no response). What do you think? - Six.
Six what? - Children. Show me them - bbbbgg."
Notes t This subject clearly restricts the "B" terra to the minor
subclass A', producing the response "more A" to the A<B question.
This response then appears firmly entrenched and is carried over to
A(all B inclusion questions. While the supplementary questions
above do appear to clarify the reference of "all the B", and while
the subject eventually produces the correct answer, there is no
guarantee that the subject is now genuinely facilitated, due to
absence of justification.
Array} 6 animals, H horses and 2 cows
S3: L.B. female, 6}7 years. "Show me all the animals - hhhhcc.
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Are there more of all the animals or are there more of the horses?
- All of the horses. Show me the horses - hhhh, counting out loud!
one, two, three, four. Four horses. Now you show me all the animals
altogether * hhhhcc, counting out loud: one, two, three, four, five,
six. All right, four horses and six animals; is that right? - Yes.
Which are there more of? - Horses. There are four horses, and how
many animals? » Two (pointing: cc). You count them out again, all
of the animals - hhhhcc, counting out loud: _one, two....six. Six
animals, isn't it? - Yes. Which is the bigger number, four or six?
- Six. Is six the bigger number? - Yes. All right then, which are
there more of: more of all the animals or more of the horses? - Six
of them. Six of the what? - Animals. Six of the animals and how
many of the horses? - Four. All right, which are there more of:
more of the animals or more of the horses? - More of the horses.
There are four horses aren't there? - Yes. And how many animals? -
Two. How many of all the animals? - Six, Well then if there are
six animals and four horses, which are there more of? - All of them.
i
All of the what? - Hors cows and horse3."3 *
Notes: This subject clearly restricts "the B" to A*, but appears
to handle "all the B" correctly. However when an amended CI question
is presented, this appears to be reduced, as before, to a comparison
of subclasses, which may be due to a confusion between the standard
and amended forms of inclusion question. However when this is
clarified with further distinction between "the B" and "all the B",
an apparently correct response is obtained.
SI: N,S,, female, 6;7 years. "Are there more of all the animals or
more of the horses? - More of the horses. Show me the horses -
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hhhh. How many? - Four. Four horses. Show me the animals - cc.
Show me all the animals - hhhhcc. How many? - Six. All right,
six of all the animals, and how many horses? - Four. Four horsesj
and how many of all the animals? » Two. Of all the animals? - Six.
All right, which are there more of, more of the horses or more of all
the animals? - More of all the animals. Why? - (no response).
Show me all the animals - hhhhcc."
Notes: This subject provides explicit evidence for the notion that
the phrase "all the B" is restricted to A'. When this phrase is
clarified, a correct response is obtained, although as before, the
subject gives no verbal justification of her correct response.
Array: 6 flowers, H red tulips and 2 yellow daffodils
S5: A.S., male, 6}7 years. "Are there more of all the flowers or
more of the red flowers? - Red. Show me the red flowers * tttt.
How many? - Four. Show me all the flowers altogether - ttttdd.
How many? - Six. All right, four red flowers and six flowers
altogether} which are there more of: more of the red flowers or more
of all the flowers? * All of them. Show me all of them - ttttdd."
Notes: This subject responds correctly when the referents of the
terms in the amended CI question are clarified.
S6: K.L., male, 6}6 years. "Are there more of all the flowers or
more of the red flowers? - More of the red flowers. Show me the
red flowers - tttt. How many? - Four. Four red flowers. Show
me the flowers * dd. Show me all the flowers - ttttdd. How many?
- Six. Six of all the flowers and how many red flowers? - Four.
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And how many of all the flowers? - Six. Which are there more ofi
more of the red flowers or more of all the flowers? - Red. How
many of the red? - Four. How many of all the flowers? - Six.
Which are there more of: more of the red flowers or more of all the
flowers? - All the flowers. Show me all the flowers - ttttdd.
All right, there's more of all the flowers. Can you tell me why
there's more of all the flowers? - 'Cos all the flowers are there
(indicating array). And how many are there? - Six. And how many
red flowers? - Four. Then why are there more of all the flowers? -
(no response)."
Notes: This subject also provides evidence that "B" is restricted
to A'. When the reference of B is clarified by referring to "all
the B", the child eventually produces a correct response to the
amended inclusion question. But as with SI above, the justification
obtained is again "inscrutable" according to Piagetian criteria for
adequacy of justification.
Discussion These protocols suggest that in subjects initially
unfacilitated by an amended form of inclusion question, there is
some measure of understanding when the referents of the question
terms are clarified by pointing and counting. However the reduction
of inclusion questions to subclass-subclass comparison questions
often seems entrenched, even when the form of the question is intended
to clarify the referents of the superordinate class-term; both standard
(A<B) and amended (A<all B) inclusion questions thus often appear
treated in a similar manner, "B" or "all B" being restricted to A',
the minor subclass.
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Now of course Piaget could argue that this is inevitable, given
the child*s inability to simultaneously compare a class with one of
its parts. But as already suggested, the child does seem able to
make such comparisons in subtraction questions; the measure of
facilitation, however modest, observed in Experiments 12 and 13 above,
lends support to this notion, as does the measure of understanding
which (initially unfacilitated) subject*s indicate on presentation of
supplementary questions in the above protocols. Thus the inevitability
of the superordinate term being interpreted as referring to the minor
subclass in majority inclusion questions seems unacceptable, and leads
to the notion that should one be able to prevent inclusion questions
being interpreted as subclass-subclass comparison questions, one might
expect to observe correct responses. Clearly the problem lies in
attempting to achieve this. In the following experiment orae such
attempt is reported where, for any class of material, we ask subjects
to point to all three sets (A, A*, all B) and then present the question:
"Are there more of the A, more of the A', or more of all the B?".
This is intended to prevent interpretation of "B" as referring only
to subclass A* (which we have suggested has occurred in previous
experiments) by explicitly mentioning subclass A' In the question, to
contrast with both B and A.
(1H2)
Experiment
Subjects 12 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (5 male)
of mean age 6;2 years (range: 6;1 - 6;3).
Material As for Experiment 13.
Procedure A class of material was placed, as before, on the
red card in front of S, order of presentation of classes being
counterbalanced across the group. The customary naming procedure
was effected.
The subject was then asked to point to "the A", "the A'" and
"all the B". When this had been done, E asked: "I want you to
tell me which there are more of: are there more of the A, more of
the A*, or more of all the B altogether?" (e.g. "Are there more of
the boys, more of the girls, or more of all the children altogether").
Some subjects interupted and gave a reply before the question had
been completed - e.g. "Are there more of the boys, more of the girls,
or .." -"More boys." When this occurred E instructed S: "You are
giving me an answer before I have finished asking the question; I
want you to *ait until I have finished the question before you tell
me what you think".
Results Of the 12 subjects tested, responded correctly to
all three items, 3 responded correctly to the second and third items
(113)
but not to the first, 2 responded correctly to the third item but
not to the first or second, and 3 responded incorrectly to all three
items. These results are summarised in Table 28:
Table 28: Results (Experiment 11)




Discussion There are some difficulties in interpretation
of these results. In previous experiments, a subject has been
credited with that answer he gives consistently on two or three
occasions for a set of three items. Using this method of scoring,
7 subjects out of 12 show facilitation in the present experiment.
However there is no means of estimating how many of these
seven would have given spontaneously correct answers to standard
CI questions had they been presented. Thus we cannot claim that
the present experiment shows a majority of subjects to have been
facilitated.
But apart from this, a further difficulty arises - our method
of scoring results by recording the predominant response (two or
three consistent responses to three items) may well do injustice
to those subjects who fail to answer correctly until the third
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item (SI and S6 in Table 28 above), for these subjects may now be
responding in a genuinely correct manner. If this should be so,
then 9 subjects out of 12 show some measure of facilitation.
Presumably this point could be clarified by testing subjects on
a longer series of items. However the former difficulty remains -
what proportion of subjects would have given spontaneously correct
answers to standard CI questions? We attempt to meet these
difficulties in the next experiment where subjects are tested on
a longer series of items, the first item of this extended series
being presented with an inclusion question in standard form in
order to "screen" subjects who might answer such questions correctly.
(1*5)
Experiment 15
Subjects 20 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (3 male)
of mean age 6;* years (range: 5;10 - 6;7).
Material Classes of children, animals and flowers, each member
being individually mounted on 1 x 1" cardboard squares as in previous
experiments; classes of matches, sweets and paperclips. Characteris¬
tics are summarized in Table 29:
Table 29: Material (Experiment 15)
Class (B) Major Subclass (A) Minor subclass (A1)
children * boys 2 girls
animals 6 horses 3 cows
flowers 5 red tulips 2 yellow daffodils
matches : * blue matches 2 red matches
sweets 6 green sraarties* 3 white polos**
paperclips 5 weeAA* paperclips 2 big paperclips
* A brand name for sugar-coated chocolate buttons
** A brand name for peppermints
*** "wee" is the Scottish dialect variant for the English
"small" or "little"
Procedure A class of material was placed on the table before
S, order of presentation being counterbalanced across subjects as
before. The customary naming procedure was effected.
(1*6)
E then presented an inclusion question in standard form: "Are
there more of the A or more of the B (A<B)?M. If S replied: "There's
more A", E then attempted to determine the process underlying S*s
response by asking: "There's more of the A than what?". Consider
a protocol by way of Illustration:
Array: 7 flowers, 5 red tulips. 2 yellow daffodils
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S.M., female, 6;2 years. "Are there more of the red flowers
or more of the flowers? - More of the red ones. More of the
red ones than what? - Yellow ones."
This sort of response was characteristic: when presented with the
standard A<B question, and after replying "More A", the supplementary
question: "There's more A than what" inevitably received the response:
"There's more A than A'"**'. This again suggests that subjects in
fact reduce standard inclusion questions to comparison of subclasses,
restricting "B" to A*.
When it had been determined that S was not answering the (standard)
question that had been presented, E then attempted to distinguish the
question that was being answered by S (in effect: are there more A
or more A') from the question that E was in fact presenting. This
involved accepting S's response to the question that S was answering,
and then re-presenting the experimenter's question, in amended form,
by way of contrast. Thus if E asked: "Are there more of the A or
more of the B?", to receive the reply: "More A"; and if E then asked:
"There's more of the A than what?", to receive the reply: "There's
more of the A than A*", E would then say: "All right, there's more
of the A than A'; but what I want to know is: are there more of the
(1*7)
A or more of all the B altogether? Show me the A; show me all the
B altogether} now which is mores are there more of the A or more of
all the B?".
Of the 20 subjects tested, 2 answered the first item correctly
with the inclusion question in standard form} thus 18 subjects
remained amenable to facilitation. Of these 18 subjects, 13 answered
the amended (item 1) inclusion question correctly after the above set
of supplementary questions had been posed, and 5 subjects answered
incorrectly. An illustrative protocol for each class of material
can be considered:
Array: 6 children, * boys and 2 girls
F.G., female, 6j6, "Aite there more of the boys or more of
the children? - Boys. More boys than what? - Than the girls.
There*s more boys than girls, that's right. But are there more
of the boys or more of all the children altogether. Show me
the boys - bbbb. Show me all the children together - bbbbgg.
Which are there more of: more of the boys or more of all the
children altogether? - All the children together."
Array: 9 animals, 6 horses and 3 cows
G.M., female, 5;11. "Are there more of the horses or more of
the animals? - Horses. More of the horses than what? - Cows.
More horses than cows, O.K. Tell me this time, are there more
horses or more of all the animals altogether? Show me the
horses - hhhhhh. Now show me all the animals altogether - hhh
hhhccc. Which is more: are there more horses or more of all the
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animals altogether? - Horses. More horses than what? - Cows.
All right, but are there more horses or more of all the animals
altogether? Show me the horses * hhhhhh. How many? - Six.
How many of all the animals? - Nine. Which is more? - Horses.
Is six more than nine? - No. Which is more? - Nine. Which
is more then* the horses or all the animals? - All altogether."
Array: 7 flowers, 5 red tulips and 2 yellow daffodils
P.T., female, 6j3. "Are there more of the flowers or more of
the red flowers? * The red. More of the red flowers than what?
* The yellow. Are there more of the red flowers or more of the
flowers altogether? - More of all the flowers together."
Array: 6 matches, 4 blue and 2 red
J.C.-, female, 6;3. "Are there more of the blue matches or more
of the matches? - Blue. More blue matches than what? - Red ones.
What about all the matches: are there more blue ones or more
of all the matches altogether? » More o1 them all."
Array: 9 sweets, 6 smartles and 3 polos
D.C., female, 6;4. "Are there more of the sweets or more of the
sraarties? - Smarties. More of the sraarties than what? - Than
polosj There's more of the smarties than polos. Are there
more of the smarties or more of all the sweets altogether? -
More of all the sweets."
Array: 7 paperclips, 5 wee and 2 big
P.N., female, 6;6. "Are there more of the wee paperclips or more
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of the paperclips, - More of the wee ones. More of the wee
ones than what? - The big ones. There's more of the wee ones
than the big ones. But are there more of the wee ones or more
of all the paperclips altogether. Show me the wee ones *
wwwwww. Now show me all the paperclips altogether - wwwwwwbb.
All right, which are there more of?- The little ones. More
little ones than what? - Big ones. All right, but are there
more little ones or more of all the paperclips altogether? ~
More of them altogether."
With the subsequent five items, before being presented with the
amended inclusion question "A<all B", S was first asked to point to
"the A" and "all the B altogether". If S answered incorrectly on
any item, supplementary questions were presented as with the first
item.
This procedure may be contrasted with that of Kohnstamm (1963)
who employed an explicit correction procedure, attempting to correct
subjects' incorrect responses to standard inclusion questions by
indicating an adequate justification rule:
(To S:) "You have to say that there are more B because A
are also B. A and A' are all B and so there are always
more B." For example - Ej "Are there more animals or
more cows?". Si "More cows". Es "No, that's not right.
You're supposed to say that there are more animals, because
cows are also animals ...."
(Kohnstamm, 1963: 330-331)
(150)
In contrast with this explicit correction procedure, our set of
supplementary questions presented after an incorrect response might be
described as an "implicit correction procedure", for we accept S's
response to the question he is effectively answering, but then imply
a contrast between this question and the one that E is actually
posing. Thus when S says that there are "More A" when we ask: "Are
there more of the A or more of the B", we never explicitly tell a
subject that he is wrongj instead we imply a contrast by saying:
"Yes there's more A than A1, but what I want to know is - are there
more A or - more of all the B". Clearly, if S responds correctly to
the supplementary questioning, this arises via implicit rather than
explicit correction.
Results The results on the first item have already been indicated
- the standard inclusion question was answered correctly by 2 subjects,
and incorrectly by the remaining 18 subjects.
For the subsequent five items, where amended inclusion questions
were posed, S's initial response has been recorded. (As already
mentioned, if this initial response was incorrect, supplementary
questions were introduced as with the first item.)




Table 30: Responses (Experiment 15)
Item CI question form
Total
responses Correct Incorrect
( standard 20 2 18
1 (
( amended 18 13 5
2 amended 18 8 10
3 amended 18 13 5
4 amended 18 13 5
5 amended 18 13 5
6 amended 18 14 4
The distribution of responses across subjects for the five
items 2 - 6 is as follows:
of the 18 subjects amenable to facilitation, 7 subjects answered
all five items correctly, 6 subjects answered four items correctly, 2
subjects answered one item correctly, and 3 subjects answered no items
correctly (initial response per item in each case).
Thus 13 subjects out of 18 show complete, or near complete,
facilitation; and 5 subjects show no, or practically no, facilitation.
The difference between the proportion of subjects who respond
correctly on the initial and subsequent items is significant (z = 3.61,
p(.001).
Discussion These results suggest that when presented with a
CI problem in standard form, subjects do not compare class and subclass,
but rather subclass and subclass in the manner indicated above: i.e. by
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restricting the interpretation of the "B" term to the minority
subclass A'; however when an "implicit correction procedure" is
introduced whereby the question S is effectively answering is
contrasted with an amended form of inclusion question whose term-
referents are clarified by rehearsal (S has to point to "the A" and
"all the B altogether"), we find that a majority of subjects produce
correct responses on at lea3t four out of five occasions. This
suggests that subjects who apparently fail with standard CI questions
may nevertheless succeed in comparing a class and its majority subclass
when the CI problem is clarified. If these results are stable, they
clearly amend the anomaly in Piaget's account of inclusion where
subjects appear able to compare class and subclass in a context of
subtraction, but not inclusion, questions.
However, tiro criticisms of the present study might be advanced.
First, consider those subjects who appear facilitated: is there any
guarantee that such subjects are genuinely facilitated? In Piagetian
studies, considerable emphasis is placed on the child's ability to
justify -his responses as an indication of his genuine understanding.
In the present study, subjects were asked to justify their responses
when correct: thus when they replied: "There's more B/more B altogether/
more of all the B" to the amended question: "A<all B", they were then
asked: "Why are there more of all the B?", We can consider a
"justification" for each class of material, produced by subjects who
have been deemed "facilitated" above:
(1) J.K., female, 6;1. "Are there more of all the children or more
of the boys? - More of all the children. Why? - Because you
count the girls in with the boys.
Six what? » Children."
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And what do you get? * Six •
(2) C.R., female, 6;5. "Are there more of the horses or more of
all the animals altogether? - More of all the animals together.
Why? - There * s nine. Nine animals; and how many horses? - Six.
Us six more than nine? - No. Which is more? - Nine."
(3) K.I., male, 5;10. "Are there more of the red flowers or more
of all the flowers? - More of the flowers. why? - Because
there's one, two, three, four of the red ones, and two more of
the yellow ones and that makes ..,(counting them out now by
pointing with his finger and so correcting himself as to the
number of tulips of which there are five, not four as S has
said) ...seven. Seven what? - Flowers altogether."
(1) E.F., female, 6;5. "Are there more of the blue matches or more
of all the matches altogether? - All the matches altogether.
Show me them - bbbbrr. Why do you think there's more of all
the matches altogether? - (no response)."
(5) G.H., female, 5;11. "Are there more of the smarties or more of
all the sweets altogether? - Altogether. Why? - 'Cos you join
them altogether."
(6) P.T., female, 6;3. "Are there more of the wee paperclips or
more of all the paperclips? - More of all the paperclips. Why? -
'Cos there's seven. Seven what? - Clips. How many wee ones?
* Five."
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Clearly, "justifications" like (4) above present considerable
difficulty, for while the child can point to her responses "(more of)
all the matches altogether", she is unable to provide any verbal
justification of this response. Justifications like (5) present
analogous difficulties - the child produces a correct response
accompanied by a "justification" which is inscrutable in Piagetian
terms.
However justifications like (1), (2), (3) and (6) seem more
satisfactory, for the child appears to provide some indication that
the extension of the class is greater than that of the subclass whilst
also recognising that the subclass contributes to the extension of
the class. If such justifications can be considered adequate, it
would appear that these correct responses result from genuine
understanding. Of the 14 subjects who responded correctly on the
sixth item in the present study, two subjects produced no verbal
justification, the justifications of three subjects were of the
inscrutable variety, and the remaining nine subjects produced responses
which were "adequate" in the sense just described.
However the problem of justification of responses is clearly not
confined to deciding what features a justification must possess in
order to be described as adequate, for failure to produce any sort
of justification can be interpreted in quite different ways (cf:
Smedslund, 1966)} thus the problem is not confined to asking what
constitutes adequate justification - we must also ask whether lack of
adequate justification is to be interpreted as signifying lack of
adequate understanding, for failure to justify may simply be the
result of the child's unfamiliar!ty in dealing vrith requests for
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justification. When considering this question it is perhaps important
to recall the infrecnency, except in studies of the type being
discussed, with which the child is faced with a request to justify
correct responses. Indeed there is something to be said for the
view that requests for justification in normal adult-child discourse
may well be interpreted by the child as little more than rhetorical
criticisms (cf: "Why did you break the window?"). Thus failure to
produce adequate justifications may be due to genuine failure in
understanding, or to being unused to having to justify correct
responses, or to interpretation of the (adult) experimenter's "why?"
questions as implied criticism. Clearly the whole problem of
justification, and what motivates failure to obtain justification,
is considerable. Thus while the ability to adequately justify
correct responses may be seen as a sufficient condition of genuine
understanding, it does not seem to be a necessary condition. In
short, the problem of justification seems a special, perhaps more
complex case of the general "translation" problem associated with
the adult's interpretation of the child's utterances, and vice-versa,
which has already been called to attention (see Braine, 1959; Bruner,
1966; Flavell, 1963; Hunt, 1961; Sigel, 1968;etc.).
The second, more specific, criticism of the present study
concerns the stability of the data: we have found 13 subjects out
of 18 facilitated. However these 18 subjects have been judged
amenable to facilitation on the basis of their incorrect response
to a standard inclusion question presented on but one item (the first
item of six). It is conceivable that a proportion of these 18
subjects who answered the first item incorrectly did so through lapses
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in attention, mis-hearing of the question, etc. and perhaps some
of these 18 would have answered subsequent standard CI questions
correctly had they been given an opportunity to do so. Thus
confining the "screening procedure" to but one item in the present
study is perhaps unsatisfactory, and in the following experiment
we attempt both to meet this possible criticism and check on the
stability of data by running a further group of subjects to whom
standard inclusion questions are presented against the first three
items in a series of nine items presented to each subject. This
will constitute a more satisfactory "screening procedure", for
subjects will only be regarded as amenable to facilitation if they




Subjects 20 naturally English speaking schoolchildren (8 male)
of mean age 6;2 years (range: 5;6 - 6;8).
Material Nine classes of material as summarized in Table 31:
Table 31: Material (Experiment 16)
Class Major subclass Minor subclass
children 4 boys 2 girls
paperclips 5 wee clips 2 big clips
flowers 6 red flowers 3 yellow flowers
animals 4 horses 2 cows
circles 5 big circles 2 wee circles
matches 6 blue matches 3 red matches
sweets 4 smarties 2 polos
clocks 5 wee clocks 2 big clocks
umbrellas 6 green umbrellas 3 blue umbrellas
The six classes of Experiment 15 are therefore retained with some
changes in ratios, and three further classes are added. Of the total
nine classes, six are representations of the objects they depict (children,
animals, flowers, circles, clocks, umbrellas: outline drawings individually
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pasted on 1 x 1" cardboard squares, as before), while three classes
(paperclips, matches, sweets) are physical objects. Further, of these
nine classes, three (children, animals, sweets) involve subclasses
whose names make no reference to their appropriate superordinate class
name (e.g. smarties, polos, "sweets"; etc.), while the subclass names
of the remaining six classes make direct reference to the superordinate
class name (e.g. big circles, wee circles, "circles"; etc.). With
half of those latter six classes, the subclasses are distinguished
by size (big/wee paperclips, circles, clocks), and half by colour
(red/yellow flowers, red/blue matches, blue/green umbrellas).
Procedure The experimental set-up was as in previous
experiments. Subjects were told thay were going to play some games;
Ss were tested individually by the same E, S and E sitting opposite
one another at a small table in the centre of which there was placed
a 9 x 9" red card. The classes of material, either physically
present or represented on individual lxl" cardboard squares were
placed on this red card in a random arrangement. The customary
naming procedure was then effected on presentation of each class of
material, order of presentation of classes being counterbalanced
across subjects.
With the first three items (items 1-3), S was asked an inclusion
question in standard form: "Are there more of the A or more of the B?".
The next three items (items 4-6) were devoted to the implicit
correction procedure of Experiment 15, and this preceded exactly
as before when S made an incorrect response to the amended inclusion
questions presented for these three items:
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"Are there more of the A or more of atll the B altogether? +
More A. More A than what? - More A than A*. Yes, there1s
more A than A*. But what I want to know is: are there more A
or more of all the B, Show me the A ...Show me all the B
altogether ...Now, which is mores are there more of the A or
more of all the B altogether?".
With the last three items (items 7-9) the inclusion question
was again presented in amended form: "Are there more of the A or more
of all the B altogether?", S first being asked to point to the
referents of these terms.
Subjects responses were recorded for items 1-3, and for items
7-9.
Results The distributions of correct and incorrect responses
for the first and last sets of three items are presented in Table 32:
Table 32: Responses (Experiment 16)
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The distribution* of these responses across subjects is as
follows:
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Items 1-3: Of the 20 subjects tested, 1 subject gave three correct
answers, 2 subjects gave one correct answer, and 17 subjects gave no
correct answers to the standard inclusion questions presented. Thus
19 subjects were judged amenable to facilitation38, only one subject
giving adequate indication of being able to respond correctly to
standard CI questions (i.e. correct on at least two out of three
occasions), this latter subject not therefore being tested further.
Items 7-9: Of the 19 subjects tested, 12 subjects gave three correct
responses, 4 subjects gave two correct responses, 1 subject gave one
correct response, and 2 subjects gave no correct responses. Thus 16
subjects are facilitated, having given two or three correct responses
to three items, and 3 subjects are unfacilitated, having given only
one, or no correct responses to three items. Of the 16 subjects
regarded as facilitated, 11 subjects provided justifications which
appear adequate in the sense described above (i.e. S appeared to
recognise that the extension of "all the B" was greater than the
extension of "the A" while "the A" contributed to the extension of
"all the B"), 1 subject provided justifications which can be described
as "inscrutable", and 4 subjects failed to provide any verbal
justifications.
The difference between the proportion of subjects who respond
correctly on the first and last sets of three items is significant
(z a 4.00, p< .001).
Discussion These results suggest that the results of the
previous experiment enjoy a measure of stability, at least when the
experimenter, and possible experimenter effects99 , are held constant.
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Thus subjects who fail to answer standard CI questions of the type
employed by Piaget may nevertheless be able to compare class and
subclass when amended inclusion questions are presented, the terms
of which have been clarified.
Before attempting to indicate the implications of these results,
we first summarise our main arguments and findings.
Chapter 5
Retrospect
The general disparity between recent studies of the child*s
linguistic and cognitive abilities was noted in Chapter 1: study of
language acquisition suggests that the child can handle much of the
complexity of language from about age four years, while Piagetian
study of cognitive development suggests that the child is unable to
handle a relatively simple problem such as da3s inclusion until about
age eight years, and in some cases (e.g. with certain classes of
animals), not until about age twelve years.
The importance which Piaget attaches to the problem of class
inclusion was indicated in Chapter 2, where it was noted that Piaget
regards the child's ability to handle inclusion the decisive test of
genuine classification, a fundamental ability in any theory of
cognitive development, as was Piaget*s view that the child of below
about eight years is unable to solve class inclusion problems because
of an inability to simultaneously compare a class and subclass. It
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was further noted that the problem of class inclusion, in Piaget's
view, shares no radical or fundamental relation with language, which
is accorded an important, but nevertheless subsidiary role in the
development of cognitive abilities.
Attention was then drawn to the fact that while Piaget attaches
no fundamental importance to language, his studies of class inclusion
have invariably employed language as a vehicle for study - i.e. the
experimenter asks the child questions which the child must interpret,
and then produce a verbal response which must in turn be interpreted
by the experimenter. Several writers have called attention to this
aspect of Piagetian studies, suggesting that in order to estimate the
influence of language, one needs to manipulate the verbal aspects of
the task. While accepting this general sentiment, it was noted that
there seems no way of deciding, a priori, which verbal aspects require
variation. There being no established experimental literature on
this question, the problem was approached indirectly by considering
studies in the psychology of language where various aspects of
language have been subject to some previous inquiry.
Thus in Chapter 3 it was observed that in recent years
considerable emphasis has been placed on language structure (syntax),
even in consideration of communicative function: i.e. the syntactic
structure of an utterance may be altered to facilitate communication
by, for example, producing an utterance in the passive, rather than
use an active construction. The idea that one may alter the syntax
of utterances in discourse in order to communicate more effectively
clearly held some appeal, for it suggested that syntactic aspects of
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the discourse employed in presenting inclusion problems might well be
varied lest the syntax customarily employed underlies communicative
misunderstandings between subject and experimenter.
However before adopting such a move, the idea that manipulations
of syntax facilitate communication was examined further, and consider¬
ation of the nature and type of utterance employed in previous
experiments which produced this conclusion led us to question its
viability. Presentation of an alternative topic-comment account,
which utilized a distinction between the topic and comment of an
utterance thus placing considerable emphasis on certain aspects of
discourse, was found to be more satisfactory in Experiments 1 and 2,
where the predictions of TC were confirmed, but the majority of the
predictions of the "syntactic account" (based on voice and word-order)
unconfirmed. This suggested that semantic aspects of language, held
to reflect certain discourse parameters (subsequently confirmed in
Experiments 3 and 4), were of considerably greater importance than
had been previously recognised. It was therefore to semantic aspects
of class inclusion that we turned in Chapter 4.
There a number of anomolies concerning the semantics of inclusion
problems were detailed. First, there was the general disparity
between the child's linguistic abilities at about age four years when
he can produce utterances likes "A dog is an animal", "A daisy is a
flower", apparently recognising that an object is a member of a class
from which it is drawn, and apparently handling the semantics of such
terms as dog, animal, daisy, flower, etc. with success. However on
presentation of a class inclusion question like: "Are there more flowers
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or more daisies?", the child answers incorrectly until about age
eight years. Thus whereas the child's production of the former
type of equational sentence suggests that it can handle the semantics
of such terms as daisy, flower, etc. at about age four years, his
responses to the latter type of inclusion question suggest that he
cannot handle the semantics of such terms until about age eight
years.
Second, Piaget reports that when class inclusion problems are
presented against certain classes of animals, the child may continue
to answer incorrectly until about age twelve years} this simply
compounds the disparity.
Third, Piaget also reports that while children between 5-8 years
are unable to co-ordinate class and subclass in a context of inclusion
questions ("Are there more A or more B":i.e. A<B), theycan neverthe¬
less handle the semantics of such terms in a context of subtraction
questions ("If you take away the A/A1, are there any B left": i.e.
B-A s A'/B-A' sAj "If you take away all the B, are there any A/A*
left": i.e. -B = -(A+A'), or B s A+A*). The child of 5-8 years
answers these latter subtraction questions correctly, suggesting
that he can handle the semantics of terms like "A", "A1", and "B",
and apparently indicating appreciation of those relations of
composition (B = A+A') and decomposition (B-A a a'/B-A* s A) which
Piaget holds to constitute the reversible (concrete) operation
involved in solution of class inclusion problems,where successful
solution is held to depend on a co-ordination of these relations
into an operational whole. But when these results are stripped
of Piagetian terminology, we seem left with yet another anomoly:
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the child can apparently handle the semantics of terms like "A",
"A*" and "B" in a context of subtraction questions, but not in a
context of inclusion questions.
Fourth, we observe a further anom<*ly, or inconsistency, in the
semantics associated with erroneous responses to class inclusion
questions in children below about age 8 years. On presentation of
the inclusion question concerning class and minor subclass ("A'<B"),
we find that the child responds correctly: "B", But when we
present an inclusion question concerning class and major subclass
("A<B"), the child now answers incorrectly: "A". We find that
Piaget holds the former response to be misleading, for both minority
and majority inclusion questions are held to be reduced by the
child to subclass-subclass comparisons <A:A')» and with the former
minority question, according to Piaget, the larger subclass A is
"simply called" by the class term "B". However there is clearly
no such process with majority inclusion questions. Therefore we
seem left with yet a further anomaly: the major subclass A is
"simply called" by the class term "B" in one type of inclusion
question (minority), but not in another (majority).
Of all the aspects of Piaget's account of inclusion, perhaps
the most difficult to accept is the notion that children are unable
to solve class inclusion problems in certain contexts (e.g. with
classes of animals) until about age twelve years. Our initial
step was therefore to examine Piaget's account of this "time lag"
which Piaget, in an admittedly a posteriori fashion, attempts to
explain in terms of "remoteness from everyday experience": i.e.
although the child may be used to making collections of various
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types of flowers, he is unlikely to be used to making collections of
various types of animal. The "remoteness" of the latter class may
therefore contribute to the delay in solving class inclusion problems
concerning such classes of material. But the notion that a class
of animals is more remote from experience than, say, a class of
flowers, has more the appearance of an hypothesis than an explanation;
it was therefore treated as such and tested in Experiment 5, When
the child's performance on material which Piaget holds to be
familiar (i.e. a class of flowers) was compared with performance
on material genuinely remote from everyday experience (nonsense
syllables which referred to animate-like nonsense figures), no
differences were found in the performance of a group of 9-12 year
old subjects on A:A', A'<B or A<B comparisons; thus Piaget's
hypothesis was not confirmed. Although we did observe a significant
difference in the performance of a younger group of 5J-8J year old
subjects on A< B inclusion questions between familiar and remote
material, we also found significant differences on A'<B and A:A*
comparisons. This suggested that any "time lag" was not to be
explained in terms of the remoteness or unfamiliarity of the material
per sa, but rather in terms of unfamiliarity with the names of the
material constituents. It seems that the younger subjects may
have experienced difficulty in keeping track of the subclass names
of the nonsense material (indicated by their significantly lower
scores on A:A' comparisons) which could by itself have led to the
significantly lower scores on A'< B and Pi B inclusion comparisons;
the older group on the other hand seem to have experienced no such
difficulties with the nonsense material, there being no significant
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differences between A:A* comparisons with familiar and remote material,
and likewise no significant differences with the inclusion questions.
Thus the "time lag" seems more concerned with the ability to
co-ordinate the names and referents of class inclusion questions
than with the remoteness of the content material.
The plausability of such a link was therefore checked in
Experiment 6, where the ability to spontaneously name the classes
of experimental material employed (children, animals, flowers) was
compared with the child*s ability to make AsA*, A'<B and A<B
comparisons. With a group of 6 year olds, we found differences
in the way in which these clases of material were spontaneously
named, as one might expect on the basis of arguments presented in
Brown (1958)t with children and animals, the child tended to name
the material via the subclasses but not the classes, but with flowers
the opposite pattern was observed - the child tended to name the
material via the class but not the subclasses. Comparing mean
correct responses for the three classes of material, we found
significantly more correct naming, and comparison, responses for
children than animals than flowers. Thus the pattern of subsequent
comparison responses directly mirrored the initial pattern of
spontaneous naming responses.
However while Experiments 5 and 6 suggested the existence of a
link between the abilities to name and compare, they provided no
indication as to the nature of such a link; thus more intensive study
with a smaller group of four year old subjects was undertaken in
Experiment 7.
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There the pattern of spontaneous naming responses was similar
to that of Experiment 6j subjects named the class but not the sub¬
classes for flowers, but the subclasses rather than the class for
children and animals. With comparison questions, the pattern of
data for children and animals conformed to that previously reported
in the literature: success was observed with comparison of subclasses
(A:Af), apparent success with minority inclusion questions (A'<B),
and failure with majority inclusion questions (A<B). However the
pattern of data for flowers was inverted: failure with A:A', failure
with A*<B, and apparent success with A<B questions. Before attempting
to discuss these rather intriguing results, the study was replicated
with a different group of subjects in Experiment 8. Results were
precisely as before.
It was surmised that these data might be explained with the
assumption that the subjects of Experiments 7 and 8 had confused the
terms and referents of the class of flowers - i.e. "tulips" was
taken as referring to the daffodils, and "daffodils" was taken as
referring to the tulips. This would not only explain the observed
lack of success with A:A* comparisons, but also the inverted pattern
of data for A'<B and A<B inclusion questions: whereas we customarily
observe apparent success with the former and failure with the latter,
with flowers we observe failure with the former and apparent success
with the latteri but the assumption that A and A' have been confused
for flowers renders the A1<B question in effect an A<B question, and
the A<B question in effect an A,<B question.
Since this assumption could account for the anomaly in results,
it was checked in Experiment 9, where it was reasoned that the inverted
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results for the inclusion questions with flowers should re-invert
when the referents of "A" and "A"* were clarified. When majority
and minority inclusion questions were re-presented to the subjects
of Experiments 7 and 8, the referents of the subclass terms being
clarified by speaking of "red/yellow flowers" in place of "tulips/
daffodils", the predicted re-inversion of the pattern of data was
observed* minority inclusion questions were now handled with
apparent success, majority inclusion questions with failure.
Thus these experiments not only confirmed the importance of
semantic aspects of class inclusion, but also suggested hypotheses
as to the processes underlying erroneous responses to class inclusion
questions which contrasted with Piaget's account.
First, we supposed, with Piaget, that when erroneous responses
to class inclusion questions occurred, the child reduced such
inclusion comparisons to a comparison of subclasses. But it was
suggested that this does not arise because the child is unable to
simultaneously compare class and subclass, but because of the way in
which the child uses the language associated with class inclusion
questions. For we supposed that with both majority and minority
inclusion questions, there is a process of short-term restriction
in the application of the class term "B": i.e. the child interprets
"B" as referring to subclass A in minority inclusion questions
("A^ B), but to subclass A' in majority inclusion questions ("A< B"),
This was suggested by consideration of the patterns of data when the
referents of "A" and "A'" were confused (Experiments 7 and 8, flowers),
for on the assumption of short-term referential restrictions, one
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would predict just the inverted pattern of data that was observed.
Thus it was argued that a process of short-term switches in
reference of the class term nB" between majority and minority
inclusion questions would reduce the anomalies in Piaget's account
of Inclusion, for an identical process is now envisaged underlying
erroneous responses to both types of inclusion question, whereas
there appears to be a difference in the processes underlying such
responses in Piaget's account} and the assumption that "B" is
restricted on specification of a subclass (as in inclusion questions)
suggested that no such restrictions obtain where subclasses are not
specified - e.g. with subtraction questions. Thus our assumption
could also reduce the anomqly between the child's performance in
contexts of subtraction and inclusion questions, where the child
appears to appreciate the relations of composition and decomposition
(B s A+A'i B-A = A', B-A' = A) in the former context, but not in the
latter.
This assumption was tested in Experiment 10, where it was
predicted that in utterances which did not specify subclasses, the
class term "B" would be interpreted as referring to both subclasses
("B" x A+A*), but interpreted as referring to subclass A in connection
with minority inclusion questions ("B" s A with "A*(B"), and as
referring to subclass A' with majority questions (**B" = A' with "A< B").
Results from a group of 5 year-olds confirmed these predictions,
especially for the inclusion questions: clearly, there were short-
term restrictions in the reference of the class term "B". While the
results for utterances containing no specification of subclasses were
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reasonably clear cut ("B" was interpreted as referring to A+A* 80%
of the time), there was however an interesting feature to these
results: namely, it seemed as if there was some "spontaneous restriction"
(i.e. restriction not induced by specification of a contrastive
subclass) of the class term "B". This suggested that "B" may be
restricted, not only through specification* of a contrastive subclass,
but may also be spontaneously restricted through uncertainty as to
its application.
Experiment 11 therefore presented the subjects of Experiment 10
with a set of subtraction questions in order to observe whether such
"spontaneous restriction" occurred (i) with a different context of
questions, (ii) when such questions were manipulated for clarity of
reference. It was found that spontaneous restriction did occur
when the reference of "B" was unclear: thus "B" was at times
restricted to one or other of the subclasses when the subtraction
questions referred to "the B", but there was never any restriction
when the reference of "B" was clarified - i.e. in subtraction
questions which referred to "all the B".
These results were then related to the anomaly in Piaget's
account where he reports success in handling such terms as "A", "A*"
and "B" in subtraction questions, but not in inclusion questions •
we find that Piaget's subtraction questions referred to "all the B",
whereas his inclusion questions referred to "the B". This suggested
the interesting hypothesis that the reason the child fails to handle
inclusion, but not subtraction questions lies in a difference between
the clarity of reference of the class term "B" between these two
contexts of question. It was therefore supposed that should the
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reference of "B" be clarified in inclusion questions (where the
child customarily meets with failure) in the way in which it is
clarified in subtraction questions (where the child customarily
meets with success), we might then observe success with inclusion
questions.
This hypothesis was tested in Experiments 12 through 16,
where performance on standard inclusion questions of the type
presented by Piaget ("A< B") was compared with performance on
amended inclusion questions which attempted to clarify the reference
of the class term ("A<all B").
In Experiment 12, results from a group of 5 year-olds were
largely contrary to expectation: only 5 subjects out of 16 were
facilitated with amended inclusion questions. For the unfacilitated
subjects it was surmised that the terra "all the B" was being
restricted as in previous experiments - i.e. "all the B" was being
restricted to subclass A*, as was the term "the B" in previous
studies. In an attempt to clarify the reference of the term "all
the B", subtraction questions were therefore interposed between
presentation of standard and amended inclusion questions in Experiment
13, on the supposition that the distinction between subtraction of
"the B" and subtraction of "all the B" would clarify the reference
of the latter term for the child. However results from a group
of 6 year-olds were again largely contrary to expectation: of 18
subjects in Experiment 13, only 3 were facilitated with amended
inclusion questions; the introduction of subtraction questions had
failed to clarify the reference of "all the B" in subsequent amended
inclusion questions for the remaining 15 unfacilitated subjects.
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Again it was surmised that these subjects were restricting the
reference of "all the B" in amended inclusion questions as was the
case with "the B" in standard questions. This was checked by
examining the protocols of supplementary questions presented, after
the experiment proper, to the last 6 subjects of Experiment 13, all of
whom were unfacilitated. Consideration of the protocols suggested
that our explanation of lack of facilitation was correct. Therefore
in the next experiment we attempted to prevent restriction of the
term "all the B" to subclass A' by presenting questions of the form:
"Are there more of the A, more of the A', or more of all the B
altogether?", supposing that explicit specification of the term "A"'
might prevent restriction of "all the B" to subclass A'. Employing
this procedure in Experiment 14, a majority of a group of 6 year-olds
was facilitated.
However the series of items on which these subjects were tested
was somewhat limited, and some subjects apparently continued to
restrict the term "all the B" to subclass A*. Thus in Experiment
15 a longer series of itegjn warn presented, and an "implicit correction
procedure" was introduced. That is, on presentation of a standard
inclusion question ("/MB") against the first item, if S answered:
"More A", he was asked: "More A than what?"; the reply being
invariably: "More A than A'". E then accepted this response for the
question that S was effectively answering, but then contrasted this
question with the one that E was in fact presenting: "Yes, there*s
more A than A*. But what I want to know is: are there more of the
A or more of all the B altogether?". Before S answered, he was
asked to point to "the A" and "all the B altogether".
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Introduction of this implicit correction procedure resulted in
13 subjects out of a group of 18 six-year-olds being facilitated.
More than half these facilitated subjects produced adequate justific¬
ation of correct responses, providing some indication that they
appreciated that the extension of major subclass A contributed to,
but was less than, the extension of the class B.
This study was repeated in Experiment 16, where with a longer
series of items which incorporated a more efficient screening
procedure, 16 subjects out of a group of 19 six-year-olds were
facilitated, 11 of these 16 providing adequate justification of
correct responses.
The immediate implications of these findings seem clear, for
they suggest that subjects who fail to answer standard class
inclusion questions of the type presented by Piaget may nevertheless
be able to compare class and subclass provided that the referents
of the terms in inclusion questions are made clear. Thus our
studies appear to account for the anomalies in Piaget's account of
class inclusion.
However besides these specific implications, our studies also
appear to suggest more general implications which, because of their
possible relevance to further inquiry, may be briefly considered in
conclusion.
General Implications
It seems that at certain points in development, the child's
use of language differs from the adult's use of language, for the
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ehild does not hold constant the reference of class terms like
animal, flower, etc. as does the adultj rather the way in which the
child uses such terms depends on the context of question (subtraction
or inclusion), the type of question (majority or minority inclusion
questions), and, especially, the clarity of reference of the terms
themselves ("B" or "all B"), Thus interpretation of class terms
in the child of below about age eight years seema determined by the
context and type of question in which such class terms appear, for
in some contexts the child uses class terms to refer to the subclasses
as does the adult, while in other contexts he restricts the reference
of class terms according to the type of question presented, although
such restrictions of reference are short-term, and of course,
restrictions depend on clarity of reference. Thus we might surranarise
the way in which the child uses the language by suggesting that between
different types and contexts of utterance, the child employs short-
term referential switches in the application of what we might call
"unclarified" class termsj this clearly differs from the way in which
such terms are employed by the adult.
However this is not to say that the child is unable to use the
language in the way in which it is used by the adult: simply that in
certain contexts he does not do so. Of course what motivates the
pre-eight-year-old child to use the language of inclusion questions
in the way that he does cannot be answered from the present studies.
Suggestions have been made (e.g. Braine, 1962 i Wallach, Hall & Anderson,
1967j Wohlwill, 1968) that perceptual set may play a significant role4*
- present a child with an array of dogs (A) and cats (A*) and ask:
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"Are there more dogs or more animals?", the perceptually potent
distinction between A and A* may well encourage the child to assume
that the question must concern the subclasses, leading to the
customary response: "More A". However while this argument has
certain appeal for majority inclusion questions, results with
minority inclusion questions (customary response: "More B") point
to the importance of co-ordination of question-terms and object-
referents, as do results with subtraction questions, and comparison
of results when terms are clarified and unclarified.
Of course further inquiry must not only consider what motivates
the pre-elght-year-old to use the language of standard class inclusion
problems in a way different from the adult, but also what underlies
the responses of post-eight-year-old children who use the language
in a way similar to the adult: that is, we must find out what
underlies this change in the way in which the language is used. It
seems as if this will only be uncovered by intensive longitudinal
study of individual children.
A further implication of our studies concerns the way in which
the language is used by the child: it seems that this is far more
complex than might have been expected; in this respect our studies
support the findings of other recent studies which have observed
considerable complexity in the child*s use of language in contexts
of comparison, description and discrimination (e.g. Campbell & Wales,
1970; Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Donaldson & Wales, 1970a, b; Taylor
8 Wales, 1970; Wales, 1970; Wales & Campbell, 1970). This has
clear implications for study of semantic development and linguistic
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comprehension: estimates of the child's ability to correctly interpret
linguistic meanings appear sensitive to the type and context of
question with which we attempt to elicit responses.
This leads to the perhaps most general implication of this
dissertations namely, our studies suggest that the controversy over
the relationship between language and thought be viewed as an empirical
issue, not an issue to be decided by a priori argument, for in
considering the role of language in study of an aspect of cognition,
our studies suggest we must look to see if, and if then how, language
and cognition are related. And to return to the remarks of the
previous paragraph, further study must be ready for the possibility
that such relationships, where they obtain, may be involved and
complex.
Finally, we can indicate the sort of problem encountered in the
present studies by quotation of two brief remarks:
Though we often think of each thing as having a name * a
single name - in fact, each thing has many equally correct
names.
(Brown, 1958)
Don't look for the meaning of a word, look for its use,
(Wittgenstein, 1953)
That is, we must constantly keep in mind that language does not
simply involve words that name objects: objects can be referred to
in various ways, equally acceptable dependent on context; if we
wish to understand the processes underlying the child's responses
across various contexts, we must look and see how the child is
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using the language. Thus these remarks of Brown and Wittgenstein
might well be adopted as mottos for further inquiry, and the studies
of the present dissertation interpreted as evidence of their worth.
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Notes
1. These publication dates refer to the English translations of
Piaget*s works originally published in French. The original
dates of publication, and French titles, can be found in
Flavell (1963). A possible source of confusion concerns the
book we refer to as Inhelder 8 Piaget, 1961. This refers to:
The Early Growth of Logic in the Child: Classification and
Seriation, published in English translation by Routledge 8
Kegan Paul: London, 1964, where the order of authors reads
Inhelder 8 Piaget. However this is a translation of La
genese des structures logiques elementaires: classifications
et seriations, published by Delaehaux et Niestle: Neuchatel,
1959, where the order of authors reads Piaget & Inhelder.
Thus Inhelder & Piaget (1964) (English translation) is
identical with Piaget & Inhelder (1959) (French original).
2. Of course there are general arguments, deriving from
consideration of the cognitive abilities of individuals
"without language", to the effect that language and cognition
are not radically related (e.g. Furth, 1964; Inhelder & Piaget,
1964; Piaget 8 Inhelder, 1969). However these arguments
appear inconclusive, largely due to the meaning of the phrase
"without language" being left unspecified. Since individuals
may comprehend language without being able to produce it
(Lenneberg, 1962), it seems necessary to distinguish individuals
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who are "without language competence" from individuals who are
"without language performance". If the latter possess linguistic
competence, they clearly possess language in an important sense,
despite the fact that they cannot produce any utterances.
In place of providing a brief summary of the Piagetian position
on class inclusion and language, we prefer to employ extended
quotations from Piaget's own writings, for, in attempting to
indicate his position via brief paraphrase, it is all too easy
to inadvertently misrepresent the position he wishes to present
(a fact attested by Piaget's often justified complaints concerning
misrepresentation).
"4;0" denotes the subject's age as being "4 years; 0 months".
This convention will be followed throughout.
As we will come to see, Piaget suggests that the stage-2 child
appreciates the relation B = A+A' in an intuitive, rather than
operational, fashion.
Read A<B asj is A included in B, which is customarily glossed
as: Are there more A or more B.
The term "simply" in "simply calling" appears in the English
translation (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964: 107), but not in the
original: <<S'il y a plus de A que de A' 1*enfant semble
parfois r%ondre juste (B(A'), parce qu'il appelle B les A
(or en ce cas A<A').)> (Piaget & Inhelder, 1959: 110).
(182)
Piaget's example, originally quoted on p.20 above, arises for
a situation where A') A. Since we wish to reserve A and A' to
denote major and minor subclasses respectively (p.10 above),
Piaget's example (both in translation and original) quoted at
this point has been amended so that A>A'. Substitution of A
for A', and A* for A, in no way affects Piaget's explanation
of responses to minority (minor subclass (whole class)
inclusion questions.
Cf: Donaldson's review of Inhelder & Piaget (1964): "It might
not be too inadequate a summary of the book to say that it
consists in an attempt to show that, in the absence of special
inquiry, the child's ability to handle language may grossly
mislead us as to his ability to handle classificatory systems"
(Donaldson, 1960: 182). (Donaldson's 1960 review of Inhelder &
Piaget (1964) of course refers to the original 1959 publication
in French - see Note 1 above.)
Slobin (1963) reports that while passives took longer to process
than actives, this result was obtained with "reversible"
sentences, where an interchange of subject and object nominals
does not lead to anomoly (e.g. the lorry was bumped by the car;
interchange: the car was bumped by the lorry » both sentences
are acceptable). When "non-reversible" sentences were used,
where interchange of subject and object nominals does yield
anomoly (e.g. the watermelon was eaten by the man; interchange:
Athe man was eaten by the watermelon), the difference in
processing times largely disappeared. Thus introduction of
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non-reversibility made passives about as easy to handle as
kernals, and passive negatives about as easy to handle as
negatives. Slobin argues: "Non-reversibility facilitates
comprehension of passive sentences in that, although the normal
subject-object order is reversed, it is still clear which of
the two nouns is subject and which object" (Slobin, 1963: 69,
70).
11. Ofi Frege (1879): "In language the place occupied by the subject
in the word-order has the significance of a specially important
place; it is where we put what we want the hearer to attend to
specially." By "subject" Frege intends: "the concept with
which the judgement is chiefly concerned," (see Geach & Black's
translation, 1960: 3).
12, It appears that children might obtain information from the sort
of question variables just mentioned; for example Brown
(personal communication) has surmised, largely from informal
observation of he?own children, that suprasegmental features
of questions might well be an important source of information
to the child: e.g. the stress and intonation an adult introduces
into a question may provide the child with information as to how
the adult expects the question to be answered. Of course, as
Gill Brown would be the first to recognise, this is no more than
a hypothesis which requires testing; however it is interesting
to envisage some of the practical difficulties which might occur
in systematic study of this sort of variable. While the
perennial difficulties are fairly obvious - gaining access to
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suitable subjects and accommodation, and obtaining sufficient
data from experimental sessions which are necessarily brief -
other difficulties are more subtle. Clearly the stimulus
sentences (questions) must be controlled as regards their
suprasegmental parameters; and while the most obvious way
of achieving this is to pre-record them on tape, thereby
introducing appropriate control, it is in fact doubtful if an
experiment could be conducted in this way, for in discussion,
Gill Brown (to whom I am indebted for much useful discmssion of
this area) has suggested that young children often fail to attend
to tape recorded sentences/questions, because the child
customarily watches the face of any questioner. This suggests
that children may in fact pick up information not only via such
acoustic features of language as stress and intonation, but also
via visual cues (such as eye-brow-raasing, head-inclination, etc.)
which may accompany such acoustic features. (Perhaps presentation
of stimulus questions on video-tape would meet this sort of
difficulty?) However while experimentation in this area could
possibly prove fruitful, we leave it aside at present, and in
what follows, restrict attention to standard Piagetian-type
questions, counterbalancing where appropriate, and adopting
unstressed, "normal" intonation contours - see Note 27 below.
Some interesting, though varied discussion of the topic-comment
distinction appears ini e.g. Chomsky, 1965; Fillmore, 1970;
Hockett, 1958; Kirkwood, 1969; Lyons, 1968; Moore, 1967;
Rommetveit, 1968; Strewson, 1964; Wilson, 1926.
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14. A study employing a substitution-in-frames technique has
observed that the surface subject ('i.e. logical object) of
passives is likely to be animate (Clark, 1965). Of the
passive sentences used to describe (R) situations, the surface
subjects are animate in half of these, inanimate in the other
half. Of the passives used to describe (NR) situations, the
surface subjects are all inanimate.
15. Note that such questions as "What?", "Eh?" etc. are often
interpreted as requests to repeat an utterance after
distraction of a participant in (adult) discourse exchanges.
(In adult-child exchanges such questions often appear to
function as requests for clarification/reformulation of the
utterance just produced - eft Campbell & Wales, 1970). No
such questions appeared in subject's responses.
16. Specifically, there appears to be a considerable amount of
inconsistency in responses, and a large effect from
"reversibility", on sentence-type 1 compared with types 2
through 8. First, whereas 40% of all subjects responding
to type 1 did so inconsistently, the mean percentage for
subjects who responded inconsistently on the other seven
types is 6% (range: 0-15%). Second, for type 1, of the
20 subjects working with R sentences, 1 gave "unclassified"
responses, 4 consistently opted for Nl, 8 for E, 4 for N2,
and the remaining 6 were inconsistent; of the 20 subjects
working with NR sentences, none gave "unclassified" responses,
1 consistently opted for Nl, none for E, 17 for N2,and the
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remaining 2 were inconsistent. Considering the percentage of
subjects who contributed to a consistent option for N2, in
sentence-type 1 there is therefore a difference of 65% between
R and NR contributions. A difference on this scale did not
occur for significant options on any other sentence-type, where
the mean percentage difference between R and NR contributions
for types 2 through 8 was 30% (range: 10-35%). These
comparisons suggest that data for type 1 differs in kind, not
just in degree, from types 2 through 8. However, since VWO
and TC have little to say about data for sentence-type 1, we do
not pursue the matter further.
17. See Lyons, 1968: 341.
18. While this may be valid for purposes of the present experiment,
it should be pointed out that there can be difficulties
associated with such a move in certain contexts of use which
exhibit an asymmetry between vises of proper names and definite
descriptions} for some interesting discussion of this issue,
see Garner (1969) and New (1968).
19. The persons chosen to appear in the clips were - Clip A: a
lecturer who was likely to be familiar to the experimental
subjects (undergraduates)} Clip B: a research assistant who was
likely to be unfamiliar to subjects. Since there was no way
of guaranteeing that these persons were, respectively, "known"
and "unknown" beforehand, subjects were screened after the
experiment, and protocols withdrawn where the appropriate
conditions had not been met - see Procedure, p. 61 above, and
Results, p. 63 above.
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20. It was intended to improve the reliability of data in
Experiment 1 by running further subjects, but this proved
impossible when further access to a video tape recorder
could not be obtained.
21. A study by Muscio (1916), within the context of giving
testimony in a court of law, raises the question why (i) is
a neutral, but (ii) a leading question:
(i) did you see a pistol on the table
(ii) did you see the pistol on the table
Clearly, the latter requires the respondent (witness) to
acknowledge previous acquaintance with the object in question.
22. A number of points of some further interest arise from
Experiments 1-4-.
First, we might inquire as to the bole of definiteness
in generic sentences (i) - (iii), which all apparently express
the same proposition (cf: Perlmutter, 1970), and whose
differential marking for definiteness appears largely
irrelevant:
(i) Whales are mammals
(ii) The whale is a mammal
(iii) A whale is a mammal
We might ask if definiteness only assumes relevance in relation
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to identifiability (cfi Rommetveit, 1968s 86 ff., 187; and
for an interesting proposal on identifiability and agent-
deletion in short passives, see Rommetveit, 1968s 292 ff.),
for failure to mark nominals for definiteness (e.g. by
using "someone", "a + nominal", etc.) may signal either an
inability to identify the person or object nominal (e.g.
(iv)), or an unwillingness to identify the subject and/or
object of the sentence in order to leave the event as
topic (e.g. (v) -cfs New, 1968)s
(iv) If you get lost, ask someone the way
(v) I want you to deliver a letter to someone
in London
While the speaker is clearly unable to identify "someone"
in (iv), the speaker must be able to identify "someone" in
(v) although he has apparently chosen not to in order to
retain another aspect of his utterance as topic. When such
considerations do not arise, as in (i) - (iii), the relevance
of marking for definiteness appears diminished. (Further
discussion of this point may also require consideration
of specificity - cf: Garner, 1969i Geach, 1965; Johnson-
Laird, 1969a, b; Lyons, 1968).
Second, we might ask how topicalization relates to language
acquisition. (A recent analysis of language acquisition
data (obtained from one child) suggests that the traditional
division of a sentence into subject and predicate may not
be so fundamental as a division into topic and comment - cfj
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Gruber, 1967). Piaget (1926) suggests that language may
be initially employed by the child in a cognitlvely ego-centric
fashion; "dual monologues" occur where two children at play
each provide a running commentary on what (s)he is doing,
but where there is a fundamental failure to communicate with
each other. While this may be eo in certain situations
(e.g. where each child is engaged in a separate play task),
listening to the discourse of young (3-4 year old) children
in a co-operative/competitive play situation (e.g. if one
child is building a tower of bricks and another child is
trying to build another, taller tower) suggests that failure
to communicate is not a general feature of their utterances,
although of course there may well be specific failures of
communication. This consideration, and the observation that
specific failures of communication can occur in adult discourse,
suggest that the interesting question does not lie in failure
to communicate as such, but rather in whether failures of
communication in children*s discourse differ radically from
those in the discourse of adults. For example, failure to
communicate in adult discourse often appears to arise when
the presuppositions of the speaker are not met in the
listener: do failures in communication between children arise
in a similar, or radically different, fashion? (cfi Moore's
(1967) interesting remarks on "topic-delection"). If the
former, this would indicate that the child is aware of some
of the parameters governing discourse exchanges.
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Alternatively, we might ask how topicalization relates
to interpretation of the child's utterances. In recent
studies of language acquisition in children, it has been
realised that traditional tape-recordings of the child's
production output often do not contain sufficient information
to permit interpretation of the transcribed utterances. This
can be illustrated with an example reported by Brown &
Fraser (1963): how are we to interpret the utterance dinner
all gone, for it may have been produced:
»
(a) When the child has swallowed the last spoonful
(meaning, "I have finished ray lunch")
(b) As the child's plate drops from the high-chair
to the floor (meaning, "my lunch has disappeared')
(c) As the mother stacks the dishes in the sink
(meaning, "we are finished with the business of
having lunch")
Clearly, if we had precise information as to the topic of
the child's utterance, this sort of problem would be
partially resolved. (The importance of recording this sort
of contextual information has recently been discussed in
Capmbell & Wales (1970), and illustrated in a study by Bloom
(1970).)
Third, we might ask how far the notion of topicalization
will permit interpretation of negative sentences. One of
the problems that arises in processing sentences like: the
(191)
circle and the triangle are not red, appears to stem from
difficulty in deciding precisely what is being negated.(cf:
Wales & Grieve, 1969), This is brought out in even more
pointed fashion with a sentence like: John did not drive
from Edinburgh to London on Saturday, which has a large
number of possible interpretations - for example, consider
some possible adjuncts to the sentences(a) but on Sunday
(b) - he travelled by train
(c) ; he only went as far as Newcastle(d) - Tom did
Etc,
As soon as we are given information as to topic: (a) time of
travelling; (b) mode of transport; (c) destination; (d) driver
of vehicle; etc., the ambiguity is resolved.
From these remarks it is clear that Experiments 1 - H
create a demand for further inquiry, and our emphasis on the
potential importance of the notion of "topicalization"
appears justified in that it demands consideration of discourse
parameters (e.g. presupposition relations) relevant to inter¬
pretation of linguistic structures. However we will not
attempt to pursue these matters here.
Piaget refers to Sinclair's "comparatives" as "vectors" and
to Sinclair's "absolute terms" as "scalars" (Piaget & Inhelder,
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1969j 89).
24. For a fTiller account of this argument, see Campbell & Wales
(1969), where it is interesting to find that syntactic
derivations of comparative structures recently proposed by
linguists such as Chomsky (1965) are faulted hot only on
the clumsiness of the forraalisations involved, but also
because the surface syntax is derived from base strings
whose semantic implications are unwarranted.
25. Notice that this can only be achieved by centring on the
ehildren'3 linguistic production (elicited descriptions)
to the exclusion of their linguistic comprehension - see
following note.
26. If there is no difference between the linguistic abilities
of the groups as regards comprehension, then there appear
to be good grounds for arguing against the notion that
there are any really significant linguistic differences
between the groupsj this renders the initial part of
Piaget1s argument all the more difficult to understand.
27. Here we work specifically within a framework which relates
directly to the sort of question typically employed by
Piaget. I.e., we present "More-or-more" questions,
counterbalancing the order of presentation of terms (e.g.
"More A or more B" versus "More B or more A", etc.). In
addition, for all questions an unstressed form was
employed (neither the first nor second term being deliberately
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stressed), as was a "normal" intonation contour (i.e.
intonation pattern (iii), p. 40)- see Note 12 above.
28. An analogous result is reported by Kohnstamm (1963).
29. The purpose of this reversal of subclass ratios between
Cards (i) » (iii) and (iv) - (vi) was to reduce the
possibility of obtaining response-biased results. In a
comparison of the subclasses of flowers, the correct
response to: "Are there more tulips or more daffodils",
will be "More tulips" for Card (i), but "More daffodils"
for Card (iv). Failure to counterbalance the material
might easily lead to misinterpretation of results, for the
child might answer as a function of response biases in
favour of, say, ease of pronunciation (: it is probably
easier for the child to say "tulips" than "daffodils"), or
colour preference (sa preference for red rather than yellow),
or proximity (i when the cards are placed on the table, one
subclass is nearer the child than the other).
30. 8 of these 12 children were selected from a different
pre-school nursery than the one which provided subjects for
Experiment 7,
31. In both Experiments 7 and 8, there is no evidence of response-
biases on comparison of the counterbalanced sets of cards
(Cards (i) - (iii) and Cards (iv) - (vi), where subclass
ratios are reversed)| since this suggests that with this
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sort of experiment subjects do not operate under the
response-biases that our material was intended to detect,
this check is dispensed with in subsequent experiments.
32. It might be argued that the basis of the observed change
in results in the present experiment lies not so much in
referential clarification of subclass terms, but simply
insofaras the subjects tested have already been exposed to
this type of experiment (Experiments 7 and 8). However
the force of this argument is dimrainished, for as will
become clear, we do not observe an improvement in correct
responses ganeral to both minority and majority inclusion
questions - rather, we observe an inversion In the response
pattern, where (majority) questions previously answered
correctly are now answered incorrectly, and vice-versa for
minority questions (cf: Table 21, p. 101).
33. At first glance, perhaps our proposals seem just as
anomalous/inconsistant as Piaget's, for we are suggesting
that "B" is not restricted in subtraction questions ("B" a
A+A'), restricted to A in minority inclusion questions (nBn s
A), and restricted to A' in majority inclusion questions
("B" = A'). However if we can show that all of these
cases are subsumed under the same process - of short-term
switches in the reference of "B", differentially determined
by the context and type of question, then the apparent
inconsistencies will disappear.
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The disagreement between the present account and that of
Campbell & Wales is more apparent than real, for they have
generalised to the child's performance on inclusion
questions from study of the child's initial acquisition of
the terms such inclusion questions involvet clearly the
former occurs much later than the latter. We might
resolve our differences by suggesting that in initial
acquisition of the task vocabulary, long-term restrictions
do occur, while in later use of these terms (e.g. in class
inclusion problems) the task vocabulary, long since
acquired, is now subject to short-term restrictions. Of
course only further study can indicate whether this is soj
but at least these two accounts are not necessarily
contradictory.
In relation to this type of response, see the discussion of
"incompatability" in Wales & Campbell (1970).
Cfj Morf (1959: 35) who has observed this sort of solution:
< <II y a plus de gobelets on plus de gobelets verts? -
Plus de gobelets verts et jaune (tres satisfaite).
Alors on peut dire qu'il y a plus de gobelets? - Non,
il n'y a que trois jaunes. Mais les gobelets, c'est
les verts et les jaunes ensemble? - Qui. Qu'est-ce
qui est plus, les gobelets ou les verts? - Les verts
et jaunes.) >
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("Are there more cups or more green cups? - More green
and yellow cups (very satisfied). Then can one say
that there's more cups? - No, there's only three
yellow ones. But cups, that's green and yellow ones
together? - Yes, Which is more, the cups or the
green ones? - The green and yellow ones.")
Thus Morf argues that the child can correctly compare the
sum of A+A* with subclass A (i.e. the child can handle
A<A+A')j but when the question is posed in the form A(B, the
child fails to answer correctly (Morf, 1959: 37):
<<Meme si le sujet n'a pas decouvert lui-meme la somme
(A+A'), il 1'accepte imme'diatement et la compare
correctement a la sous-classe A; en revanche, il refuse
systematiquement de comparer A a B, comae nous l'avons
observe tout au long du nos experiences .> >
("Even is S hasn't discovered for himself the sum
(A+A*) he accepts it immediately and compares it
correctly with subclass A; on the other hand, he refuses
systematically to compare A with B as we have observed
all the way through.")
Thi3 would seem to confirm that we have been correct in
arguing that the standard inclusion question (A<B) is not
answered incorrectly because of an inability to compare class
and subclass, but rather because of difficulties with the
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language associated with class inclusion problems.
37. It might be suggested that adults, faced with the question:
"There's more A than what?", would give precisely the answer
that the child gives: "There's more A than A'". In relation
to the present discussion, the purpose of the question must
be considered relative to its context.
38. It might be argued that half the subjects amenable to
facilitation should have been assigned to the "implicit
correction procedure" and the remainder to a control group
which received no such correction \ then an experimental versus
control group comparison could have been made, lest improvement
in performance stems simply from repeated exposure to the
task. This design was considered for Experiment 16, but
two factors decided against it. First, availability of
subjects at the time of testing did not permit the n of
experimental/control groups to be increased to a reasonable
size. But the second factor was more compelling: namely,
the data of Experiment 15 appear to indicate quite clearly
that repeated exposure to inclusion problems will not by
itself lead to facilitation, for it appears from Experiment 15
that facilitation is an all-or-none phenomenon - the distrib¬
ution of responses across subjects showsthat 13 Ss gave four
or five correct responses out of five, and that 5 Ss gave one
or no correct responses. When we recall that these latter
5 Ss were not only repeatedly exposed to inclusion problems,
but were also implicitly corrected on each successive item,
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to no avail, the notion that repeated exposure to inclusion
problems can by itself lead to correct responses looes its
appeal. This point has been confirmed by Morf (1959),
A paper by Ahr & Youniss (1970), encountered six weeks after
completion of Experiment 16 above, suggests that the
possibility of experimenter effects can be discounted. Ahr S
Youniss argue that inclusion questions are reduced to sub-
class-subclass comparisons through the child's (6-8 years)
miscomprehension ofthe questionj in an attempt to prevent
such miscomprehension they instituted two training procedures:
(a) expanded question training, and (b): correction training.
Both training procedures may be described as "explicit" (in
contrast with the "implicit correction procedure" employed
in the present studies), for on production of an incorrect
response, S was explicitly told: "'You are wrong. Tell me
the right answer,* Correction was repeated until S gave the
correct answer. When necessary, E prompted S, but E never
said the class name} S had to generate it." (Ahr & Youniss,
1970: 139| no indication is given as to the nature of E*s
prompting.) With procedure (a), where expanded questions
were presented as in Experiment 13 above in an attempt to
prevent "referential confusion", or, in our terms, restriction
of the "B" term to the A* subclass, Ahr & Youniss presented
questions like: "Are there more pets (B) or more dogs (A) or
more cats (A*)?" While this procedure was found to facilitate
responses during training itself, there was no facilitation on a
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series of subsequent test items; however on these test
items, the inclusion questions presented reverted to
standard form. With procedure (b), where incorrect
responses to standard inclusion questions were corrected in
the manner just indicated, facilitation was maintained on
a subsequent series of test items presented in standard
form. Ahr & Youniss claim that these results indicate that
6-8 year old children can compare class and subclass if
given appropriate training. To this extent, their paper
therefore suggests that our own results are not simply the
result of experimenter effects. However it is interesting
to note that Ahr & Youniss make no mention of what the
child might be learning during training; nor do they mention
the possible relevance of language. Prom our present
studies, it would appear that what the child learns is the
way in which the experimenter is employing the terms in
inclusion questions - i.e. S is learning the way in which
E intends the co-ordination of inclusion question terms with
object-referents.
When considering perceptual set, it is important to remember
that the typical experimental procedure, where an array is
presented to the child, probably encourages perceptual set,
for inclusion questions are "analytic" - i.e. in order to
answer them, one need make no reference to any array! there
could not be "more dogs than animals" by virtue of the way
in which we (adults) use the language.
(200)
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